1.Paphitis, Sharli Anne. "Nietzsche’s
Sovereign Individual and the Ethics of Subjectivity." The Ethics of Subjectivity. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015. 71-102.
本文主張，納入脆弱性的概念，有助於我們理解尼采的主權個體。所謂主權個體，乃是肯定脆弱性，並擁抱脆弱性，而非逃避脆弱性之人。
2.Leiter, Brian. "Who is the'sovereign individual'? Nietzsche on freedom." Nietzsche on Freedom (September 10, 2009). CAMBRIDGE CRITICAL GUIDE TO NIETZSCHE'S ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY, Simon May, ed (2010).
站在非道德論者的立場上，尼采以主權個體的概念作為手段嘲諷理性個體與自由，主權個體的自主性，也許是長期間無意識鍛造而後的強制結果。責任或自由之類的概念，不是「主權個體」此概念的考慮，他們不構成構成主權個體之概念。
--------------------------
[1]1.Paphitis, Sharli Anne. "Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual and the Ethics of Subjectivity." The Ethics of Subjectivity. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015. 71-102.
|
Nietzsche is perhaps one of the most controversial figures in
Western philosophical history. This is in no small part owed to his attacks
on Christianity and conventional morality, as well as his skepticism about
human freedom. Nietzsche’s skeptical views of human freedom and the self
might initially make him seem an unlikely candidate for providing us with a
robust account of subjectivity, and his attacks on morality might similarly
make him a seemingly unlikely proponent of an account of human flourishing.
However, in this chapter I explore Nietzsche’s understanding of the ethics of
subjectivity, showing that Nietzsche
provides us with an attractive positive account of human agency, personhood,
and flourishing. Nietzsche asserts, in part through his
characterization of the Sovereign Individual, that some form of self-control
is required for the project of exercising agency. 1 This self-control view of
human agency is similarly central to recent analytic accounts proposed by
Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson and Alfred Mele. 2 While the self-control view
of agency is plausible, we should question whether, and in what ways,
exercising selfcontrol contributes to our understanding of ourselves as
persons and to our flourishing – as Nietzsche himself does.
|
尼采也許是西方哲學史上最具爭議性的人物之一。這在很大程度上歸功於他對基督教和傳統道德的攻擊，以及他對人類自由的懷疑論。尼采對人類自由和自我的懷疑觀點最初可能會使他成為一個不太可能為我們提供強有力的主體性說明的候選人，而他對道德的攻擊也可能同樣使他成為一個不太可能的人類繁榮說明的支持者。然而，在這一章中，我探討了尼采對主體性倫理的理解，表明尼采為我們提供了一個關於人類機構、人格和繁榮的有吸引力的正面說明。尼采主張，部分通過他對主權個人的描述，某種形式的自我控制是行使代理權的專案所需要的。1 這種關於人類代理權的自我控制觀點同樣也是最近由哈裡-法蘭克福、加里-沃森和阿爾弗雷德-梅爾提出的分析性描述的核心。2 雖然自我控制的代理觀點是合理的，但我們應該質疑，行使自我控制是否以及以何種方式有助於我們對自己作為人的理解和我們的繁榮--正如尼采本人所做的那樣。
|
|
In her paper Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism, Martha Nussbaum
argues that Nietzsche’s philosophical project can be seen as an attempt to
“bring about a revival of Stoic values of self-command and self-formation.” 3
She argues that, to his detriment, Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual epitomizes
a kind of Stoic ideal of inner strength and self-sufficiency which goes
“beyond Stoicism” in its valorization of radical self-emancipation from the
contingencies of life and from our own human vulnerability. Nussbaum thus
urges us to question whether the picture of strength through self-control in
Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual is really a picture of human strength at
which we would be willing, or at which we ought, to aim.
|
在她的論文《憐憫與慈悲。Martha Nussbaum認為，尼采的哲學項目可以被看作是試圖
"使斯多葛式的自我命令和自我改造的價值觀得到復興"。3 她認為，尼采的 "主權個人 "是一種斯多葛式的內在力量和自給自足的理想的縮影，這對他來說是不利的，因為它強調從生活的偶然性和我們自身的脆弱性中獲得徹底的自我解放。努斯鮑姆因此敦促我們質疑尼采的《主權個人》中通過自我控制獲得力量的圖景是否真的是我們願意或應該追求的人類力量圖景。
|
|
In this chapter I take up Nussbaum’s challenge within the
framework of my own thoughts on the role of both agency and
vulnerability in our conception of personhood. While I agree with
Nussbaum that the self-emancipation characterization of the Sovereign
Individual provides us with, in many important ways, an ultimately
unattractive ideal of human strength at which to aim, such a characterization
of Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual remains problematic. It is my contention
here that the Sovereign
Individual, like the Stoic, is to be characterized in terms of his deep
recognition of the necessity of his own vulnerability, but that, importantly,
it is the Sovereign Individual’s reaction to this recognition that distinguishes
the ideal of strength which we find in him from the problematic Stoic ideal.
While the Stoics overemphasize the ideal subject’s capacity for control,
suggesting that he will do so in an attempt to transcend his necessary human
vulnerability through an escaping and rejecting of it, Nietzsche’s Sovereign
Individual is antithetical to the Stoic in precisely this respect: the
Sovereign Individual lives through and with his vulnerability by actively
affirming it. The Sovereign Individual is thus more properly to be
understood as embodying and affirming precisely the very fragility and
vulnerability which the Stoic person seeks to transcend through rejection and
denial. 4 Given Nussbaum and Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Stoic position, I
argue that Nietzsche and Nussbaum may have more in common than Nussbaum
suggests. Finally, in this chapter I aim to show that by proposing the
Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence as the ultimate test for the highest
affirmation of life which the Sovereign Individual must pass, Nietzsche also
provides part of what he takes to be the solution to the threat of both the
impending nihilism and the inhibiting current morality of his age.
|
在這一章中，我將在我自己對代理權和脆弱性在我們的人格概念中的作用的思考框架內接受努斯鮑姆的挑戰。雖然我同意努斯鮑姆的觀點，即主權個人的自我解放特徵在許多重要方面為我們提供了一個最終沒有吸引力的人類力量的目標，但尼采的主權個人的這種特徵仍然存在問題。我在這裡的論點是，像斯多葛派一樣，"主權個人 "的特點在於他對自身脆弱性的必要性的深刻認識，但重要的是，正是 "主權個人 "對這種認識的反應，使我們在他身上發現的力量理想與有問題的斯多葛派理想相區別。斯多葛派過分強調理想主體的控制能力，認為他這樣做是為了通過逃避和拒絕人類必要的脆弱性來超越它，而尼采的 "主權個體 "恰恰在這方面與斯多葛派相反："主權個體 "通過並與他的脆弱性一起生活，積極肯定它。因此，"主權個人 "更應該被理解為體現和肯定了斯多葛主義者試圖通過拒絕和否定來超越的脆弱和弱勢。4 鑒於努斯鮑姆和尼采對斯多葛立場的批評，我認為尼采和努斯鮑姆的共同點可能比努斯鮑姆所建議的更多。最後，在這一章中，我旨在表明，通過提出 "永恆複現 "學說作為主權個體必須通過的對生命的最高肯定的終極測試，尼采也提供了他認為是解決即將到來的虛無主義和他那個時代的抑制性的現行道德的威脅的部分方法。
|
Concluding remarks
|
In his seminal paper “Freedom
of the Will and the Concept of a
Person,” Harry Frankfurt outlines what he takes to be most distinctive of
our personhood. Personhood, for Frankfurt, is a term which has been
misappropriated by P.F Strawson precisely because of the lack of agency talk
in his discussions of personhood. Against the Strawsonian view in which the
person is defined exclusively as something which has a mind and a body,
Frankfurt outlines what he takes to be most distinctive of our personhood,
those characteristics and abilities which he claims are “essential to persons,”
or which are “uniquely human,” as primarily defined by our agency. Recall
that on Frankfurt’s account, and similarly on other formal analytic accounts
which follow Frankfurt’s general framework, it is our ability to govern and control our own actions and behavior
that is the distinguishing mark of our humanity, since it is this ability
that is taken to make us the authors of ourselves and our lives. And agency is taken to be what constitutes our
personhood because agency gives us the kind of control over ourselves that is
thought to distinguish us from the rest of the animal kingdom.
|
哈裡-法蘭克福在其開創性的論文《意志自由和人的概念》中，概述了他認為我們的人格的最顯著特徵是什麼。對法蘭克福來說，人格是一個被P.F Strawson盜用的術語，這正是因為他在討論人格時缺乏對代理權的談論。在斯特勞森的觀點中，人被完全定義為有思想和身體的東西，與此相反，法蘭克福概述了他認為我們的人格的最獨特之處，他聲稱這些特徵和能力是 "人的本質"，或者說是 "獨特的人"，主要由我們的機構來定義。回顧一下，在法蘭克福的論述中，以及在遵循法蘭克福總體框架的其他形式分析論述中，我們支配和控制自己的行動和行為的能力才是我們人性的顯著標誌，因為正是這種能力使我們成為自己和自己生活的作者。代理權被認為是構成我們人格的東西，因為代理權給了我們對自己的那種控制，而這種控制被認為是將我們與其他動物王國區分開來。
|
|
In this chapter, I have argued against the Frankfurtian picture of
the role of agency in personhood, although I do, nevertheless, think that
agency is an important constitutive element of our personhood. There is, of
course, something quite remarkable (and arguably unique) about our capacity
to exercise this kind of control over ourselves. And here, I do think that
Frankfurt points out precisely what is, in part, wrong with the Strawsonian
view of personhood. However, I have also argued that to characterize agency
as of primary importance in our understanding of personhood is not only to
misunderstand the nature of our personhood, it is also a dangerous
misunderstanding which impoverishes our idea of both personhood and human
flourishing, or living the “good life” (in broadly speaking ethical terms).
My life, I think, would not be recognizably human and it would be radically
impoverished, if not wholly undesirable, if I did not care very deeply about
the things over which I have no control – specifically, we
could mention concerns such as how my projects actually fare in the external
world and my interpersonal relationships with other people. Nussbaum
is right, I have argued, to point out that our human vulnerability and our reaction to
this vulnerability are necessary for understanding what personhood entails.
Where I have disagreed with Nussbaum is in her reading of Nietzsche.
Nietzsche, I have argued, similarly to Nussbaum, disagrees with Frankfurt
about the role of agency and vulnerability in personhood. And this is
precisely where Nietzsche’s account of personhood, like Nussbaum’s, gains its
strength. 88
88. Taking the notion of vulnerability as a fundamental idea in
Nietzsche’s ethics may, at first blush, seem somewhat controversial, and it
has certainly not been a widely discussed aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy in
general. As I have argued in this chapter, I take the notion of vulnerability
to be something addressed by Nietzsche in subtle, yet nuanced ways. I think
that this aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy thus requires further
investigation.
|
在這一章中，我反對法蘭克福式的關於代理權在人格中的作用的描述，儘管我確實認為代理權是我們人格的一個重要構成要素。當然，我們對自己進行這種控制的能力是相當了不起的（可以說是獨一無二的）。在這裡，我確實認為法蘭克福恰恰指出了斯特勞森式的人格觀點的部分問題。然而，我還認為，把代理權作為我們對人格的理解的首要因素，不僅是對我們人格的本質的誤解，也是一個危險的誤解，它使我們對人格和人類繁榮的想法變得貧乏，或過上 "美好生活"（廣義上的倫理術語）。我認為，如果我不深切關心我無法控制的事情，我的生活就不是可識別的人類，即使不是完全不可取，也會從根本上變得貧乏--具體而言，我們可以提及的關切包括我的項目在外部世界的實際表現以及我與其他人的人際關係。我認為，努斯鮑姆指出我們人類的脆弱性和我們對這種脆弱性的反應對於理解人格的內涵是必要的，這是正確的。我與努斯鮑姆不同的地方在於她對尼采的解讀。我認為，尼采和努斯鮑姆一樣，不同意法蘭克福關於機構和脆弱性在人格中的作用的看法。而這恰恰是尼采對人格的描述，就像努斯鮑姆的一樣，獲得了它的力量。88
88. 将脆弱性的概念作为尼采伦理学的一个基本思想，乍一看似乎有些争议，而且这肯定不是尼采哲学的一个普遍讨论的方面。正如我在本章中所论述的，我认为脆弱性的概念是尼采以微妙而又细微的方式处理的。因此，我认为尼采哲学的这个方面需要进一步研究。
|
Leiter, Brian. "Who is the'sovereign
individual'? Nietzsche on freedom." Nietzsche on Freedom (September 10,
2009). CAMBRIDGE CRITICAL GUIDE TO NIETZSCHE'S ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY,
Simon May, ed (2010).
1.
站在非道德論者的立場上，尼采以主權個體的概念作為手段嘲諷理性個體與自由，主權個體的自主性，也許是長期間無意識鍛造而後的強制結果。責任或自由之類的概念，不是「主權個體」此概念的考慮，他們不構成構成主權個體之概念。
|
導言
Most readers of Nietzsche’s On the
Genealogy of Morality over the last century would, one suspects, be
astonished to discover the prominence recent scholarship has given to the
enigmatic figure of the “sovereign individual,” who appears just once, in
section 2 of the second essay (GM, II, 2), and never appears again, in the
Genealogy or indeed anywhere else in the corpus.1 Yet according to Keith
Ansell-Pearson, for example,
|
導言
在過去的一個世紀裡，尼采《道德譜系》的大多數讀者都會驚訝地發現，最近的學術研究對 "主權個人 "這個神秘的人物給予了突出的評價，他只在第二篇文章的第二節（GM，II，2）中出現過一次，而且在《道德譜系》中或者實際上在文獻的其他地方都沒有再出現。
|
|
The overriding aim of the Genealogy of
Morals is to show that what Kant and the modern liberal tradition of moral
and political thought simply take for granted, the sovereign individual in
possession of a free will and conscience, is in reality the product of a
specific historical labour of culture or civilization. (Ansell-Pearson 1991:
277)
|
道德譜系》的首要目標是表明，康德和現代自由主義道德和政治思想傳統簡單地認為是理所當然的，擁有自由意志和良知的主權個人，實際上是文化或文明的特定歷史勞動的產物。(Ansell-Pearson 1991: 277)
|
|
If this were really the “overriding aim”
of the Genealogy, one would have expected Nietzsche to be a bit clearer about
it and to have more to say about this “sovereign individual.”
Ansell-Pearson’s claim is, to be sure, rather extreme, but his is,
nonetheless, on a recognizable continuum with more sober assessments. John
Richardson, for example, describes GM, II, 2, as “a dramatic statement of
[Nietzsche’s] positive view” of freedom (Richardson 2009: 128). For Peter
Poellner, the sovereign individual gives expression to “the constitutive
conditions of full-fledged, autonomous rather than heteronomous selfhood”
(Poellner 2009: 152). Ken Gemes thinks the “sovereign individual” illuminates
“genuine agency” (2009: 37), the question, “what is it to be a self capable
of acting” (39), indeed, “what exactly it is to be a genuine self” (40).
|
如果這真的是《家譜》的 "首要目標"，我們就會期待尼采對此有更清晰的認識，對這個 "主權個體 "有更多的論述。Ansell-Pearson的主張無疑是相當極端的，但他的主張與更清醒的評估是可識別的連續體。例如，John Richardson將GM, II, 2描述為 "對[尼采]自由的積極觀點的戲劇性陳述"（Richardson 2009: 128）。對Peter Poellner來說，主權個人表達了 "成熟的、自主的而非異質的自我身份的構成條件"（Poellner 2009: 152）。Ken Gemes認為 "主權個體 "照亮了 "真正的機構"（2009：37），即 "什麼是能夠採取行動的自我"（39），實際上，"到底什麼是真正的自我"（40）。
|
|
So who is this “sovereign individual” of
GM, II, 2, and what does he have to do with Nietzsche’s conceptions of free
will, freedom, or the self? I shall argue for what would have been, at one
time, a fairly unsurprising view, namely, that (1) Nietzsche
denies that people ever act freely and that they are ever morally responsible
for anything they do; (2) the figure of the “sovereign individual” in no way
supports a denial of the first point; and (3) Nietzsche engages in what
Charles Stevenson (1938) would have called a “persuasive definition” of the
language of “freedom” and “free will,” radically revising the content of
those concepts, but in a way that aims to capitalize on their positive
emotive valence and authority for his readers.2
|
那麼，GM, II, 2中的這個 "主權個人 "是誰，他與尼采的自由意志、自由或自我的概念有什麼關係？我將論證在某一時期相當不令人驚訝的觀點，即：（1）尼采否認人們曾經自由行動，否認他們對自己所做的一切負有道德責任；（2）"主權個體 "的形象絕不支持對第一點的否認。(3) 尼采對 "自由 "和 "自由意志 "的語言進行了查理斯-史蒂文生（1938）所說的 "有說服力的定義"，從根本上修改了這些概念的內容，但其方式是為了利用這些概念對讀者的積極情感價值和權威。 2
|
|
More precisely, I aim to show that the
image of the “sovereign individual” is consistent with the reading of
Nietzsche as a kind of fatalist, which I have
defended for many years (Leiter 1998; 2002: 81–87; 2007). On the fatalist
interpretation, Nietzsche thinks that persons have certain essential
psychological and physiological traits over which they have no autonomous
control and which, together perhaps with environmental influences like
values, causally determine their life trajectories. In particular,
Nietzsche thinks that the feeling of free will is, at bottom, an
epiphenomenon of a process in which conscious thoughts that are consistent
with and temporally proximate to succeeding actions are misinterpreted as
causal, when, in fact, both the thoughts and the actions themselves are
causally determined by non-conscious, perhaps neurophysical aspects of the
person (see Leiter 2007). The upshot is that our actions are
neither causa sui, nor caused by any conscious state with which we might
identify, and so our actions cannot bear ascriptions of responsibility, that
is ascriptions of justified praise and blame. To the extent, then, that
Nietzsche continues to use the language of “freedom” and “free will” – and he
does so in a variety of passages that we will consider – he must use those
concepts in revisionary senses unrecognizable to either of the two major
traditions of thinking about free will in the modern era: on the one hand,
the broadly Kantian identification of freedom with autonomous action, meaning
action arising from rational selflegislation (or guidance), which grounds
moral responsibility; and, on the other, the broadly Humean equation of
freedom with acting on the basis of effective, conscious desires with which
we “identify” (in some sense to be specified). Neither traditional concept of
freedom or free will is available to or embraced by Nietzsche the fatalist.3
|
更確切地說，我旨在表明 "主權個人 "的形象與我多年來一直捍衛的對尼采作為一種宿命論者的解讀是一致的（Leiter 1998; 2002: 81-87; 2007）。在宿命論的解釋中，尼采認為人有某些基本的心理和生理特徵，他們無法自主控制這些特徵，而這些特徵或許與價值觀等環境影響因素一起，因果地決定了他們的生活軌跡。特別是，尼采認為，自由意志的感覺從根本上說是一個過程的表像，在這個過程中，與後續行動相一致且在時間上相近的有意識的想法被誤解為因果關係，而事實上，這些想法和行動本身都是由人的非有意識的、也許是神經物理方面的因素決定的（見Leiter 2007）。結果是，我們的行為既不是因果關係，也不是由我們可能認同的任何意識狀態造成的，因此我們的行為不能承擔責任的銘文，也就是合理的讚美和責備的銘文。那麼，只要尼采繼續使用 "自由 "和 "自由意志 "的語言--他在我們將要考慮的各種段落中都是這樣做的--他就必須在現代關於自由意志的兩個主要思維傳統中的任何一個都無法識別的修正意義上使用這些概念。一方面，康得對自由與自主行動的廣泛認同，意味著由理性的自我立法（或指導）產生的行動，它是道德責任的基礎；另一方面，休謨對自由與基於有效的、有意識的欲望的行動的廣泛等同，我們 "認同 "這些欲望（在某種意義上有待明確）。這兩種傳統的自由或自由意志的概念都不為宿命論者尼采所利用或接受。
|
|
To show that the image of the “sovereign
individual” squares with Nietzsche’s fatalism, I distinguish, in what
follows, between two possible “deflationary readings” of the passage. On one such reading, the figure of the “sovereign
individual” is wholly ironic, a mocking of the petit bourgeois who thinks his
petty commercial undertakings – his ability to make promises and remember his
debts – are the highest fruit of creation. On another deflationary
reading, the “sovereign individual” does indeed represent an ideal of the
self, one marked by a kind of self-mastery foreign to less coherent selves
(whose momentary impulses pull them this way and that), but such a self
and its self-mastery is, in Nietzschean terms, a fortuitous natural artifact
(a bit of “fate”), not an autonomous achievement for which anyone could be
responsible.4 To associate this ideal of the self with the
language of “freedom” and “free will” is an exercise in “persuasive definition”
by Nietzsche, a rhetorical skill at which he was often the master. I am
inclined to think the second reading is probably the correct one, though the
somewhat ridiculously hyperbolic presentation of the “sovereign individual”
makes the first reading attractive. But either reading allows us to
understand how and why Nietzsche, the fatalist and arch-skeptic about free will, would have created the
figure of the “sovereign individual.”
|
為了證明 "主權個人 "的形象與尼采的宿命論相吻合，我在下文中對這段話進行了兩種可能的 "通貨緊縮 "解讀。在一種解讀中，"主權個人 "的形象完全是一種諷刺，是對小資產階級的嘲諷，他認為自己的小商業活動--他的承諾和記帳能力--是創造的最高成果。在另一種通貨緊縮的解讀中，"有主權的個人 "確實代表了一種自我的理想，一種與不太連貫的自我（其瞬間的衝動將他們拉向這個方向或那個方向）相異的自我管理，但這樣的自我及其自我管理，用尼采的話說，是一種偶然的自然產物（一種 "命運"），而不是一種任何人都能負責的自主成就。將這種自我理想與 "自由 "和 "自由意志 "的語言聯繫起來，是尼采對 "有說服力的定義 "的一種練習，他常常是這種修辭技巧的高手。我傾向于認為第二種解讀可能是正確的，儘管對 "主權個人 "的有點可笑的誇張表述使第一種解讀具有吸引力。但無論哪種解讀，都能讓我們理解尼采這個宿命論者和對自由意志持懷疑態度的人，是如何以及為什麼會創造出 "主權個體 "這個人物。
|
|
1 I have generally started with the
translations of Nietzsche’s works by Clark and Swensen, Hollingdale, and/or
Kaufmann, and then made changes based on the Colli and Montinari edition of
the Sämtliche Werke (1980–88), though in some cases the translations are
entirely mine.
|
1 我一般從克拉克和斯文森、霍林代爾和/或考夫曼對尼采作品的翻譯開始，然後根據Colli和Montinari版的《Sämtliche Werke》（1980-88）進行修改，不過在某些情況下，譯文完全是我的。
|
|
2 “A ‘persuasive’ definition is one which
gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar word without substantially
changing its emotive meaning, and which is used with the conscious or
unconscious purpose of changing, by this means, the direction of people’s
interests” (Stevenson 1938: 331).
|
2 "一個'有說服力的'定義是指在不大幅改變其情感意義的情況下為一個熟悉的詞賦予新的概念意義，並且在使用時有意識或無意識地想通過這種方式改變人們的利益方向"（Stevenson 1938:
331）。
|
|
3 Rutherford (2009) makes a prima facie
plausible case that Nietzsche’s view is closer to Spinoza’s conception of
freedom, but as Rutherford notes, Spinoza’s is a“neglected”conception in the
history of philosophy, and so has little or no resonance with those ideas of
freedom that are culturally important. (Rutherford also discusses the Stoic
view of freedom as a possible antecedent, but given Nietzsche’s explicit
hostility to the Stoics and his many substantive differences with them – over
the role of “assent” in the causation of action, the possibility of correct
judgments about “the good,” and compatibilism [all noted by Rutherford] –
this pedigree for Nietzsche’s view seems less likely.)
|
3 Rutherford (2009)提出了一個表面上看似合理的理由，即尼采的觀點更接近於斯賓諾莎的自由概念，但正如Rutherford所指出的，斯賓諾莎的概念在哲學史上是一個 "被忽視的 "概念，因此與那些具有文化重要性的自由觀念幾乎沒有共鳴。盧瑟福也討論了斯多葛的自由觀作為一個可能的前因，但鑒於尼采對斯多葛的明確敵意以及他與他們的許多實質性分歧--關於 "同意 "在行動的因果關係中的作用，關於
"善 "的正確判斷的可能性，以及compatibilism（盧瑟福都提到了）--尼采的觀點的這種淵源似乎不太可能）。
|
|
4 The Spinozian view that Rutherford ends
up ascribing to Nietzsche – according to which “[t]he person who becomes free
is the person whom fate favors with the ability to regiment in herself a
principle of acting that is expressive of her inherent power” (Rutherford
2009: 35) – comes to the same thing, though Rutherford does not remark upon
the radically revisionary notion of freedom involved.
|
4 盧瑟福最後將斯賓諾莎的觀點歸於尼采--根據這一觀點，"成為自由人的人是被命運眷顧的人，他有能力在自己身上規定一個表現她內在力量的行動原則"（Rutherford 2009:
35）--得出了同樣的結論，儘管盧瑟福並沒有對所涉及的自由概念進行根本的修正。
|
|
Conclusion
If Nietzsche really says so little that suggests he holds out the hope of a
freedom or free will that would be recognizable to the philosophical
tradition, or common sense, as such; if his skepticism about freedom and
responsibility is so resolute; if what he actually says about freedom and
free will is so clearly revisionary, so plainly an exercise in persuasive
definition that means to exploit his readers’ antecedent emotional investment
in “freedom” on behalf of very different Nietzschean ideals, even quite
illiberal ones – then how are we to explain the recent scholarly “consensus”
(if that is what it is) with which we began? It is, I fear, a manifestation
of the fault against which Nietzsche often railed, and which we have seen so
many times before in the Nietzsche literature, in Heidegger’s transformation
of Nietzsche into the last metaphysical philosopher, in Kaufmann’s rendering
of him as a harmless secular humanist, in Nehamas’s defanging of him as an
aestheticist (cf. Leiter 1992). In each case, the aim is to make Nietzsche
less appalling to we delicate modern readers than he really is: for Nietzsche does not believe in freedom or
responsibility; he does not think we exercise any meaningful control over our
lives; he does not think that his revisionary sense of “freedom” – the “long,
protracted will” as he puts it in the passage from GM, II, 2, with
which we began – is in reach of just anyone, that anyone could “choose” to
have it; indeed, in the important passage from Twilight with which we
concluded, “freedom” is rather clearly invoked on behalf of Nietzsche’s
illiberal vision of the inescapable reality of human inequality. The
resistance to these points in the recent scholarly literature, I conclude,
reflects the continuing malign influence of moralizing readings of Nietzsche,
of the failure to remember what he says about his conception of Renaissance
virtue, namely, that we understand it, and him, “moralinefree” (A, 2).16
|
結論
如果尼采真的沒有說什麼，表明他對哲學傳統或常識所認可的自由或自由意志抱有希望；如果他對自由和責任的懷疑態度是如此堅決。如果他對自由和自由意志的實際論述是如此明顯的修正，如此明顯的說服性定義的練習，意在利用他的讀者對 "自由 "先前的情感投資，代表非常不同的尼采理想，甚至相當不自由的理想--那麼我們如何解釋最近的學術
"共識"（如果那是什麼的話），我們開始時就是這樣？我擔心這是尼采經常抨擊的錯誤的表現，我們在尼采文獻中已經多次看到這種錯誤，在海德格爾將尼采轉變為最後的形而上學哲學家，在考夫曼將他渲染為無害的世俗人文主義者，在尼哈馬斯將他詆毀為美學家（參見Leiter 1992）。在每一種情況下，其目的都是為了使尼采在我們這些脆弱的現代讀者眼中不至於像他那樣令人震驚。因為尼采不相信自由或責任；他不認為我們對自己的生活有任何有意義的控制；他不認為他的修正意義上的 "自由"--"漫長的、持久的意志"，正如他在我們開始提到的《轉基因》第二章第2節中所說的那樣--是任何人都可以得到的，任何人都可以 "選擇 "擁有它。事實上，在我們最後提到的《暮光之城》的重要段落中，"自由 "被相當明確地引用，代表尼采對人類不平等這一不可避免的現實的不自由的看法。我的結論是，最近的學術文獻中對這些觀點的抵制，反映了對尼采的道德化解讀的持續惡性影響，反映了沒有記住他對文藝復興時期美德概念的說法，即我們對它和他的理解是 "無道德的"（A，2）。
|
|
16 An earlier draft benefited from the
discussion of it at a plenary session of the annual meeting of the Friedrich
Nietzsche Society at St. Peter’s College, Oxford, in September 2009. I am
especially grateful to Peter Kail for pressing on me the need to think about
Spinoza, which led me in turn to the illuminating paper by Rutherford (2009),
|
16 早期的草案得益於2009年9月在牛津大學聖彼得學院舉行的弗裡德里希-尼采學會年會的全體會議上對它的討論。我特別感謝彼得-凱爾向我強調了思考斯賓諾莎的必要性，這反過來又讓我看到了盧瑟福（2009）的富有啟發性的論文。
|
