2023年11月28日星期二

[摘要] 關於希臘悲劇的兩個公開演講之一 (待續)

 

1.      無意識的、從民眾生活中生成起來的藝術。(對立於學究戲劇)

2.      在德國,戲劇的自然根源即狂歡節戲劇。

3.      在傳統與自然聽覺的持續矛盾中,人們到了根本不再為耳朵,而是為眼睛作曲的地步。我們在音樂領域裡早就超越了一種閱讀音樂的博學多少的皮影戲(Schattenspiel),而在詩歌領域裡,書面創作的非自然性是如此獨佔上風。

4.      反對被撕裂的藝術(眼歸眼、耳歸耳),而是要設想一種總體藝術。(5)

5.      如果詩歌構成戲劇最內在的基本元素,那麼,與詩歌(在這種對它來說全新的形式中)相對立的就是雕塑了。

6.      尼采對雅典節日的描述很細,值得一讀,見頁6-7

7.      「雅典人觀看偉大的酒神頌歌的悲劇,他們的心靈本身尚具有使悲劇以誕生的那個要素的一些東西。那就是極強烈地噴發出來的春天的欲望,一種混合感覺的呼號和奔騰,有如一切質樸民族和整個大自然在春天臨近時所識得的一般。在這裡,一切都是深刻的本能。(7)

8.      古典戲劇是從龐大的狄奧尼索狂熱歌隊(或中世界的聖約翰舞者和聖維托舞者身上)中興盛起來的。

9.      戲劇的開始並不是由於有人把自己偽裝起來了,意在欺騙他人:不是的,毋寧說,戲劇之開始是由於人迷亂的,人相信自己發生了轉變,被施了魔法。在「迷亂」、狂喜(Ecstase)狀態中,只還需要一個步驟:我們沒有重回自身,而是進入另一個人之中,以至於我們自己做出著魔者的舉動。所以說到底,在觀看戲劇時會引發深度的驚奇:大地動搖起來,個人的無解與僵化也動搖了。而且,正如狄奧尼索斯的狂熱者相信屺的轉變,同樣地,戲劇詩人也相信他的人物的真實性。

10.  尼采引用了在世建築師的話,他為穹頂畫和被裝飾的穹頂給出了一個鑒定,他說:「對藝術作品來說,有比出神狀態更有益的了,這種出神狀態乃出離於與切近之物的粗俗而直接的接觸,出離於人類的慣常視線。」我們肯定可以為戲劇欣賞要求某種類似的東西:以某種非同尋常的態度和感覺去觀看,這對繪畫和戲劇是有好處的──儘管這還不是要建議人們採取站著看戲的羅馬習俗。(9)

11.  古代希臘,唯最艱難的事,才是自由人的使命──這樣一個驕傲的法則貫穿於整個希臘藝術。

12.  悲劇原本無非是一個宏大的合唱,而實際上,這種歷史認識卻為我們提供了解決那個奇怪問題的鑰匙。古典悲劇的主要作用和整體作用,在最好的時代裡始終還依據於合唱歌隊:合唱歌隊是人們首先必須考慮而不能棄之一旁的要素。(11)…主角作為扮演者,通過合唱歌隊就像一個傳聲筒,以一種巨大的放大方式向觀眾大聲喊出自己的感受。(12)

13.  正是合唱歌隊規定了在悲劇中表明自己的詩人幻想的界限:宗教合唱舞蹈以其莊嚴的行板,限制了詩人們通常如此放縱的創造精神。(12)

14.  在古典音樂劇中,根本不存在人們不得不算計的東西:即便神話中個別英雄的狡詐,本身也具有某種質樸老實的因素。劇戲的本質從來都沒有轉變成為奕棋的本質。古代悲劇在情節和懸念是貧乏的:我們甚至可以說,在其早先的發展階段,古代悲劇根本沒有著眼於情節,而倒是關注受苦和激情(動名詞HandelnLeiden)(13)

15.   在起源上,悲劇無異於一首客觀的抒情詩,一首從特定神話人物的狀態而來(而且穿著這些神話人物的服裝)唱出來的歌曲。(14)

16.  我們不知道或者只是約略知道,苦難,一般而言就是苦難爆發時的情感生活,是怎樣被帶到感人至深的印象上的。(15)

17.  面對一部希臘悲劇,我們感到無權評說,因為它的主要影響多半依據於一個對我們來說已經失落的要素,也即依據音樂。音樂應當支持詩歌。音樂完全只被用作達到目的的手段:音樂的任務在於神和英雄的痛苦和苦難轉換為觀眾最強烈的同情。(詞語是迂迴的,音樂則是直指人心的)(15)

2023年11月27日星期一

[雜記] 越級打怪... 還是鬼打牆的韋伯方法論...

 越級打怪...


早上讀了一些文章,意外讀到了Andrew Abbott對規範性社會學的討論,韋伯被簡單鞭打了一下,而在同一期,看見了Hammersley的平反,主張韋伯的應然與實然之分野仍然適用,雖然需要一些小幅度修正。H提到了Bruun, H. (2007). Science, values and politics in Max Weber’s methodology (2nd ed.). Aldershot: Ashgate.這本書,我找來快速翻了一下,噢...天呀,看起來不是能快速翻過去的書。Bruun的書是改寫自1972擴充的再版,翻著翻著,嗯...我想趕快到最後一頁。

我的讀書陷入了某種不耐煩的狀態。

「社會學應該要是門規範性的學科,因為自其起始,就是回應雙元革命帶來的社會危機所創立的世俗性回應方式」

「為什麼我們要認為科學家所謂基於事實的價值判斷,一定優先於我們一般的常識見解?如果科學家本身的價值判斷本身就不是中立的呢?又或者,科學家只認為他們的知識比起常民知識重要,為什麼常民一定要服從科學家的判斷?」

「面對健康問題,大多數理性的人,都會服從科學家的判斷,除非你想要得上流行病,那就自由地去,但是你的自由會造成大家的危害,所以基於科學,我還是不能讓你自由的去。你唯一的選擇是,感覺到你自己是自由的,或者感覺到你自己是不自由的--端看你的選擇」。(David Graeber如是肯定科學在某方面指引方向的作向)

「作為大學老師,應該要力克自身的價值立場,提供各方面的事實供參考,而不是代為下判斷,也不要自以為可以在人格的形成上起什麼指導作用--因為老師與學生的權力並不對等,課堂講壇不是可辯論的廣場,儘管我們之中許多人假裝那個地方是一個可以自由討論的空間,但那只是大家一起配合的假裝」

社會學的危機,有種種回應方式,譬如主張社會學應該要從事政策研究,協助政策研究,有的主張,更加客觀中立地呈現「事實」--儘管這個事實的呈現,本身就已經是種選擇,所以重點在於提供更多種的選擇,而不是越位地替別人選擇。

但所謂的社會學的危機,又是誰的危機呢?

對於韋伯來說,會不會是大學講師的人格危機,每個人都想要當教主,所以仰賴著學生的順服與依賴,然後主張某某某的說法不對,誰誰誰的想法壓迫到我了,然後再加以包裝上學術上的語言、流派,進行相互的審查,區辨。人格就此被刻寫過去,然後,也不知道自己該堅持什麼了。

其實我讀書讀的好困惑呀,這個困惑一直沒有辦法過去,但就用永恆迴歸來衡量自己的行動吧,我是不是會作這件事作一百次,嗯,可能還是會持續困惑下去,但繼續讀書讀下去,雖然希望撥給運動的時間能夠再多一些,但總之,是喜歡讀書的一個狀態。

所以,作為一個學者,要成為一個超學者,也就是讓各種觀點能呈現的多視角的學者,克服了單視角的人的階段,不確定有沒有盡頭,但就是努力讓自己認識更多,知道更多(如芙莉蓮對魔法的學習-興趣---也許有一天有人會因為這些無用的魔法而開心,或者因為這些不起眼的魔法,而覺得旅行不再無聊)。作為一個政治人,則是在匯聚諸事實後與釐清諸價值後,勇敢地承擔自己的判斷,韋伯也曾經如此勇敢過?

寫一寫,好一點,但韋伯的方法論,其實根本就不是方法論吧?而是以方法之名,重估一切價值的嘗試吧,最有趣的點,在於,這個重估一切價值,是連「重估一切價值」這件事都保持著重估的立場--一旦你明確了自身的價值立場,那就帶著你的決心與意志,為價值而奮戰吧--不論是你為救人而救人的醫生,或者為追求知識而追求知識而知識的學術人,ideal始終在你的行動當中引導著你。

那麼,什麼時候,會覺得,我們應該要用知識指引行動,為行動下判斷呢?(也就是不再覺得知識本身是為知識之故)尋求社會支持,以及選邊站的時刻,但那時候已經不再是純然的認識者(提供自己對於相對全盤認識的提供者),而已經走向行動了--說清楚講明白你的價值就好,不要用知識份子假裝自身的全知全能。

[摘要] Brobjer, T. H. (2023). The Close Relationship Between Nietzsche's Two Most Important Books. Springer Nature.

 Brobjer, T. H. (2023). The Close Relationship Between Nietzsche's Two Most Important Books. Springer Nature.

尼采的哲學不應該僅僅被視為他在已出版的書中呈現的觀點的靜態表達,而應該被視為正在發展且未完成的工作,涉及問題,如價值觀是什麼,我們如何評價它們,以及潛在地改變或重新評價它們。這種觀點和方法既更接近尼采的意圖,也比傳統的靜態觀點更有趣、更具建設性和更具成果。(頁322-323)

2023年11月24日星期五

[摘要] 葉浩 2023 鄂蘭的政治本體論: 一個從時間維度來詮釋共和主義的嘗試 收錄於《政治與社會評論》78期,頁1-64

  極權政府也是整個國家全民上下共同促成的行動結果。只不過, 這行動的完成本身並不是一種必然, 而是各種偶然的集合。柏拉圖並未設想創造一個未來的納粹德國, 馬克思也並非一開始即意圖解放俄羅斯, 甚至那些支持希特勒上台的人也未曾料想之後的結果會是如此。這正是鄂蘭所謂的行動之本質: 不可預測, 且沒有任何一個人是某一段時間之內的真正「主權者」(sovereign)(Arendt, 1998b: 234),徹底掌握了當中所有事物發展的一切, 也因此即便是在極權主義國家, 沒有人不扮演了某種角色或貢獻了力量。 是故, 也都有程度不一的承擔與責任。 她的政治本體論於是也是一種提醒, 要求我們每一個人審視自己在社會上乃至人類共同世界當中參與了誰開啟的故事, 什麼故事,又扮演了哪一種角色。(33-34)



正如鄂蘭多次提醒哲學家如何使用類比來重新界定乃至替換不同領域的運作邏輯, 我們不該忘記: 一張桌子在製作完成之後將不會有其他組成元素不斷加入, 但政治社群卻會不斷有新的成員加入─換言之, 一個能延續下去的政治體必然會有成員上的新陳代謝, 這才符合鄂蘭所強調, 一個新生兒來到世界就是一個開端之說法。(39)


關於一個政治體存在的首要問題該是: 政治的意義為何?鄂蘭的回答是「 政治的意義是自由」,一如她在〈 導『 入』政治〉一文所說, 且她認為這答案再明確不過(Arendt,蔡佩君譯,2010,頁142) 。此外, 她也指出自由並不僅是亞里斯多德以城邦為想像的那種「不被統治或統治他人」,亦或「 每個人都與其他人平起平坐」,相互交談, 因為那是以廣場(agora) 為基礎的「 空間」想像(2010,頁152、153)。鄂蘭不反對這種自由, 但她更在意從「 時間」角度來理解, 能讓人能重新開始、 啟動新故事的自由(2010,頁160) 。」 後者能讓人在延續既有政治共同體時, 不至以前人的「 不朽」來葬送後人的「 開端」,或不至讓手上握有政權的政客假借死人的名義來葬送那些被當作通往民族偉大復興路上的「多餘之人」(s  uperfluous  men)(Arendt,  1968: 457) 。也唯有如此, 才不至於讓那一些真正受壓迫的人,必須採取流血革命來脫離身處的國家 (42)


外, 將時間帶回鄂蘭設想的公共空間, 也能突顯出人們在那空間當中的互動, 並不僅止於蔡英文所理解的彼此「 爭勝」或得以展現「 互為主體性」的溝通, 而是包括了承認前人的成就、 過往事件的意義, 並從中看見自己所能扮演的角色。 誠然, 一個政治社群需要各種不同的人在不同時代扮演特定的角色, 才能永續長存。 正如基督教在過去兩千年來仰賴了耶穌的門徒、見證者、 殉道者, 以及傳講神蹟與見證的信徒, 乃至提供理論來賦予他們所言一個融貫說法的神學家, 才能延續至今。 而無論哪一種角色扮演, 一個人都必須先將自己置入一個故事中, 才能理解時局、 進行判斷或採取必要的行動。 換言之, 鄂蘭的理論不是單憑空間角度可以完全掌握的政治想像。(43)


 她認為所有的政治行動都必然是一群人的共同行動, 不是也不該是一人。 二來, 她的理論當中有另一種獨特的角色, 可扮演共和國的守護者。那就是「說書人」(storyteller)。同時允許說書與革命,正是對應前述的「 維護」與「 創建」這兩種偉大政治事業。 筆者以為,這才是鄂蘭的共和主義最迥異於古典共和主義特殊之處。(44)


這種探究起源的寫作方式, 剛好也符合鄂蘭所謂的「 政治」之體現。 那就是人人得而將「 已見」(doxa)或說「 世界對他顯現與開啟的方式」展現給其他人, 且唯有藉此才能踏上的那一條「 理解」(understanding)之路(Arendt,李雨鍾、李威撰、黃雯君譯,2021,頁70) 。這條路沒有盡頭。 不管個人或集體, 永遠都在路上。 因此,不管是是個人的最初想法或與他人交換觀點之後的看法, 都不會是柏拉圖所設想那一種符應永恆不變的理型世界之「 真知」(e  pistemé)。這也是鄂蘭堅稱自己是「 政治理論家」而非「 政治哲學家」的理由。「理論」   (t  heory)一詞的希臘文「θεωρία」原意為「觀看」(2021,頁51、158)   。倘若她本人也秉持此一理念來書寫, 那讀者也應當以此方式來閱讀文本。(46)


當我們將《 論革命》置於這兩個脈絡來閱讀, 英國史學巨擘霍布斯邦當年對該書內容的嚴厲批評, 乃至指責鄂蘭根本不具歷史專業,似乎過於較真了(Hobsbawm,  1965/1994)。誠然,作者無論在取材、證據或詮釋上都充滿選擇性, 但與其說把該書理解為一本意圖跟專業史家爭論真相細節或誰的解釋才更貼緊因果事實的歷史著作, 毋寧說那是一個以書寫方式所進行的政治行動, 性質上無異於踏入公共領域來說服大眾的一場政治溝通。 正如英國哲學家沃諾克夫人(Baroness Warnock) 在開啟本文的引言中所說, 歷史是一個「 沒有終點的故事」 (Warnock, 1994: 188),因為人們可以不斷地發掘新的面相與新的意義, 把故事繼續說下去。 鄂蘭採取的書寫行動, 坐實了這一種敘事哲學的觀點。(49)


[摘要] Maynard, D. W., & Heritage, J. (2023). Ethnomethodology's Legacies and Prospects. Annual Review of Sociology, 49.

 結論:民族方法論的遺產和前景

加夫金克爾的遺產是巨大的,它延伸到許多研究領域和知識學科。然而,值得注意的是,這種影響力並非來自於與尤爾根·哈貝馬斯(Jürgen Habermas)、皮埃爾·布爾迪厄(Pierre Bourdieu)、安東尼·吉登斯(Anthony Giddens)或其他主要社會學家有關的廣泛社會理論的產物,而是通過一個相對狹窄且技術性的主題集合出現的。在加夫金克爾的社會理論中,我們可以強調以下幾個關鍵元素。

首先,加夫金克爾在他職業生涯初期決定將焦點放在社會世界,正如它對社會行為者所呈現的方式。儘管社會世界可以以多種方式呈現,但只有對社會行為者而言,它才是可行動和具有社會影響力的。儘管這種韋伯主義立場在戰後年代變得越來越普遍,但只有加夫金克爾問及了社會行為者世界中的日常物品和事件是如何通過常識推理的操作來訪問的。同樣地,只有加夫金克爾充分理解人類文化不是一個共同查閱的地圖或詞典條目,而是堅持認為一個在主觀間理解的世界需要分析聚焦於共享的推理方法,並在情境中實施操作。

第二,加夫金克爾巧妙地運用曼海姆的文件解釋方法,作為一個過程,其中底層模式和它們相關的外觀之間的相互闡釋關係為人類對對象和事件的理解提供了深刻的情境性質。加夫金克爾對文件解釋方法的探索涉及到基本上是情境性的解釋過程的大膽和全面的擴展,擴展到人類推理的各個方面。這一舉措的重要性在於,它動搖了當時主流的社會學觀點,即規則、規範或價值可以為社會組織提供明確的基礎,更不用說對社會行動的科學可預測性了。規則、規範和價值涉及在情境中的使用,並伴隨這種使用,實際和壓倒性的默認解釋。這一舉措的影響範圍非常廣泛。從單詞、句子、對話和文件到指導性聲明、指導和修復手冊、法律和價值觀,一切都需要情境化,以實現其社會實現和影響。將文件解釋方法納入這一過程的舉措在加夫金克爾對社會世界中所有觀察和理解的情境依賴性的同樣擴展使用中再次出現。大量的民族方法論研究工作,包括對偏差和執法、法律運作、科學、工作場所研究和人機互動的研究,都建立在這些基本思想之上。

第三,經典民族方法論實踐在所有社會領域中的運作都由加夫金克爾所稱的“信任”所支持:社會成員之間相互承諾的共同和預設,即通過對話和行動上不可避免地執行的情境操作來管理意義。在他的博士論文中,加夫金克爾論證認為,這種對意義生成的承諾是社會秩序的基本特徵,遠比霍布斯所提出的更為深刻。加夫金克爾還展示了這種承諾是多麼深刻的道德性質,它貫穿了整個過程,通過這個過程,行動和情況被呈現為可以負責任的,人們在醒來的每一刻都使用並依賴於這種負責任。

這些都是具有廣泛範圍和強大力量的重要主題。它們滲透到社會生活的每個角落,並驅動著多樣的實證貢獻:對正常和規範環境的民族志、社會問題、偏差、殘疾、科學和技術、工作場所調查、更標準研究所涉及的方法,如編碼、調查研究、統計解釋,以及性別、種族和其他身份類別如何實現他們的客觀性。沿著這些方向,我們無法預測未來可能出現什麼,或者如何出現。就像性別研究的虛擬爆發一樣,基於加夫金克爾對阿格內斯(Agnes)的研究,民族方法論在其他領域的基本研究可能會啟動或支持社會科學中尚未展望的大規模,甚至是爆炸性的發展。

這些主張之所以可能成立,是因為根本沒有時間可以遠離民族方法論所揭示的常識推理和實踐,這些推理和實踐對於在人類生活的每個領域中實施社會行動是根本性的。

2023年11月22日星期三

[摘要] Keenan, B., & Sokol, K. (2023). Mind the gap! Bridging explainable artificial intelligence and human understanding with Luhmann's Functional Theory of Communication. arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.03460.

 看到一篇演算法跟盧曼系統論的文章,用機器翻譯大概讀了一下,覺得以下的說法蠻有趣的

Keenan, B., & Sokol, K. (2023). Mind the gap! Bridging explainable artificial intelligence and human understanding with Luhmann's Functional Theory of Communication. arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.03460.
結論:「電腦不是自組織系統,也不感知自己。它們不知道自己不知道的事情。在社會中部署ADM和XAI系統的結果之一可能是更堅定地劃定價值觀、決策和組織能力的界限,這些必須保留給人類心智操作。具有諷刺意味的是,一個排除了我們人類參與社會運作的理論可能有助於我們更好地保護自己。我們可以明確指定人類決策、意義創造以及在不同領域中負責任的重要性。畢竟,正如von Foerster觀察到的,並由Esposito報導的,“如果傳統機器的結果變得不可預測,我們不認為它是創造性或獨創性的——我們認為它是故障的”。」
不論是從盧曼系統論,或者是鄂蘭對人類的行動生活的條件的討論,得出的結論都相同--決策是個過程,人類行動涉及意義創建及言說與行動的循環(或反身性,雖然兩者意涵有些微差異),系統說必須考慮子系統,鄂蘭說必須考慮由複數性的人構成的網,系統論談自我創生;鄂蘭談誕生性。不論從那個面向看,演算法作為子系統或者作為工具人的新時代表現,其實乃是有限的目的-手段之遞回。鄂蘭談多視角與無執著於私我的觀察以促成公共性,盧曼的思考則著重視系統的自我觀察與自我創生(抱歉,我系統論不太瞭解,所以硬是要比也是有點勉強)。但總而之言,無需神話化演算法作為人工智慧,演算法之所以被神話化,如何作為一種溝通,又或者如何作為一種新的支配型式,才是需要進一步觀察的面向。

[摘要] Aradau, C., & Blanke, T. (2022). Algorithmic reason: The new government of self and other (p. 288). Oxford University Press.

Aradau, C., & Blanke, T. (2022). Algorithmic reason: The new government of self and other (p. 288). Oxford University Press.

chatgpt的書目介紹

算法今天是否統治了世界?人工智慧是否在做生死攸關的決定?社交媒體公司是否能夠操縱選舉?當我們面對公眾和學術界對前所未有變化的焦慮時,這本書提供了一種不同的分析棱鏡來調查這些變化,將其視為更平常且充滿爭議。Aradau和Blanke開發了概念和方法工具,以理解算法操作如何塑造自我和他者的治理。儘管這些操作分散且混亂,但它們被一種上升的算法理性所維繫。通過對算法操作的全球視角,本書幫助我們理解算法理性如何重劃邊界和重新配置差異。本書探討了算法理性通過合理性、物質化和干預的出現。它追踪了算法合理性的分解、重組和分割在危險他者的建構、平台的權力以及經濟價值的生產中的物質化。書中展示了使算法可治理的政治干預遭遇摩擦、拒絕和抵抗。通過質性和數字方法,對從英國的大規模監控和劍橋分析醜聞到美國的預測性警務,從中國的面部識別和巴基斯坦的無人機定位到德國的仇恨言論規範等不同場景和爭議的調查,發展了對算法理性的理論觀點。《算法理性》通過作者背景涵蓋人文、社會科學和計算機科學的跨學科方法,提供了一種對反烏托邦和絕望的替代方案。

chatgpt對結論的翻譯

 「這次博覽會不僅僅是數位資本主義的商業場景,同時也是爭議和不一致的場景。通過進入各種場景,演算法變成了爭議的對象,本書提出了理解那些支撐著特定、多元和異質演算操作的政治合理性,這些操作已經被納入自我和他者的統治之中。我們希望避免對技術的反烏托邦觀點,民主終結的災難性預測,或風險抹除爭議或將其推遞到未來的不確定時刻。

演算法理由提出了一種不同的觀點,關於通過數據和演算操作統治我們生活的多元實踐。演算法理由命名了那些已經將語言、身體和行動轉化為計算機可以處理的數據的合理性。這些合理性承諾著通過超越小/大、人口/個體、言論/行動和自我/他者的二元對立,振興統治實踐。演算法理由的概念幫助我們理解事物如何在其異質性中保持一致。儘管最近的批評性工作已經強調了研究演算法的「日常生活」的必要性,但我們主張了解這些異質實踐如何展開並傳播特定的政治合理性的重要性。正如布朗所說的關於新自由主義的理由,它是「全球無所不在,但在空間和時間上非統一且非自我同一的」。演算法理由同樣具有全球性和異質分佈,重塑了統治實踐和技術。這不僅是工程師在自動化和優化方面的責任,它也已經形塑了社會以及我們如何理解它們。

...

正如我們在這本書中所主張的,演算法理由旨在數據化世界並使之成為演算法可行動的對象:機構、主體、經驗、關係,一切都變得適合演算法。演算法理由重新構思了知識如何被產生以統治人口和個體、自我和他者的問題,它產生了相對新的知識和決策,因此也產生了相對新的統治自我和他者的技術,同時為分散實踐提供了一個連貫性,使方法得以傳遞並設備得以流通。

...

最後,我們將爭議視為一種具有特殊爭辯模式的方式,其中存在一個公開性的元素。這包括社會學家西里爾·勒米厄所謂的爭議的三重結構,不僅指的是參與爭議的行為者,還指的是召集同儕或非同儕的公眾。在這個意義上,爭議不同於爭論、競爭和對立的語言,後者將衝突和不一致視為雙元結構,解決方案正是從這些結構中出現的。爭議不僅依賴於行為者本身,還需要第三個結構元素,如公眾、法官、委員會等。爭議被理解為‘不朽的“時刻”,其中出現了對現有機構安排難以解決的問題。儘管公開性元素對我們對爭議的分析很重要,從劍橋分析公司的醜聞到專利專家的公眾,但我們還展示了爭議場景如何轉變為其他形式的不一致,從摩擦到拒絕再到抵抗。對我們來說,衝突的雙元結構和爭議的三元結構之間的區別是一種啟發性工具,有助於區別和聯繫各種形式的爭辯。

...

演算法理由通過潛在無限的小數據和大數據的重組超越了這種僵局。這並不意味著演算法理由從無知轉向知識,正如大數據和人工智能愛好者所主張的那樣。它也不意味著我們從知識轉向無知,就像格言‘相關不等於因果關係’似乎所示。我們已經展示了,演算法知識是在與統計和證詞知識對抗的過程中產生的。我們從演算法理由的承諾出發,重新審視了大數據和小數據的重組方式,以及言論和行動如何可以被重新定義為對抗錯誤和真相說話之間張力的真實行為。數字空間因其看似充滿了數據化的無意識行為而受到讚譽,這些行為超越了言論和行動的二元對立。

[磨擦作為干預] 演算法操作通常是基於感知之下甚至是超感知的。因此,演算法很難轉變為使合作的民主行動成為可能並重新分配感性的‘公共物’。演算法的‘麻煩’和‘故障’已被提出作為概念,以理解演算法顯示其故障、錯誤和失敗並因此引發批評的時刻。演算法的麻煩建立在唐娜·哈拉維所提出的‘與麻煩同在’的邀請上,詞源上意味著激起、擾亂,但也意味著存在並‘在無數未完成的地方、時間、事情、意義的多種配置中交織’,而故障則來自計算技術錯誤和故障的用途。然而,故障也是‘非預期的錯誤’,‘傾向於可以忽略,很快被仍然運作的更大系統吸收’。摩擦與麻煩和故障有類似的破壞取向,需要接近數據及其演算操作。然而,通過共同行動將這些變成‘公共物’,我們對摩擦的概念不同於麻煩的本體不確定性和故障的知識上驚喜。

摩擦、拒絕和抵抗通過展開民主潛能,重塑了爭議和不一致的場景......即使政治行動的條件變得更加有限,摩擦、拒絕和抵抗也可以重新配置政治干預,面對演算法統治的挑戰。這些概念和實踐是相互交織的,而不是互斥的。它們不是用一套概念和實踐來替代另一套,正如一些作者呼籲用協作替代問責制,用正義替代倫理,或用壓迫替代偏見。摩擦、拒絕和抵抗在爭議和不一致的場景中發揮作用。隨著演算法、數據和人工智能的爭議不斷發展,場景也可以成為民主的工作場所,就像巴利巴爾所謂的‘民主的民主化’,是‘重新激活比過去出現的更激進的參與形式,或者是...適應當今社會條件的新的平等和自由形式的發明’。」

摘要 Ziarek, E. P. (2022). Against Digital Worldlessness: Arendt, Narrative, and the Onto-Politics of Big Data/AI Technologies. Postmodern Culture, 32(2).

 

Ziarek, E. P. (2022). Against Digital Worldlessness: Arendt, Narrative, and the Onto-Politics of Big Data/AI Technologies. Postmodern Culture32(2).

 

為了分析大數據在數位世界中的無世界性及其在人工智慧中的使用問題,我借鑑了漢娜·鄂蘭的核心主張,即現實感的喪失是歷史特定攻擊對人類複數性的影響。

根據鄂蘭的觀點,真實感來自於三種互相交織的關係,這些關係僅為啟發目的而被分離:自然現象對人類感官的呈現、透過工作和技術建構的世界,以及通過共同行動和交談產生的人際關係網絡。這種觀點有助於定義數位世界的無世界性:屈服於數位資本的目的,數位技術不僅加劇經濟剝削,還削弱了世界的現象學呈現和人類的複數性。這是因為與世界的關係是由經濟、科學和技術所中介,並與政治互動的「網絡」交織在一起(Human 183–84)。這個人際事務的網絡維繫著人類的複數性,並維持著共同世界的感覺(204)。鄂蘭的網絡隱喻並非偶然。對她而言,複數性不是孤立個體的數量眾多,而是一種關係形式的社會性,其特徵是平等與區別之間、共同存在與每個人不可重複的獨特性之間的使能張力。即使統治或暴力限制了共同存在於抵抗的反社群,這種共同性也與分享「行為和言辭」交織在一起,這使得政治行動者能夠向彼此揭露他們的獨特性,並共同實現政治生活中的新開始。每當人們的平等、區別和獨特性的世界呈現受到政治權力技術或經濟剝削的攻擊時,現實感也同樣被侵蝕。正如鄂蘭所說,沒有人類的複數性,世界本身就變成了「一堆無關的事物」——不再是一個適合行動、理解或溝通的共同世界(204)。

最後且最重要的是,數據在人工智慧中的使用與在政治鬥爭中的敘事使用之間的對比,明確了這些實踐的對立本體論。對於鄂蘭來說,敘事/政治行為的結合預設並再現了共同世界本體論所依賴的人類複數性的「網絡」。相比之下,只要大數據在人工智慧和機器學習中的使用受制於數位資本主義的經濟目的和決策自動化,其本體論就對應於數位無世界性。這種數位無世界性重新框定了算法治理的危害,這是RouvroyBerns提出的一個概念,Rouvroy將其定義為一種「中性化體制」(regime of neutralization)100),旨在解除主觀行動、言論和「決策能力(基於不確定性而決策,而非服從計算結果)」的能力,以及對政治項目的集體想像(101)。這些本體論之間的對比極為鮮明,它反映了當前對現實的「混合」和對立性公投的特點。

 

漢娜·鄂蘭對獨特性溝通性的重申,在當代有關算法秘密及其相反面:對技術透明度的還原性呼籲的辯論中更顯迫切。反映了數位資本主義和政治決策自動化的匯聚,大數據的算法處理繞過了維繫人類複數性的判斷溝通性——概念性和反思性的。往往,即便那些在數據挖掘和機器學習流程中編碼的技術性和非技術性決策可以概念性地溝通,也仍然被從公共判斷和爭議中撤回:例如,待解決問題的選擇、其數學形式化、使用的算法類型、可用訓練數據的來源和類型等。正如Andrejevic所指出,這些半「神諭式」的自動化結果從公眾意見中撤回,旨在取代甚至概念性的判斷、爭議和政治想像的替代可能性2)。因此,算法決策的實施不僅將解釋和論證的負擔轉移給那些受到「自動化不平等」(Eubanks)傷害的人,而且還助長了數位無世界性和普遍的共識喪失。

相比之下,對鄂蘭來說,獨特性的溝通既不依賴於透明的話語,也不依賴於算法結果的最佳化。相反,它基於向他人的判斷呼籲,而無需保證他們實際上會同意我們。正如她所論述,反思性判斷的溝通要求所謂的擴展心態(enlarged mentality),即在我們向他人宣告判斷時和判斷過程本身中都能夠考慮其他觀點的能力。在判斷過程中考慮其他觀點既不等於客觀立場,也不是對這些觀點的佔有,而是對我們自己判斷的批判性反思(Lectures 70–72)。通過從實際和潛在的他人視角批判性地反思自己的判斷,一個人可能會從自己的教條主義、自戀、文化規範和習慣性、不反思的觀點中獲得距離,從而達到某種相對的公正性,或者康德所說的「無利害性」(73)。換句話說,正如Rodolphe Gasche所建議,對鄂蘭(與康德不同),反思性判斷包括考慮我們與之共享世界的他人,其潛在或實際的觀點由想像力代表(112–14)。這就是為什麼從他人的觀點判斷預設並實現人類複數性。根據Cecilia Sjoholm的說法,判斷的溝通維持了sensus communis和現實感(82–85)。

除了規模和速度外,大數據最有爭議的意識形態斷言在於其真實性的主張:大數據似乎「自言自語」,揭示了一種新形式的客觀性,這種客觀性,正如BernsRouvroy所指出的,似乎從生命本身內在地湧現。這種「真實性」首先依賴於科學視角的轉移,從解釋(歷史譜系,所有形式的因果關係,包括權力和自由的因果關係)到基於機器學習算法發現的數學模型中的相關性發現「實際情況」。由於在龐大的數據集中發現相關性、模式或異常的算法不需要解釋,也不需要事先的科學假設測試,大數據臭名昭著地宣布了科學中的「理論終結」(並非僅在人文學科中)(Anderson)。對於D'IgnazioKlein來說,這種認識論再次複製了女性主義認識論經常批評的「神話性、虛幻性、不可能的立場」(73–96)。此外,這種偏離解釋、理由和對社會關係的解釋放棄了對壓迫和不平等歷史的任何責任。

對世界異質性的量化進一步助長了數位無世界性。數位技術的速度(速度)和效率「抽象地談論」,來自現象和歷史世界,取決於拒絕事實性和普通和科學語言的模糊性,以利於將經驗事實的數學形式化和轉化為機器可計算性。正如Mayer-SchonbergerCukier承認的,大數據的革命最終不在於大小,而在於使量化與理解同義79–97)。這就是為什麼他們建議用更精確、現在廣泛使用的新詞「數據化」來取代「數據」這個詞。通過清除「數據」一詞的潛在詞源參考到拉丁語datum數據化傳達了電腦化數據挖掘的代理作用,將自然、政治和歷史現象的不可還原的異質性轉化為可量化的「多樣性」,可以被測量、存儲和檢索(使用數位處理器和存儲)78)。讓人聯想到殖民和種族主義征服的暴力修辭,「數據化」整個世界的暴力修辭強調了技術能力和政治慾望「捕獲可量化資訊」(78)。

IV. 結論

在這篇文章中,我通過聚焦於兩種不同社會實踐之間的矛盾來解讀對人類多樣性的數字傷害:大數據與AI的結合,以及敘事和政治行動的相互依賴。這些矛盾塑造了我們“混合型”民主、數字資本和算法治理的特征,它們既有政治層面也有本體論層面。基於漢娜·鄂蘭(Hannah Arendt)的工作,我認為誕生的本體論(ontology of natality)與敘事和政治激進主義的交匯點相對應。誕生強調了人類能夠揭示自己的獨特性、分享世界,並與他人一起行動,反對歧視,爭取自由。雖然大數據和機器學習的政治吸引了更多記者和學者的關注,但其本體論效應也是公眾關注的問題,這一點從對共享現實世界的喪失的擔憂中可以看出。我將這種本體-政治危機稱為“數位無世界性”(digital worldlessness.)。這種世界無形感通常是默認或明確承認的,特別是在魯瓦魯伊(Rouvroy)的論點中,她認為大數據的算法處理“呈現為對抗任何無法計算的異質性、對抗所有不可同化外部的思考、不可減少、非市場化、非完成化……也就是說,對抗世界的數字現實的免疫系統”(100)。正如這一洞察所示,數字技術不僅與人類多樣性的本體論相對立,實際上還將其置於風險之中。

 

然而,敘事、行動和大數據之間的對立關係並不代表一種可能的選擇,它們從內部割裂了這些社會實踐,揭示了它們模糊的混合特徵。一方面,共同世界的日益增長的數據化潛在地依賴於眾多合法化敘事——例如,重新興起的宏大敘事,將技術進步與政治自由和公共利益等同起來——或其對立面,AI征服創造者的反烏托邦願景。不那麼轟動性的是,數據的指涉性和其“結果”的正當化同樣由眾多“數據虛構”中介。另一方面,如算法正義聯盟(Algorithmic Justice League)或數據為黑人生活(Data 4 Black Lives)等新形式的政治激進主義呼籲將解放性敘事作為政治鬥爭中集體治理和基於社區的數據使用的關鍵元素。正如數據為黑人生活的宣言所宣稱,數據政治可以被想像和動員成其他形式:“數據抗議。數據作為問責。數據作為集體行動。”同樣,算法正義聯盟依靠“藝術、機器學習研究和故事講述的交叉”來抵抗數據化的傷害。這些組織通常由計算機科學家和統計學家發起,絕大多數是由女性和有色人種組成,它們在抵抗數字傷害的鬥爭中重新爭取集體行動、判斷和藝術實踐。我會認為,這些敘事和政治行為也在鄂蘭的意義上重新演繹了人類多樣性,並因此提供了對抗數字世界無形的替代方案。

 

2023年11月20日星期一

論「批判式閱讀」本身作為一種歷史性的主體生產之規律之虔誠閱讀之產物

 

原文

Google翻譯

Chatgpt 4.0

Warner, M. (2012). Uncritical reading. In Polemic (pp. 13-38). Routledge.

華納,M.2012)。 不加批判地閱讀。 論戰(13-38 頁)。 勞特利奇。

 

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Uncritical Reading

不加批判的閱讀

不加批判地閱讀

Michael Warner

麥可沃納

麥可·華納

Students who come to my literature classes, I find, read in all the ways they aren’t supposed to. They identify with characters. They fall in love with authors. They mime what they take to be authorized sentiment. They stock themselves with material for showing off, or for performing class membership. They shop around among taste-publics, venturing into social worlds of fanhood and geekdom. They warm with pride over the national heritage. They thrill at the exotic and take reassurance in the familiar. They condemn as boring what they don’t already recognize. They look for representations that will remediate stigma by giving them “positive self-images.” They cultivate reverence and piety. They try to anticipate what the teacher wants, and sometimes to one-up the other students. They grope for the clichés that they are sure the text comes down to. Their attention wanders; they skim; they skip around. They mark pages with pink and yellow highlighters. They get caught up in suspense. They laugh; they cry. They get aroused (and stay quiet about it in class). They lose themselves in books, distracting themselves from everything else, especially homework like the reading I assign.

我發現,來上我的文學課的學生會以各種不該有的方式閱讀。他們認同角色。他們愛上了作家。他們模仿他們認為是授權的情感。他們為自己儲備了炫耀或表現班級成員資格的材料。他們在品味大眾中貨比三家,冒險進入狂熱和極客的社交世界。他們對民族遺產感到自豪。他們對異國情調感到興奮,對熟悉的事物感到安心。他們譴責他們尚未認識到的事物是無聊的。他們尋找能夠透過給予他們「正向的自我形象」來消除恥辱的表徵。他們培養敬畏和虔誠。他們試圖預測老師想要什麼,有時甚至比其他學生更勝一籌。他們摸索著他們確信文本歸結為陳腔濫調的內容。他們的注意力分散;他們略讀;他們跳來跳去。他們用粉紅色和黃色螢光筆標記頁面。他們陷入懸念之中。他們笑了;他們哭了。他們會被激起(並在課堂上保持安靜)。他們迷失在書本中,分散了自己對其他一切的注意力,尤其是像我佈置的閱讀這樣的家庭作業。

我發現,來上我文學課的學生們閱讀的方式,完全是他們不應該的。他們與角色產生認同、愛上作者、模仿他們認為是被授權的情感。他們儲備素材,用於炫耀或表現自己的階級身份。他們在不同的品味公眾間選擇,冒險進入粉絲和极客的社交世界。他們為國家遺產感到自豪,對異國情調感到興奮,並在熟悉的事物中尋找安慰。他們對未曾認識的內容嗤之以鼻。他們尋找能夠透過提供“正面自我形象”來補救污名的呈現。他們培養崇敬和虔誠。他們試圖預測老師想要什麼,有時甚至想超越其他學生。他們摸索著他們確信文本所歸結的陳詞濫調。他們的注意力容易分散;他們粗略閱讀;隨意跳讀。他們用粉色和黃色螢光筆標記頁面。他們被懸念所吸引。他們笑;他們哭。他們感到興奮(但在課堂上對此保持沉默)。他們在書本中迷失自己,從其他事物,尤其是像我指定的閱讀作業中分心。

My work is cut out for me. My job is to teach them critical reading, but all these modes of their actual reading—and one could list countless more—will tend to be classified as uncritical reading. What does it mean to teach critical reading, as opposed to all other kinds of reading? Are there any other kinds that can or should be taught?

我的工作是為我準備的。我的工作是教他們批判性閱讀,但他們實際閱讀的所有這些模式——可以列出無數更多——往往被歸類為非批判性閱讀。與所有其他類型的閱讀相比,教授批判性閱讀意味著什麼?還有其他類型可以或應該教嗎?

我的工作已經劃定。我的職責是教他們批判性閱讀,但所有這些他們實際的閱讀方式——還可以列舉無數——通常會被劃分為不加批判的閱讀。教授批判性閱讀意味著什麼,與所有其他閱讀方式有何不同?是否還有其他可以或應該被教授的閱讀方式?

Different teachers might have different ideas of how to do critical reading, but the axis of opposition is fundamental to our institutional role. Whether we are propounding new criticism, deconstruction, or cultural studies, our common enterprise is to discipline students out of their uncritical habits into critical reading—whatever we mean by that. Critical reading is the folk ideology of a learned profession, so close to us that we seldom feel the need to explain it. My own department requires of all entering graduate students a course called “Critical Reading.” We don’t specify anything about what will be taught in the course; how could we? The assumption is that any of our faculty can be trusted to convey the general idea—and no one should be burdened with expressing it.

不同的老師可能對如何進行批判性閱讀有不同的想法,但對立軸是我們機構角色的基礎。無論我們是提出新的批評、解構或文化研究,我們共同的事業就是讓學生擺脫他們的束縛。 不加批判的習慣轉變為批判性閱讀——無論我們的意思是什麼。批判性閱讀是學術界的民間意識形態,它離我們如此之近,以至於我們很少覺得有必要對其進行解釋。我所在的係要求所有進入研究生的學生學習一門名為「批判性閱讀」的課程。我們沒有具體說明課程中將教授什麼內容;我們怎麼能?我們的假設是,我們的任何一位教員都可以被信任傳達整體想法,並且任何人都不應該承擔表達它的負擔。

不同的老師可能對如何進行批判性閱讀有不同的看法,但這種對立軸心對於我們的機構角色至關重要。無論我們是在宣揚新批評、解構還是文化研究,我們的共同事業是要將學生從他們不加批判的習慣訓練成批判性閱讀——無論我們如何界定。批判性閱讀是學術專業的民間意識形態,如此貼近我們以至於我們很少覺得有必要解釋它。我自己的系所要求所有進入研究生的學生必須修讀一門名為“批判性閱讀”的課程。我們不指定課程中將教授什麼;我們怎麼能指定呢?假定是我們的任何一位教員都可以被信任傳達這個一般理念——也沒有人應該負擔表達它的責任。

The Cornell English department webpage begins with what I take to be a typical mission statement: “The Department of English teaches analytical and critical reading; lucid and effective writing; and studies in the values and problems of human experience and culture.” Like most institutional prose, this proclamation is so careful to avoid controversy and kulturkampf that it wraps itself in banality. True, it is a consequential banality: because the critical profession has come to understand itself primarily as teaching “analytical and critical reading,” some other justifications for the profession—notably the task of transmitting a prestigious heritage or canon—have proven difficult to sustain, once they have come to be seen as uncritical. But for the most part what is striking about this language is the apparent consensus behind it. And although the self-conception of the discipline seems perversely antagonistic to all the ways our students actually read, it has worked quite well—at least throughout the twentieth century—to legitimate the profession. With very different inflections over the past century, the normative program of critical reading has allowed literature departments to sell themselves as providing a basic element of education, despite a widely felt disenchantment with the idea of literature, which students in a technologically changing climate increasingly encounter as archaic.

康乃爾大學英語系網頁以我認為典型的使命宣言開頭:「英語系教授分析性和批判性閱讀;清晰有效的寫作;並研究人類經驗和文化的價值觀和問題。與大多數機構散文一樣,這份宣言非常小心地避免爭議和文化鬥爭,以至於將自己包裹在平庸之中。誠然,這是一個隨之而來的陳詞濫調:因為批判性職業已經開始將自己理解為主要是教授分析性和批判性閱讀,所以該職業的其他一些理由——尤其是傳播享有盛譽的遺產或經典的任務——已被證明難以維持,一旦他們被視為不挑剔。但在大多數情況下,這種語言的引人注目之處在於背後明顯的共識。儘管這門學科的自我概念似乎與我們學生實際閱讀的所有方式背道而馳,但它在使這一職業合法化方面發揮了很好的作用——至少在整個二十世紀是如此。在過去的一個世紀裡,批判性閱讀的規範性計劃經歷了截然不同的變化,使得文學系能夠將自己推銷為提供教育的基本要素,儘管人們普遍對文學的概念感到失望,在技術不斷變化的在環境中,學生越來越多地遇到文學概念作為古老的。

康奈爾大學英語系網頁以我認為是典型的使命陳述開頭:“英語系教授分析和批判性閱讀;清晰有效的寫作;以及人類經驗和文化的價值和問題研究。”像大多數機構文本一樣,這份宣言非常謹慎地避免爭議和文化鬥爭,以至於包裹在陳腔濫調中。的確,這是一個重要的陳腔濫調:因為批判專業已經開始將自己主要理解為教授“分析和批判性閱讀”,一些其他專業的理由——尤其是傳遞一個有聲望的遺產或典範——一旦被視為不加批判,就難以維持。但大多數情況下,這種語言的顯著之處在於其背後明顯的共識。儘管這種學科的自我認知似乎與我們學生實際閱讀的所有方式格格不入,但至少在整個二十世紀,它都相當成功地為專業合法化。在過去的一個世紀中,批判性閱讀的規範性計劃以非常不同的方式,使得文學系能夠將自己定位為教育的基本要素,儘管學生們普遍對文學的概念感到失望,在技術變遷的氣候下,他們越來越多地將文學視為過時。

Clearly, the idea resonates far beyond our own professional class. As we never tire of demonstrating, modern literature is itself full of fables of bad reading. Don’t read like Quixote, like Emma Bovary, like Ginny Weasley. The rich overdetermination of such fables in modernity allows us to imagine ourselves as the bearers of a heroic pedagogy, the end of which is not the transmission of a canon or the catechistic incorporation of facts and pieties, but an open future of personal and collective liberation, of full citizenship and historical belonging. To quote another revealingly bland rallying cry: “Critical literacy means making one’s self present as part of a moral and political project that links the production of meaning to the possibility for human agency, democratic community, and transformative social action.”1 We are here, we like to tell our students, to save you from habits of uncritical reading that are naive, immature, unexamined—or worse. Don’t read like children, like vacation readers on the beach, like escapists, like fundamentalists, like nationalists, like antiquarians, like consumers, like ideologues, like sexists, like tourists, like yourselves.

顯然,這個想法引起的共鳴遠遠超出了我們自己的專業階層。正如我們不厭其煩地論證的那樣,現代文學本身就充滿了糟糕閱讀的寓言。不要像《唐吉訶德》、《艾瑪·包法利》、《金妮·衛斯理》那樣讀書。現代性中此類寓言的豐富的多重決定性使我們能夠將自己想像為英雄教育學的承載者,其目的不是傳播教規或將事實和虔誠納入教義問答,而是個人和集體解放的開放未來,完全的公民身份和歷史歸屬。引用另一個明顯平淡的戰鬥口號:「批判性素養意味著使自己成為道德和政治項目的一部分,該項目將意義的生產與現實聯繫起來。 人類能動性、民主社區和變革性社會行動的可能性。」1我們想告訴我們的學生,我們在這裡是為了讓你們擺脫幼稚、不成熟、未經審視甚至更糟的不加批判的閱讀習慣。不要像孩子一樣讀書,像海灘上的度假讀者一樣,像逃避現實者一樣,像原教旨主義者一樣,像民族主義者一樣,像古物學家一樣,像消費者一樣,像理論家一樣,像性別歧視者一樣,像遊客一樣,像你們自己一樣。

顯然,這個觀念的影響遠遠超出了我們專業階層的範圍。正如我們不厭其煩地展示的,現代文學本身充滿了對不良閱讀的寓言。不要像基哈特、愛瑪·包法利或金妮·衛斯理那樣閱讀。這些寓言在現代性中的豐富過度確定性,使我們得以將自己想像為英勇教學法的承載者,其目的不在於傳遞一個典範或教條式地融入事實和虔誠,而是開啟個人和集體解放的未來,擁有完整的公民身份和歷史歸屬。再引用另一個揭示性的平淡口號:“批判性識讀意味著將自己作為道德和政治項目的一部分,將意義的產生與人的能動性、民主社群和轉型社會行動的可能性相連接。”1 我們在這裡,我們喜歡告訴我們的學生,是為了拯救你們脫離天真、未成熟、未經審視——或更糟的——不加批判的閱讀習慣。不要像孩子、沙灘上的休假閱讀者、逃避現實者、原教旨主義者、民族主義者、古董收藏家、消費者、意識形態家、性別歧視者、遊客或像你們自己那樣閱讀。

Critical reading is evidently dense with social meaning; but its significance for modernity seems difficult to pin on any empirically describable practice of reading. Why is it apparently the case that any style of actual reading that we can observe in the world counts as uncritical? And how could it nevertheless seem that professors of literature regard the critical attitude as a necessary implication of reading itself? A suspicion begins to suggest itself: Is critical reading really reading at all? Is it an ideological description applied to people who are properly socialized into a political culture, regardless of how (or whether) they read? Or, granting a little more in charity: Is it not so much a reading practice as a notional derivative from a prior, uncritical reading that it must posit in order to exist? Is it a style of rereading, or discourse about reading, rather than reading per se?2 Does it name the kind of liberal openness to self-questioning and reflective explicitation that could theoretically take any practice of reading as its occasion? Or is it more like a discipline, seeking to replace the raw and untrained practices of the merely literate with a cultivated and habitual disposition to read by means of another set of practices? If so, can those styles of reading be anatomized, or placed in a history of textual practice? If the latter, is this reading culture one of the formal-historical conditions of what counts as critical reason? A heroic pedagogy can be founded on textual techniques because of an imputed relationship between the practice of reading and critical reason, but what is that relationship?

批判性閱讀顯然充滿了社會意義。但它對現代性的意義似乎很難歸結於任何可以憑經驗描述的閱讀實踐。為什麼我們在世界上觀察到的任何實際閱讀方式顯然都被認為是不批判的?然而,文學教授怎麼會認為批判態度是閱讀本身的必然意義呢?人們開始懷疑:批判性閱讀真的是閱讀嗎?這是一種意識形態描述,適用於那些適當地融入政治文化的人,無論他們如何(或是否)閱讀?或者,多給予一點慈善:與其說它是一種閱讀實踐,不如說它是一種從先前的、不加批判的閱讀中衍生出來的概念衍生品,而它必須假設才能存在?它是一種重讀的風格,還是一種關於閱讀的話語,而不是閱讀本身?2它是否命名了一種對自我質疑和反思性明確的自由開放態度,理論上可以以任何閱讀實踐為契機?或者它更像是一門學科,試圖透過另一套實踐來培養有教養的、習慣性的閱讀習慣,從而取代那些僅僅識字的人原始的、未經訓練的實踐?如果是這樣,這些閱讀風格是否可以被剖析,或是放入文本實踐的歷史中?如果是後者,這種閱讀文化是否是批判理性的形式歷史條件之一?由於閱讀實踐和批判性理性之間存在推定關係,英雄式教育學可以建立在文本技巧的基礎上,但這種關係是什麼?

批判性閱讀顯然充滿社會意義;但其對現代性的重要性似乎難以歸結於任何實證描述的閱讀實踐。為什麼看起來我們在世界上觀察到的任何實際閱讀方式都被視為不加批判?而文學教授們又怎會看似將批判態度視為閱讀本身必然的涵義?一種懷疑開始浮現:批判性閱讀真的是閱讀嗎?它是不是一種意識形態的描述,適用於那些被適當地社會化進入政治文化的人,不管他們如何(或是否)閱讀?或者,稍微慷慨一點:它不是那麼多的閱讀實踐,而是一種從先前的不加批判的閱讀中衍生出的概念,這種閱讀必須設定為存在的前提?它是一種重新閱讀的風格,或者是關於閱讀的話語,而不是閱讀本身?2 它是否代表了一種自我質疑和反思性明確化的自由開放性,理論上可以將任何閱讀實踐作為其契機?或者它更像是一種紀律,試圖以另一套實踐取代僅有讀寫能力的原始和未經訓練的實踐,培養出一種習慣性地通過其他方式閱讀的態度?如果是這樣,那些閱讀風格能被解剖出來,或放在文本實踐的歷史中嗎?如果後者,這種閱讀文化是否是批判理性計算中的正式歷史條件之一?英勇的教學法可以基於文本技術而建立,因為它假設閱讀實踐和批判理性之間存在某種關係,但那種關係是什麼?

The enormous shadow of uncritical reading suggests another set of problems as well. Within the culture of critical reading it can seem that all the forms of uncritical reading—identification, self-forgetfulness, reverie, sentimentality, enthusiasm, literalism, aversion, distraction—are unsystematic and disorganized. Uncritical modes of reading, it would seem, are by definition neither reflective nor analytic. They must therefore prove untenable—i.e., transmute into the material of critical reading—when summoned to the bar of examination. Uncritical reading, it would seem, is naive; by its nature it cannot attain the coherence of a normative program of reading. It cannot constitute a real rival to what is called critical reading. Hence the ready consensus: If the choice is between critical and uncritical reading, who could be for the latter?

不加批判的閱讀所帶來的巨大陰影也暗示了另一組問題。在批判性閱讀文化中,所有非批判性閱讀的形式──認同、忘我、遐想、感傷、熱情、字面主義、厭惡、分心──似乎都是不繫統且無組織的。從定義來看,不加批判的閱讀方式似乎既不是反思性的,也不是分析性的。因此,當被召喚到考試場時,它們必須被證明是站不住腳的——即轉化為批判性閱讀的材料。不加批判地閱讀, 看起來,是天真;就其本質而言,它無法達到規範閱讀計畫的連貫性。它無法構成所謂批判性閱讀的真正競爭對手。因此,大家一致認為:如果要在批判性閱讀和非批判性閱讀之間做出選擇,誰會選擇後者?

不加批判閱讀的巨大陰影也暗示了另一組問題。在批判性閱讀的文化中,所有不加批判的閱讀形式——如認同、自我遺忘、夢幻、情感化、熱情、字面主義、厭惡、分心——似乎都是非系統性和無組織的。看起來,不加批判的閱讀方式根據定義既不反思也不分析。因此,在接受審查的法庭上,它們必須證明是站不住腳的——也就是說,轉化為批判性閱讀的材料。看來,不加批判的閱讀是天真的;其本質上無法達到閱讀的規範性計劃的連貫性。它無法構成所謂批判性閱讀的真正對手。因此,共識很容易達成:如果選擇是批判與不加批判的閱讀,誰會選擇後者呢?

But what if it isn’t true, as we suppose, that critical reading is the only way to suture textual practice with reflection, reason, and a normative discipline of subjectivity? If we begin to understand critical reading not simply as the coming-into-reflexivity of reading, but as a very special set of form relationships, then it might be easier to recognize rival modes of reading and reflection on reading as something other than pretheoretically uncritical. The most obvious candidates for such a program of “uncritical” reading are various styles of religious reading, but they are not the only ones. (An interesting point of comparison would be pornographic reading, which becomes a developed and familiar practice in the period of critical reading’s ascendancy.)3

但是,如果批判性閱讀不是將文本實踐與反思、理性和主體性規範紀律縫合在一起的唯一途徑,那又會怎麼樣呢?如果我們開始不僅將批判性閱讀理解為閱讀的反身性,而且將其理解為一組非常特殊的形式關係,那麼就可能更容易認識到競爭性的閱讀模式和對閱讀的反思,而不是理論上的非批判性的東西。 。這種「不加批判」的閱讀計畫最明顯的候選人是各種風格的宗教閱讀,但它們並不是唯一的。 (一個有趣的比較點是色情閱讀,它在批判性閱讀占主導地位的時期成為一種發達且熟悉的做法。)3

但如果我們所假設的並非事實,即批判性閱讀並非將文本實踐與反思、理性和主體性的規範紀律縫合起來的唯一方式呢?如果我們開始將批判性閱讀不僅僅理解為閱讀的反思化,而是一套非常特殊的形式關係,那麼,或許更容易認出閱讀和閱讀反思的其他對立模式,不僅僅是前理論上的不加批判。最明顯的不加批判閱讀計劃的候選者是各種宗教閱讀風格,但它們並非唯一。(一個有趣的比較點將是色情閱讀,它在批判性閱讀崛起的時期成為一種發展成熟且熟悉的實踐。)3

We tend to assume that critical reading is just a name for any self-conscious practice of reading. This assumption creates several kinds of fallout at once: It turns all reading into the uncritical material for an ever-receding horizon of reflective self-positing; by naturalizing critical reading as mere reflection it obscures from even our own view the rather elaborate forms and disciplines of subjectivity we practice and inculcate; it universalizes the special form of modernity that unites philology with the public sphere; and it blocks from view the existence of other cultures of textualism. In these ways it could be called a mistake or an ideology, but of course it is also the internal viewpoint of a culture with its own productive intensities, its own distinctive paradoxes, enabling even this essay, for better or worse.

我們傾向於認為批判性閱讀只是任何自覺閱讀實踐的一個名稱。這種假設同時產生了多種後果:它把所有的閱讀都變成了不加批判的材料,以適應不斷後退的反思性自我定位的視野;透過將批判性閱讀自然化為純粹的反思,它甚至從我們自己的觀點中掩蓋了我們實踐和灌輸的相當複雜的主體性形式和紀律;它普遍化了將語言學與公共領域結合的現代性的特殊形式;它阻礙了其他文本主義文化的存在。從這些方面來說,它可以被稱為錯誤或意識形態,但當然,它也是一種文化的內部觀點,具有自己的生產強度、自己獨特的悖論,無論好壞,都使得這篇文章成為可能。

我們傾向於假設,批判性閱讀只是任何自覺的閱讀實踐的名稱。這個假設立即產生了幾種後果:它將所有閱讀變成了反思自我定位的不斷遠退地平線的不加批判材料;通過將批判性閱讀自然化為單純的反思,它甚至遮蔽了我們自己對我們實踐和灌輸的相當複雜的主體性形式和紀律的認識;它將哲學與公共領域聯合起來的現代性特殊形式普遍化;並且它阻擋了我們看到其他文本主義文化的存在。在這些方面,它可以被稱為一種錯誤或意識形態,但當然它也是一種文化的內在觀點,具有自己的生產密度、自己獨特的悖論,甚至使這篇文章得以產生,無論是好是壞。

Among the critics who have noticed the importance of what is usually left unthought as uncritical reading is Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. In a suggestive polemical essay published as the introduction to NovelGazing, she argues that the dominant modes of academic criticism have drifted into an essentially paranoid suspicion of textual attachment.4 Sedgwick’s polemic targets a specific set of academic movements; but I suspect that most of what she excoriates as paranoid could be described as an extreme case in which norms of the critical have hypertrophied and become conspicuous. For reasons that might be various—such as the competitive positioning of professional discourse, which invites us to ensure that our own critical reflections will be more critical than those of our anticipated, imaginary critics—the critic adopts a projectively aggressive defensiveness in relation to the object of criticism.

伊芙·科索夫斯基·塞奇威克(Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick)是注意到通常被忽視的非批判性閱讀重要性的評論家之一。在作為NovelGazing的引言發表的一篇暗示性的論戰文章中,她認為學術批評的主導模式已經陷入了對文本依附的本質上偏執的懷疑。4 塞奇威克的論戰針對的是一組特定的學術運動;他的論戰針對的是一系列特定的學術運動。但我懷疑,她所斥責的偏執狂的大部分內容都可以被描述為一種極端的情況,在這種情況下,批判的規範已經過度膨脹並變得引人注目。基於多種原因,例如專業話語的競爭定位,這要求我們 為了確保我們自己的批判性反思比我們預期的、想像中的批評者的批判性反思更加批判——批評家對批評對象採取了投射性的攻擊性防禦。

注意到通常被視為不加批判的閱讀的重要性的評論家之一是伊芙·科索夫斯基·塞奇威克。在作為《NovelGazing》導言發表的富有啟發性的爭論性文章中,她認為,學術批評的主導模式已漂移成一種對文本依附的本質上偏執的懷疑。4 塞奇威克的爭論針對的是一系列特定的學術運動;但我懷疑,她所指責的大部分偏執可以被描述為一個極端案例,即批判的規範已經增生並變得明顯。出於各種原因——例如專業話語的競爭定位,它鼓勵我們確保我們自己的批判性反思將比我們預期的、想像中的批評家更批判性——評論家採取了一種對批評對象的預設攻擊性防禦性。

Sedgwick identifies as the basic elements of paranoid reading (1) an anticipatory aversion to surprise, taken as the only security of knowledge; (2) a mimetic reflexivity in which the critic is seen as making explicit a latent or hidden reflexivity in the text; (3) a strong insistence on seeing everything in the terms of its central suspicions; (4) an interest only in negative affects; and (5) an apparently boundless faith in the efficacy of exposure. All of these can be seen as heightened versions of one or another normative project of the critical per se, though the degree of exaggeration is more visible in some, such as (4). The first, an anxiously anticipatory knowingness, is often hard to distinguish in practice from ordinary critical distance—at least when distanciation is taken as the necessary route to knowledge that is threatened by attachment, incorporation, or involvement, and where the object of analysis is credited with some anticipation of the critic’s attempt to get distance on it. The second, an eliciting of a latent reflexivity attributed to the object, is a close cousin of a Romantic critical assumption I will return to later in connection with an observation by Walter Benjamin. The last, a faith in criticism as an act of exposure or demystification, is an article of faith in public-sphere forms, related to what I have elsewhere called a principle of supervision. In paranoid criticism it has become an imaginary and unmediated exposure, a power of mere knowingness. This faith in exposure is often implicit in what goes by the name critique.

塞奇威克認為偏執型閱讀的基本要素是:(1)對驚喜的預期厭惡,將其視為知識的唯一保障; (2) 模仿性反身性,其中批評者被視為明確了文本中潛在或隱藏的反身性; (3) 強烈堅持從中心懷疑的角度來看一切; (4) 僅對負面影響感興趣; (5) 對暴露的功效顯然有著無限的信心。所有這些都可以被視為批評本身的一個或另一個規範項目的強化版本,儘管在某些方面誇大的程度更為明顯,例如(4)。第一種,一種焦慮的預期認知,在實踐中常常很難與普通的批判距離區分開來——至少當疏離被視為通往受到依戀、合併或捲入威脅的知識的必要途徑時,而分析的對像是相信批評家試圖與之保持距離的一些預期。第二個,引出歸因於對象的潛在反身性,是浪漫主義批判假設的近親,我稍後將結合沃爾特·本雅明的觀察來回顧。最後,相信批評是一種揭露或揭秘的行為,是公共領域形式的信仰條款,與我在其他地方所說的監督原則有關。在偏執的批評中,它變成了一種想像的、未經中介的暴露,一種純粹認知的力量。這種對曝光的信念往往隱含在所謂的批評中。

塞奇威克將偏執閱讀的基本要素歸納為:(1)對驚喜的預期性厭惡,被視為知識的唯一安全;(2)一種模仿的反思性,在該反思性中,評論家被視為使文本中潛在或隱藏的反思性變得明確;(3)堅持僅用其中心懷疑的條款來看待一切;(4)僅對負面情緒感興趣;以及(5)對揭露效力的看似無限的信念。所有這些都可以被視為批判性本身的一個或另一個規範項目的加強版本,儿其中一些的誇張程度,如(4),更為明顯。第一個,一種焦慮的預知性了解,在實踐中往往難以與普通的批判性距離區分開來——至少當疏離被視為獲取知識的必要途徑時,這種知識被威脅到了依附、融入或參與,而分析的對象被認為對評論家試圖對其保持距離有所預期。第二個,從對象中引出的潛在反思性的歸屬,與浪漫主義批評假設的親近表親,我將在後面與沃爾特·本雅明的一項觀察相關聯時再回到這點。最後一個,將批評視為揭露或解構行為的信念,在公共領域形式中與我在其他地方稱為監督原則相關。在偏執批評中,它已成為一種想像中的、未經媒介的揭露,一種僅憑了解的力量。

In making her polemic against critical criticism, Sedgwick also seeks to articulate, legitimate, and promote a loose array of alternative commentary forms among queer academics, which she groups under the name “reparative reading.” Reparative reading styles in her view have in common a rhetoric of attachment, investment, and fantasy about their textual occasions. For Sedgwick, these represent ways of reading that have been avoided or stigmatized as uncritical. They are certainly not preoccupied with critical distance toward their interpretive objects. But is reparative reading a structured program of reading or explication? For the most part Sedgwick describes it as local, detailed, and unsystematized. Even the patterns she singles out have this partial character, such as a willingness to describe fragments or passages without a total schematization of the text. For this reason, Sedgwick’s reparative reading seems to be defined less by any project of its own than by its recoil from a manically programmatic intensification of the critical. It is not so much a method as (principled?) avoidance of method.

在反對批評性批評的過程中,塞奇威克還試圖在酷兒學者中闡明、合法化和推廣一系列鬆散的另類評論形式,她將這些形式歸類為「修復性閱讀」。在她看來,修復性閱讀風格的共同點是對文字場合的依戀、投入和幻想。對塞奇威克來說,這些代表了被迴避或被指責為不批判的閱讀方式。他們當然不會專注於與他們的解釋對象之間的臨界距離。但修復性閱讀是一種結構化的閱讀或詮釋程序嗎?塞奇威克在很大程度上將其描述為局部的、詳細的和非系統化的。甚至她挑選出來的模式也有這種部分特徵,例如願意描述不帶任何內容的片段或段落。 文本的整體模式化。由於這個原因,塞奇威克的修復性閱讀似乎不是由其自身的任何項目來定義,而是由其對批評的狂躁綱領性強化的反感來定義。與其說這是一種方法,不如說是(有原則的?)避免方法。

在對批判性批評發起的爭論中,塞奇威克還試圖闡述、合法化並推廣一系列在酷兒學術界中的替代評論形式,她將其歸納為修復性閱讀。在她看來,修復性閱讀風格共有的是對其文本場合的依附、投入和幻想的修辭。對塞奇威克來說,這些代表了一些被避免或被貶低為不加批判的閱讀方式。它們顯然不是專注於對其解釋對象的批判性距離。但修復性閱讀是一個有結構的閱讀或解釋程序嗎?塞奇威克大多數情況下將其描述為局部的、詳細的和非系統化的。即使是她單獨指出的模式也具有這種片面性質,比如願意描述片段或段落,而不是對文本進行完整的概念化。因此,塞奇威克的修復性閱讀似乎不那麼是由其自身的任何項目所定義,而是由其對批判性的狂熱程式化強化的反彈所定義。它不那麼是一種方法,而更像是(有原則的?)避免方法。

A rather different picture of critical reading and its uncritical other can be glimpsed in the work of anthropologist Saba Mahmood, even though Mahmood is not especially concerned with texts. Where Sedgwick sees an exaggerated criticism being countered by partial projects of attachment and reverie, Mahmood in a very different context draws a contrast between a critical ethic and another, rival system, often deemed uncritical, but equally organized and methodized as an ethical project. In a searching analysis of the women’s mosque movement in Egypt, Mahmood shows its practical and ethical matrix is systematically misrecognized by feminists for whom the pursuit of autonomized agency through critical reflection is taken to be the only legitimate form of subjectivity. Mahmood works with women who aspire to be “slaves of God.” This apparent abnegation of agency in fact turns out to be pursued by an elaborate program of reflection, ritual practice, mutual correction, commentary, reasoning, habit-formation, and corporeal discipline—in short, a cultivation of piety. Mahmood argues that piety in this context cannot be seen as an uncritical attitude, or a survival of premodern tradition, or passivity, or unreflective conformity; it must rather be seen as an ethical project (where “ethical” is understood in the terms of the later Foucault) that has as its end a particular conception of the human being. This conception is fundamentally incommensurable with that of critical citizenship. And here Mahmood draws a further conclusion. It is not enough to do a critique or critical reading of the piety movement, for this leaves unquestioned precisely what is at stake: namely, the way the enframing of knowledge as critical presupposes a project for being a certain kind of person. The standard of the critical, Mahmood suggests, could and should be parochialized in turn as an ethical discipline of subjectivity rather than as the transparent medium of knowledge.5

在人類學家薩巴·馬哈茂德的作品中可以瞥見批判性閱讀和非批判性閱讀的截然不同的景象,儘管馬哈茂德並不特別關心文本。塞奇威克認為誇張的批評被部分依戀和遐想的項目所反駁,而馬哈茂德則在一個非常不同的背景下將批判性倫理與另一種競爭體系進行了對比,後者通常被認為是不批判的,但同樣作為一個倫理項目而組織和有條理。在對埃及婦女清真寺運動的深入分析中,馬哈茂德表明,其實踐和倫理矩陣被女權主義者係統性地錯誤認識,對她們來說,透過批判性反思追求自治機構被認為是唯一合法的主體性形式。馬哈茂德與渴望成為「上帝的奴隸」的女性一起工作。這種表面上對能動性的放棄實際上是透過精心設計的反思、儀式實踐、相互糾正、評論、推理、習慣形成和肉體紀律來追求的——簡而言之,是虔誠的培養。馬哈茂德認為,在這種情況下,虔誠不能被視為一種不加批判的態度,或者是前現代傳統的殘餘,或者是被動性,或者是不加反思的順從;相反,它必須被視為一個倫理項目(其中倫理是用後來的福柯的術語來理解的),其目的是對人類的特定概念。這種觀念與批判性公民觀念根本上是不可通約的。在這裡,馬哈茂德得出了進一步的結論。對虔誠運動進行批判或批評性的解讀是不夠的,因為這毫無疑問地明確了其中的利害關係:即,將知識作為批判性框架的方式預設了成為某種人的計劃。馬哈茂德認為,批判的標準可以而且應該被狹隘化為一種主體性的倫理紀律,而不是透明的知識媒介。5

在人類學家薩巴·馬赫穆德的工作中,可以看到一個與批判性閱讀及其不加批判的對立面截然不同的畫面,儘管馬赫穆德並不特別關注文本。在塞奇威克看到的是被依附和幻想的部分項目所對抗的誇張批評,在一個截然不同的背景下,馬赫穆德則描繪了批判倫理與另一個經常被認為是不加批判的、但同樣有組織和方法化的倫理項目之間的對比。在對埃及婦女清真寺運動的深入分析中,馬赫穆德展示了其實用和倫理框架是如何被那些認為通過批判性反思追求自主化能動性是唯一合法主體性形式的女性主義者系統性地誤解的。馬赫穆德與那些渴望成為上帝的奴隸的婦女合作。這種明顯的能動性放棄實際上被證明是通過一個精心的反思、儀式實踐、相互糾正、評論、推理、習慣形成和身體紀律的計劃來追求的——簡而言之,是一種虔誠的培養。馬赫穆德認為,在這種背景下,虔誠不能被視為一種不加批判的態度、前現代傳統的延續、被動性或非反思性的順從;它必須被視為一個倫理項目(在晚期福柯的條款中理解為倫理),其終極目標是對人類的特定概念。這種概念與批判公民身份根本不相容。在此,馬赫穆德得出了進一步的結論。僅僅進行對虔誠運動的批評或批判性閱讀是不夠的,因為這樣做恰恰沒有質疑到真正的問題所在:即將知識框架為批判性的前提是作為某種類型人的項目。馬赫穆德建議,批判標準應該並且可以反過來局限於作為主體性的倫理紀律,而不是作為知識的透明媒介。5

How could we extend Mahmood’s insight about the critical to an understanding of critical reading and its relation to other, putatively uncritical modes of reading? Mahmood does not herself analyze the textual arts. But she does note as germane to her analysis that the pietists’ preference for recitation as a mediation of Quranic text has to do with the cultivation of a dilated temporality to interrupt mundane time and reframe daily routine. Recitation and audition, in other words, are taken in this context to be techniques or arts for the inculcation of virtuous habits—not as a putatively primordial “orality” that would be the residual other of literacy. The important point in Mahmood’s analysis, though, is not just a different technique of textprocessing, or a different attitude about the text object, but a different kind of subject to which the technique is oriented.

我們如何將馬哈茂德關於批判性的見解擴展到對批判性閱讀及其與其他假定的非批判性閱讀模式的關係的理解?馬哈茂德本人並不分析文本藝術。但她確實指出,與她的分析密切相關的是 虔誠主義者偏好背誦《古蘭經》文本,這與培養擴張的時間性以打斷世俗時間並重新建構日常生活有關。換句話說,在這種情況下,背誦和聽力被視為灌輸道德習慣的技術或藝術,而不是被認為是識字的殘餘的原始口語。然而,馬哈茂德分析中的重點不僅在於不同的文本處理技術,或對文本對象的不同態度,而且在於該技術所針對的不同類型的主體。

我們如何將馬赫穆德對批判性的洞察擴展到對批判性閱讀及其與其他假定的不加批判閱讀方式的關係的理解上?馬赫穆德自己並未分析文本藝術。但她在分析中指出,虔誠者對於作為古蘭經文本媒介的誦讀的偏好,與培養一種擴張的時間性有關,這種時間性打斷了日常時間並重新構架日常例程。換句話說,在這種背景下,誦讀和聆聽被視為培養良好習慣的技術或藝術,而不是作為一種假定的原始「口傳性」,即文學的殘餘另類。然而,馬赫穆德分析中的重要點不僅僅是一種不同的文本處理技術,或對文本對象的不同態度,而是這種技術所指向的不同類型的主體。

Critical reading and uncritical reading, in this analysis, would need to be distinguished not so much on the basis of different technical methods, nor as reflective and unreflective versions of the mere processing of text artifacts, but as contrasting ways in which various techniques and forms can be embedded in an ethical problematic of subject-formation—in the case of critical reading, one oriented to freedom and autonomous agency against the background of a modern social imaginary. In the contrast between critical liberal secularism and the piety of the mosque movement, the difference can be very deep indeed, in a way made newly salient by the current political climate. But where cultures of textualism and their ethical projects are not thrown into such vivid contrast by the context of englobing struggles, it might be easy to miss the nuances by which reading practices are embedded within and organized by ethical projects for cultivating one kind of person or another. The broad contrast Mahmood draws between secular criticism and a specific tradition of Islamic piety, in other words, might be only the beginning, leading us to recognize that a great variety of text practices and ethical projects have been consolidated as, or assimilated to, the picture of critical reading—with everything else being left unthought as uncritical.

在這種分析中,批判性閱讀和非批判性閱讀需要區分的不是基於不同的技術方法,也不是單純處理文本工件的反思性和非反思性版本,而是不同技術和形式的對比方式。可以嵌入主體形成的倫理問題中──就批判性閱讀而言,是一種在現代社會想像背景下面向自由和自主機構的問題。批判性的自由世俗主義和清真寺運動的虔誠之間的對比確實可能非常深刻,在某種程度上,當前的政治氣候使之更加突出。但是,如果文本主義文化及其倫理計劃沒有在全球鬥爭的背景下形成如此鮮明的對比,那麼人們可能很容易忽視閱讀實踐嵌入到倫理計劃中並由倫理計劃組織起來的細微差別,以培養一種人或一種人。其他。換句話說,馬哈茂德在世俗批評和特定的伊斯蘭虔誠傳統之間進行了廣泛的對比,這可能只是一個開始,使我們認識到各種各樣的文本實踐和倫理項目已經被鞏固或同化為批判性閱讀的圖像——其他一切都被視為不批判的。

在這種分析中,批判性閱讀和不加批判的閱讀需要被區分開來,這種區分不那麼基於不同的技術方法,也不僅僅是對文本工藝品單純處理的反思性和非反思性版本,而是作為各種技術和形式被嵌入主體形成的倫理問題的對立方式——在批判性閱讀的情況下,是一種面向自由和自主能動性的方式,背景是現代社會的想像。在批判性自由主義世俗主義與清真寺運動的虔誠之間的對比中,差異可能非常深刻,以一種當前政治氣候新近凸顯的方式。但是,在文本主義及其倫理項目的文化並未被當下的全面鬥爭所鮮明對比的背景下,人們可能容易忽略閱讀實踐如何被倫理項目內嵌和組織,以培養這樣或那樣的人。換句話說,馬赫穆德所描繪的世俗批評與伊斯蘭虔誠特定傳統之間的廣泛對比,可能只是開端,引領我們認識到多種文本實踐和倫理項目已被整合成或同化為批判性閱讀的圖景——而其他一切則被視為不加批判而未被思考。

To pose the problem of critical and uncritical reading in this way is to ask new questions about what counts as critical, what it might be shorthand for, what distinct projects might be caught up in the tar of the uncritical, and how different ethical orientations might inflect different arts of commentary or practices of text-objectification and text-realization. This of course is a vast project. It is not my intention to undertake it here in any thorough way. I can neither give a full analysis of the kinds of agency and subjectivity that have at various points been classed as critical or uncritical, nor show in detail how they have been correlated with different textual arts. But I can try to suggest some ways that these questions can reframe existing scholarship in the history and theory of reading. In the remainder of this essay I revisit some of the main topoi in recent studies of the history of reading in order to pose, rather than answer, this question: how have various arts of commentary and practices of text-rendering come to be linked to the ethical projects organized on the axis of the critical and the uncritical? And what might we see in this history if we did not take critical reading as an invisible norm?

以這種方式提出批判性和非批判性閱讀的問題,就是提出新的問題:什麼算是批判性的、它可能是簡寫的、哪些不同的項目可能會陷入非批判性的焦油中,以及不同的道德取向可能會如何影響。體現不同的評論藝術或文本客觀化和文本實現的實踐。這當然是一個浩大的工程。我無意在這裡以任何徹底的方式進行它。我既無法對在不同點上被歸類為批判性或非批判性的能動性和主觀性進行全面分析,也無法詳細展示它們如何與不同的文本藝術相關聯。但我可以嘗試提出一些方法,使這些問題能夠重新建構閱讀歷史和理論中的現有學術成果。在本文的其餘部分中,我回顧了最近閱讀史研究中的一些主要主題,以便提出而不是回答這個問題:各種評論藝術和文本呈現實踐如何與閱讀史聯繫起來?以批判和非批判為軸心組織的道德項目?如果我們不把批判性閱讀視為一種無形的規範,我們會在這段歷史中看到什麼?

以這種方式提出批判性和不加批判性閱讀的問題,是在提出關於何謂批判性、它可能是什麼的簡稱、哪些不同的項目可能被捲入不加批判的泥潭,以及不同的倫理取向如何影響不同的評論藝術或文本客觀化和實現的實踐。這當然是一個龐大的項目。我在這裡無意以任何徹底的方式進行它。我既不能全面分析在不同時點被歸類為批判性或不加批判性的各種能動性和主體性,也無法詳細展示它們如何與不同的文本藝術相關聯。但我可以嘗試提出一些方式,這些問題可以重塑閱讀歷史和理論方面現有的學術研究。在本文的剩餘部分,我重新審視閱讀歷史近期研究中的一些主要話題,以提出而非回答這個問題:各種評論藝術和文本呈現實踐是如何與圍繞批判性和不加批判性軸心組織的倫理項目相聯繫的?如果我們不將批判性閱讀視為一個看不見的規範,我們在這段歷史中又能看到什麼?

 

 

 

 

 

 

II

Surprisingly, given the volume of recent scholarship on the history of reading, I have found no history of the protocols and norms for a discipline of critical reading as such. Maybe this should not be surprising. Since literary critics tend to think of critical reading as the necessary form of any self-conscious reading, they seldom imagine it as the kind of practice that might have—as I think it does—a history, an intergeneric matrix of forms, a discipline. Histories of reading have been dominated either by inquiries into the material forms of texts or by the sort of simple classifications that can be made by outside observers without reference to the normative orientations of readers (e.g., “extensive” versus “intensive” reading, silent or vocalized, etc.). It is not immediately clear how a history of what counts as critical reading might be imagined, or what alternative reading disciplines might be misrecognized as uncritical.

令人驚訝的是,考慮到最近關於閱讀史的學術研究,我沒有發現批判性閱讀學科的協議和規範的歷史。也許這並不奇怪。由於文學批評家傾向於將批判性閱讀視為任何自覺閱讀的必要形式,因此他們很少將其想像為一種可能(正如我認為的那樣)的實踐,一種歷史,一種跨屬形式的矩陣,一門學科。閱讀史要麼被對文本物質形式的探究所主導,要麼被外部觀察者在不考慮讀者規範取向的情況下做出的簡單分類所主導(例如,「廣泛」閱讀與「精讀」閱讀、默讀和默讀)。或發聲等)。目前還不清楚如何想像批判性閱讀的歷史,或者哪些替代閱讀學科可能被誤認為是非批判性的。

令人驚訝的是,鑑於近來有關閱讀歷史的大量學術研究,我並未找到任何關於作為一門學科的批判性閱讀的協議和規範的歷史。或許這不應該令人驚訝。由於文學批評家傾向於將批判性閱讀視為任何自覺閱讀的必要形式,他們很少將其想像為一種可能具有歷史、跨類型形式矩陣和學科紀律的實踐——正如我所認為的那樣。閱讀的歷史一直受到對文本物質形式的探究或外部觀察者所做的簡單分類(例如,廣泛對比深入閱讀,默讀或出聲閱讀等)所主導,這些分類不涉及讀者的規範取向。如何想像批判性閱讀的歷史,或可能被誤認為不加批判的其他閱讀學科,並不立即清晰。

Thanks to the energies of some very inventive historians of the book, however, there is a large literature that might be related to this topic. These historians have produced a new paradigm in which reading is understood as a highly variable practice, intimately related to the material organization of texts. They have denaturalized many of our assumptions about what it means to read. And this is essential in grasping what critical or uncritical reading could mean, since the mental image of critical reading seems to require at minimum a clear opposition between the text object and the reading subject—indeed, critical reading could be thought of as an ideal for maximizing that polarity, defining the reader’s freedom and agency as an expression of distance from a text that must be objectified as a benchmark of distanciation.

然而,由於一些非常有創造力的歷史學家對本書的研究,有大量文獻可能與這個主題相關。這些歷史學家創造了一種新的範式,其中閱讀被理解為一種高度可變的實踐,與文本的材料組織密切相關。他們改變了我們對閱讀意義的許多假設。這對於理解批判性或非批判性閱讀的含義至關重要,因為批判性閱讀的心理形像似乎至少需要文本對象和閱讀主題之間存在明確的對立——事實上,批判性閱讀可以被認為是一種理想的閱讀方式。最大化這種極性,將讀者的自由和能動性定義為與文本的距離的表達,必須將其客觀化為距離的基準

然而,多虧了一些非常有創意的書籍歷史學家的努力,我們有了一大批可能與此主題相關的文獻。這些歷史學家創造了一個新範式,在這個範式中,閱讀被理解為一種高度多變的實踐,與文本的物質組織密切相關。他們對我們關於閱讀意味著什麼的許多假設進行了去自然化處理。而這對於理解批判性或不加批判性閱讀可能意味著什麼至關重要,因為批判性閱讀的心理形象似乎至少需要文本對象與閱讀主體之間的清晰對立——實際上,批判性閱讀可以被認為是最大化這種兩極分化的理想,將讀者的自由和能動性定義為與必須作為距離標準的客觀文本距離的表達。

This is precisely the sort of assumption about what texts are and how readers approach them (including this idea that texts are objects that readers “approach”) that the new historians of reading dispute. They have shown that centuries of innovations in the formalization of easily navigable texts lie behind such a picture. Guglielmo Cavallo and Roger Chartier, in their survey of the new histories of reading, note that there is evidence from as early as the fourth or even fifth centuries BCE of “a reading style capable of reading ‘through’ a text and permitting attentive consideration, examination and probing of what was being read.”6 The great library of Alexandria, they note, gives evidence of specialized practices of entextualization and the rationalization of access:

這正是新閱讀史學家所爭論的關於文本是什麼以及讀者如何接近文本的假設(包括文本是讀者「接近」的對象的觀點)。他們表明,在這樣的圖景背後,隱藏著幾個世紀以來在易於導航的文本形式化方面的創新。古列爾莫 卡瓦洛(Cavallo )和羅傑·沙蒂耶(Roger Chartier)在對新閱讀史的調查中指出,早在公元前四世紀甚至五世紀就有證據表明一種能夠'通讀'文本並允許仔細思考、檢查的閱讀風格」。他們指出,亞歷山大大圖書館提供了具體實踐和訪問合理化的證據:

正是對文本本質以及讀者如何接近它們(包括這種讀者接近文本對象的想法)的這種假設,是新的閱讀歷史學家所爭議的。他們展示了幾個世紀以來在形式化易於導航的文本背後的創新。古列爾莫·卡瓦洛和羅傑·夏蒂埃在他們對新閱讀歷史的綜述中指出,早在公元前四或五世紀就有一種能夠穿透文本並允許仔細考慮、審查和探究所閱讀內容的閱讀風格的證據。6 他們指出,亞歷山大圖書館的存在證明了專門的文本化實踐和存取合理化。

It was universal because it was dedicated to the preservation of books of all ages and from the entire known world; it was rational because the books it contained were to be reduced to order and to a system of classification . . . that enabled them to be arranged according to author, work and content. That universality and rationality, however, were directly dependent on writings that could be evaluated critically, copied, put into a book, categorized and placed with other books. (10)

它具有普遍性,因為它致力於保存各個時代和整個已知世界的書籍;它是合理的,因為它所包含的書籍將被簡化為順序和分類系統。 。這使得它們能夠根據作者、作品和內容進行排列。然而,這種普遍性和合理性直接依賴於可以批判性地評估、複製、放入書中、分類並與其他書籍放在一起的著作。 (10)

這是因為該圖書館致力於保存所有年代和已知世界的書籍;它之所以合理,是因為它所收藏的書籍要被整理成序並歸類成一個系統……這使得它們可以按照作者、作品和內容進行排列。然而,這種普遍性和合理性直接依賴於可以被批判性地評估、複製、裝訂成書、分類並與其他書籍放置在一起的著作。(10

Our history might evidently be a long one, if we think of critical reading this broadly. But what does “evaluated critically” mean here? This story usefully emphasizes the material conditions for the objectification and segmentation of discourse that are presupposed by the ideal of critical reading; and the contributors to Cavallo and Chartier’s book add many more, such as the triumph of the codex format in antiquity to the elimination of scriptio continua in the late Middle Ages.

如果我們廣泛地進行批判性閱讀,我們的歷史顯然可能很長。但這裡的「批判性評估」是什麼意思呢?這個故事有效地強調了批判性閱讀理想所預設的話語客觀化和細分的物質條件。 CavalloChartier 的書的貢獻者還添加了更多內容,例如古代抄本格式的勝利以及中世紀晚期scriptio Continua的消除。

如果我們將批判性閱讀這樣廣泛地考慮,那我們的歷史可能會很長。但這裡的批判性評估是什麼意思呢?這個故事有助於強調批判性閱讀理想所預設的話語客體化和分段的物質條件;卡瓦洛和夏蒂埃的著作中的貢獻者們還添加了許多其他內容,比如古代抄本格式的勝利到中世紀後期連續書寫的消除。

This scholarship has the great advantage of reminding us that what we call critical reading presupposes forms for textual objectification and a web of social relations around text objects. When ancient Greeks appointed readers—in some cases slaves—whose task was to vocalize texts of laws or monuments so that auditors might reflect on them, it would not have seemed obvious that the act of reading itself had a critical orientation.7 A great many techniques of entextualization have to be laminated together to enable the free movement of critical evaluation in relation to its objects.8 But did critical evaluation appear as the inevitable meaning of the new procedures of text-objectification? And could that mean the same thing for the monks of Alexandria and for modern students?

這項獎學金的巨大優勢在於提醒我們,我們所謂的批判性閱讀以文本客觀化的形式和圍繞文本對象的社會關係網為先決條件。當古希臘人任命閱讀者(在某些情況下是奴隸)時,其任務是宣讀法律或紀念碑的文本,以便審計員可以對其進行反思,但閱讀行為本身俱有批判性取向似乎並不明顯。 7文本客觀化的技術必須被層壓在一起,以使批判性評價能夠自由地與其對象相關。8但是,批判性評價是否表現為文本客觀化新程序的必然意義?和 這對亞歷山大的僧侶和現代學生來說意味著同樣的事情嗎?

這些學術研究的巨大優勢在於提醒我們,我們所謂的批判性閱讀預設了文本客體化的形式和圍繞文本對象的社會關係網絡。當古希臘人指定讀者——在某些情況下是奴隸——他們的任務是將法律或紀念碑的文本出聲閱讀,以便聽眾可以對其進行反思,這時閱讀行為本身具有批判性傾向並不是顯而易見的。7 為了使批判性評估相對於其對象的自由運動成為可能,必須將大量的文本化技術層層結合在一起。8 但批判性評估是否作為新的文本客體化程序的不可避免含義出現?這對亞歷山大的僧侶和現代學生意味著同樣的事情嗎?

The modern idea of critical reading clearly draws on a very old tradition that has gone under other names for most of its history. Martin Irvine sees the textual culture of Western Europe as having had a remarkable continuity for more than 1,200 years in the artes grammaticae of the learned. Most of the forms of entextualization that are now simply taken for granted in the word text developed over this long history of grammatica, with its fourfold division of the scientia interpretandi: lectio (rules for construing and reciting); enarratio (rules for interpretation, including tropes, topics, syntax and semantics); emendatio (rules for authenticating and correcting); and iudicium (evaluation).9 The modern idea of critical reading reorganizes this tradition, enfolding the last three of the four categories. And there are many features of the scholarly textual culture that of course came to be paradigmatic of uncritical reading. For example, the performance of critical reading as a mode of free agency requires that it not be seen as a strict application of rules, in the manner of grammatica. But because grammatica formalized a fundamental relation between a systematized analytic metalanguage and its codified entextualized objects, critical reading could modify the metapragmatic framework while maintaining most of the older forms of textual objectification. The modern idea also continued the pattern in grammatica of imagining the specialized techniques of literacy as the model of a much broader normative program—the first of the liberal arts. “Learning, interpretation, and religious understanding,” Irvine writes, “were all defined in the terms of the large field of discourse that spread out from the practice of grammatica in schools, libraries and scriptoria.”10

現代批判性閱讀的概念顯然借鑒了一種非常古老的傳統,而這種傳統在其大部分歷史中都以其他名稱命名。馬丁歐文 (Martin Irvine) 認為西歐的文本文化在藝術領域有著 1,200 多年的顯著連續性 所學的語法。現在在單字文本中被認為是理所當然的大多數語境化形式都是在語法學的漫長歷史中發展起來的,科學界有四重劃分。 Interpretandi : lectio (解釋和背誦規則); enarratio (解釋規則,包括比喻、主題、語法和語義); emendatio (驗證和更正規則); 9現代批判性閱讀理念重組了這個傳統,涵蓋了四個類別中的最後三個。學術文本文化的許多特徵當然成為了不加批判的閱讀的典範。例如,作為自由機構模式的批判性閱讀的表現要求它不能被視為以語法方式嚴格應用規則。但由於語法形式化了系統化的分析元語言與其編纂的語境化對象之間的基本關係,批判性閱讀可以修改元語用框架,同時保留大多數舊形式的文本客觀化。現代思想也延續了文法模式,將專門的識字技術想像為更廣泛的規範性計劃(第一個文科)的模型。 「學習、解釋和宗教理解,」歐文寫道,「都是用從學校、圖書館和書寫室的語法實踐中傳播出來的廣闊話語領域來定義的。」10

現代批判性閱讀的觀念顯然源於一個非常古老的傳統,這個傳統在其歷史的大部分時間裡以其他名稱存在。馬丁·厄文認為,西歐的文本文化在學習的藝術方面擁有超過1200年的顯著連續性。大多數現在在文本這個詞中被視為理所當然的文本化形式都是在這段漫長的語法史上發展出來的,其四分法包括了解釋科學:lectio(構詞和朗讀規則);enarratio(解釋規則,包括修辭、話題、語法和語義);emendatio(驗證和校正規則);和iudicium(評估)。9 現代批判性閱讀的觀念重組了這一傳統,將後三類融合在一起。當然,許多學術文本文化的特徵後來成為了不加批判閱讀的典範。例如,作為自由能動性的批判性閱讀表現需要它不被視為嚴格遵循語法規則的應用。但因為語法將一個系統化的分析元語言和其編碼的文本化對象之間的基本關係形式化,批判性閱讀可以在保留大部分舊有的文本客體化形式的同時,修改元語用框架。現代觀念還延續了語法中將專業技術的識字技巧想像為更廣泛規範計劃的模式——自由藝術的第一門。學習、解釋和宗教理解,厄文寫道,都是根據從學校、圖書館和抄寫室的語法實踐中擴散出來的大型話語領域的條款來定義的。”10

What we mean by critical reading obviously has deep roots, some phases of which (such as humanist philology) have been studied with more attention than others.11 The phrase critical reading itself, though commonly taken by us to indicate a natural kind of reading—right, reasonable, free, and good, but often not much more specific than that— is, however, a relatively recent coinage, its current sense being difficult to find before the eighteenth century. It can be clearly seen in Romantic aesthetic philosophy, where already it is fused with the concept of the work of art. This was demonstrated in a brilliant work by the young Walter Benjamin:

我們所說的批判性閱讀顯然有著深刻的根源,其中的某些階段(例如人文主義語言學)比其他階段受到了更多的關注。11批判性閱讀這個短語本身,儘管我們通常認為它是一種自然的閱讀—— “正確合理自由善良,但往往並不比這更具體——然而,這是一個相對較新的造詞,在18 世紀之前很難找到它目前的含義。在浪漫主義美學哲學中可以清楚地看到這一點,它已經與浪漫主義的概念融合在一起。 藝術品。年輕的沃爾特·本傑明的一部出色的作品證明了這一點:

我們所謂的批判性閱讀顯然有深厚的根基,其中某些階段(如人文主義的語文學)比其他階段受到了更多的關注。11 儘管我們通常將批判性閱讀這一詞語理所當然地看作是一種自然的閱讀方式——正確、合理、自由、良好,但通常不會更具體——這一詞語卻是一個相對較新的創造,其當前意義在18世紀之前很難找到。它在浪漫主義美學哲學中可以清楚地看到,那時它已經與藝術作品的概念融合在一起。這一點在沃爾特·本雅明年輕時所著的一部杰出作品中得到了展示:

The immanent tendency of the work and, accordingly, the standard for its immanent criticism are the reflection that lies at its basis and is imprinted in its form. Yet this is, in truth, not so much a standard of judgment as, first and foremost, the foundation of a completely different kind of criticism—one which is not concerned with judging, and whose center of gravity lies not in the evaluation of the single work but in demonstrating its relations to all other works and, ultimately, to the idea of art. . . . Criticism of a work is, rather, its reflection, which can only, as is self-evident, unfold the germ of the reflection that is immanent to the work. . . . For the value of a work depends solely on whether it makes its immanent critique possible or not.12

作品的內在傾向以及相應的內在批評標準是其基礎上的反映,並印刻在其形式中。然而,事實上,這與其說是一種判斷標準,不如說是一種完全不同的批評的基礎——這種批評不關心判斷,其重心不在於對事物的評價。單一作品,但展示其與所有其他作品的關係,並最終與藝術理念的關係。 。對一部作品的批評,正是它的反思,這是不言而喻的,它只能揭示作品內在的反思的萌芽。 。因為作品的價值完全取決於它是否使其內在的批評成為可能。12

作品的內在傾向,以及相應的內在批評標準,是其基礎上的反思,並印在其形式中。然而,這實際上不那麼是一個判斷標準,而首先是一種完全不同的批評——一種不關心判斷的批評,其重心不在於對單一作品的評價,而在於展示它與所有其他作品的關聯,最終與藝術的理念……一個作品的批評實際上是其反思,這只能毫無疑問地展開作品內在反思的萌芽……因為一部作品的價值僅取決於它是否使其內在批評成為可能或不。”12

With this conception of art, Romanticism deepened the ideal of critical reading, as opposed to any other kind of reading, making it seem like the unfolding of the necessity of art itself. From this point the adjective critical acquires a new salience.

透過這種藝術觀念,浪漫主義深化了批判性閱讀的理想,這與任何其他類型的閱讀不同,使其看起來像是藝術本身的必要性的展開。從這時起,「批判」這個形容詞就獲得了新的意義。

(token受限,後不再譯,以左方google翻譯為準)

This conception rests, however, on earlier developments, such as the apparent universalization of the critical role in the public sphere.13 Its importance to our pedagogy almost certainly has to do with even later developments, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, since it explicates and makes possible the kind of discourse that constitutes the profession itself. The critical reading we teach, in other words, might be largely projected from our own circulatory practices. I suspect it is indeed an essential element of critical reading that the reader be imagined as a producer of discourse. Critical reading, in this context, means a discipline of commentary, projected as immanent to reading. But a real explanation must go farther; the self-interest of professionalized critics is insufficient to explain how a profession oriented to the teaching of critical reading could justify itself as a necessity to nonprofessionals.

然而,這個概念依賴早期的發展,例如公共領域中關鍵作用的明顯普遍化。13它對我們教育學的重要性幾乎肯定與十九世紀末和二十世紀初的更晚的發展有關,因為它闡明了構成該職業本身的話語並使之成為可能。換句話說,我們教授的批判性閱讀可能很大程度上來自於我們自己的循環實踐。我懷疑將讀者想像為話語的生產者確實是批判性閱讀的基本要素。在這種情況下,批判性閱讀意味著一種評論學科,被視為閱讀的內在內容。但真正的解釋必須走得更遠;專業批評家的自身利益不足以解釋以批判性閱讀教學為導向的職業如何能夠證明自己是非專業人士的必需品。

 

Obviously, more is at stake than mere text-processing, at one extreme, or the virtuosic textualism of professional critics, at the other extreme. Because the techniques of distanciating knowledge are tied to a subjectivity-forming ascesis toward freedom and have come to define agency in modern culture, a discipline of critical reading can draw on the widest cultural-historical meanings of critical reason. We can see this in Immanuel Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?,” which derives so much from the idea of critical reading. “It is so easy to be immature!” he exclaims in the second paragraph. “If I have a book to have understanding in place of me . . . I need not make any efforts at all.” Kant contrasts this immature, replicative reading with the public use of reason, of which his supreme example is “a man of learning addressing the entire reading public.” His assumption, evidently, is that the readers of that public must read differently from the immature person.

顯然,這不僅僅是一個極端的文本處理,或另一個極端的專業批評家的精湛文本主義。因為疏離知識的技術與形成主體性、走向自由的苦行連結在一起,已經開始定義 作為現代文化的代理,批判性閱讀學科可以利用批判理性最廣泛的文化歷史意義。我們可以在伊曼紐爾·康德的《什麼是啟蒙運動? 》中看到這一點,很大程度上源於批判性閱讀的理念。很容易變得不成熟!他在第二段中驚呼。 「如果有一本書可以代替我去理解。 。我根本不需要做任何努力。康德將這種不成熟的、重複性的閱讀與理性的公共使用進行了對比,他的最高例子是「一個有學問的人向整個閱讀公眾講話」。顯然,他的假設是,公眾讀者的閱讀方式必須與不成熟的人不同。

 

The effort that Kant thought readers should make in order to read for themselves takes on, for him, the coloration of the rest of his project; critical reading is an image of a certain kind of critical reason. And that association has left its imprint. Kant’s English translators used the French word critique to translate the German word kritik, thus creating within English a difference between criticism and critique. This may have been done to capture the special sense of kritik in Kant as (in Walter Benjamin’s phrase) “an esoteric term for the incomparable and completed philosophical standpoint”; but its subsequent usage is much broader.14 Ever since, critical reading has been identified with an ideal of critique as a negative movement of distanciation, whether of disengagement or repudiation. (Ironically this might be most true within cultural studies, which often prides itself in anti-Kantianism.)

康德認為讀者應該為自己閱讀而付出的努力,對他來說,為他的計劃的其餘部分增添了色彩。批判性閱讀是某種批判性理性的形象。這種聯繫已經留下了印記。康德的英語譯者使用法語單字 critique 來翻譯德語單字kritik ,從而在英語中創造了批評和批判之間的區別。這樣做可能是為了捕捉康德的批判的特殊含義(用沃爾特·本雅明的話來說)一個深奧的術語,代表無與倫比的和完整的哲學立場;但它隨後的用法要廣泛得多。14從那時起,批判性閱讀就被認為是一種消極的疏遠運動,無論是脫離還是否認。 (諷刺的是,這在文化研究中可能是最真實的,文化研究常常以反康德主義而自豪。)

 

There is a great deal of continuity between Kant’s picture of critical reading and dominant ideologies of reading in twentieth-century public culture, as can be seen in such manuals as How to Read a Book, the 1940 classic by Mortimer Adler and Charles Van Doren, or more recently How to Read and Why, by Harold Bloom. Adler and Van Doren call their model “active reading,” and they make it clear that they intend a whole style of personality and culture to flow from the practices that they recommend. It is, quite clearly, a discipline. Just as Kant exclaims that, “If I have a book to have understanding in place of me . . . I need not make any efforts at all,” so Adler and Van Doren write that “to pass from understanding less to understanding more by your own intellectual effort in reading is something like pulling yourself up by your bootstraps.”15 For Bloom as well, the problem of reading is essentially one of individual self-positing. His book opens with this declaration: “It matters, if individuals are to retain any capacity to form their own judgments and opinions, that they continue to read for themselves.”16

Doren ) 1940 年的經典著作《如何閱讀一本書》等手冊中看出。或最近哈羅德·布魯姆(Harold Bloom)的《如何閱讀和為何閱讀》。阿德勒和範多倫將他們的模型稱為主動閱讀,他們明確表示,他們希望從他們推薦的實踐中產生一種完整的個性和文化風格。很明顯,這是一門學科。正如康德所感嘆的那樣:如果我有一本書可以代替我的理解…” 。我根本不需要做出任何努力,」因此阿德勒和範多倫寫道,「透過自己在閱讀中的智力努力,從理解較少到理解更多,就像是靠自己的力量把自己拉起來。」15對布魯姆來說也是如此,閱讀問題本質上是一個個人的自我定位問題。他的書以這樣的宣言開頭:「重要的是,如果 個人應保留形成自己的判斷和意見的能力,並繼續自己閱讀。」16

 

Kant suggests that the difference between his two models of reading is that between a reliance on external authority and the maturitybestowing exercise of independent thought—a difference, in other words, within the individual. But if we were to inquire into the history of this normative program, surely we would want to cast our net a little wider than the individual reader. The new histories of reading suggest that a vast cultural matrix is condensed into, and taken for granted as, critical reading: complex practices of entextualization and explicit metadiscourse (archives, annotation, indices, debate genres, commentary, summary and paraphrase, critical essays, professional scholarship, research). These allow reading to be understood as realizing a set of normative stances (especially critical distance, reflexivity, and explicitness, but generally others as well, such as independence, irony, or subversiveness) that in turn produce kinds of subjectivity (autonomy, individuality, freedom, citizenship, enlightenment) structured by a hierarchy of faculties.17

康德認為,他的兩種閱讀模式之間的區別在於對外在權威的依賴和獨立思考的成熟性之間的區別,換句話說,這是個人內在的區別。但如果我們要探究這項規範性計畫的歷史,我們肯定會希望將我們的網撒得比個人讀者更廣泛一些。新的閱讀史表明,一個巨大的文化矩陣被濃縮成批判性閱讀,並被理所當然地視為批判性閱讀:語境化和明確元話語的複雜實踐(檔案、註釋、索引、辯論流派、評論、總結與釋義、批判性文章、專業獎學金、研究)。這些使得閱讀被理解為實現一系列規範立場(尤其是批判距離、反身性和明確性,但通常還有其他立場,例如獨立性、反諷性或顛覆性),這些立場反過來又產生各種主觀性(自主性、個體性、自由、公民權、啟蒙)由能力等級結構所構成。17

 

One might be forgiven, given the derivation of the word critic, for thinking that critical reading is oriented to judgments of value, to sorting worth. Critical reading, one might think, would be reading that reflects on its own aesthetic judgments. But one would evidently be wrong. Professionalized literary criticism has for the most part given up the business of taste-making; that has been turned over to unprofessionalized book reviewers. Critical reading is very different, it seems, from what the critic (in the usual sense) does. Indeed, someone who reads just to decide whether she likes something is more likely to be counted by us as an uncritical reader. The critical posture seems not to be the thumbs-up-thumbs-down decision of aesthetic judgment. (Benjamin notes this in the passage quoted above.) Aesthetic judgment is practiced in countless domains; but when was the last time you heard solemn injunctions to practice critical gardening, or critical hairstyling?

考慮到批評者這個詞的起源,人們可能會認為批判性閱讀是以價值判斷、價值排序為導向的。人們可能會認為,批判性閱讀是一種反思自身美學判斷的閱讀。但顯然這是錯誤的。專業化的文學批評大部分已經放棄了品味營造的任務;已移交給非專業書評家。批判性閱讀似乎與批評家(通常意義上的)所做的事情有很大不同。事實上,那些只是為了決定自己是否喜歡某樣東西而閱讀的人更有可能被我們視為不加批判的讀者。批判的姿態似乎不是審美判斷的豎起大拇指的決定。 (本傑明在上面引用的段落中註意到了這一點。)美學判斷在無數領域中得到實踐。但你最後一次聽到嚴肅的指示,要求你進行批判性的園藝或批判性的髮型設計是什麼時候?

 

To some degree the separation of criticism from taste can be seen already in the Aristotelian conception of the kritikos. Aristotle methodically distinguishes his critical judgment from the taste judgments of audiences or the publics of popular contests. Criticism is the practice of the few, not of the many. The critic’s work, as Andrew Ford summarizes it, “is not to evaluate the moral or ethical value of particular poems, but to derive from an examination of all forms of poetry the principles governing each kind and determining its proper pleasure.”18 The critic thus comes into being as the counterpart not only of the work, but of the audience. Nevertheless Aristotle uses the term kritikos to describe a man of judgment in general, and it is skill in judgment that makes literary criticism a mode of ethical life and citizenship. The modern ideal of critical reading means something quite different. Like Aristotle’s, it also entails—more explicitly in some cases than in others—an ethical personality and a model of citizenship. But it has to do less with habits and skills of judgment than with openness to criticism. Indeed, one of its hallmarks is the reservation of judgment.

在某種程度上,批評與品味的分離已經可以在亞里斯多德的批評概念中看到。亞里斯多德有條不紊地將他的批判性判斷與觀眾或大眾競賽中的品味判斷區分開來。批評是少數人的做法,而不是多數人的做法。正如安德魯·福特總結的那樣,批評家的工作「不是評估特定詩歌的道德或倫理價值,而是從對所有詩歌形式的審查中得出管理每種詩歌並確定其適當樂趣的原則。」18因此,批評者不僅是作品的對手,也是觀眾的對手。然而,亞里斯多德使用「批判」一詞來描述一般的判斷力的人,正是判斷力的技巧使文學批評成為一種道德生活和公民身份的模式。現代理想的批判性閱讀意味著完全不同的東西。就像亞里斯多德的思想一樣,它也包含——在某些情況下比在其他情況下更明確——道德人格和公民模式。但它與習慣和判斷技巧的關係不大,而是與對批評的開放態度有關。事實上,它的特點之一就是保留判斷力。

 

Despite the differences between the ancient and modern understandings of the critical role, much can be learned about the nature of critical reading from Ford’s historical account, The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece. Ford’s insight is that the main constituents of literary criticism—the idea of genre, the conception of poesis as artifact-making, formal criteria of value— reorganized the archaic song and performance practices that criticism purported merely to describe. Thus the earliest recorded judgments of worth about song have to do with appropriateness to context, where song is primarily understood as ritual performance in an ethical environment of context-specific obligations. Gradually such performances came to be reclassified as belonging not just to their immediate occasions but also to formally defined classes of comparable performances: genres. The new mode of judgment entailed both gain and loss, since the ethical context of judgment—in which assessing song was a matter of determining the nature of the social occasion and one’s proper comportment in it—could now be provisionally set aside.

儘管古代和現代對批評作用的理解存在差異,但從福特的歷史敘述《批評的起源:古典希臘的文學文化和詩學理論》中可以學到很多關於批評性閱讀的本質。福特的見解是,文學批評的主要組成部分——體裁觀念、作為工藝品製作的詩歌概念、正式的價值標準——重新組織了批評僅僅旨在描述的古老歌曲和表演實踐。因此,最早記錄的關於歌曲價值的判斷與對背景的適當性有關,其中歌曲主要被理解為在特定背景義務的道德環境中的儀式表演。逐漸地,此類表演被重新分類為不僅屬於其直接場合,而且還屬於正式定義的類似表演類別:流派。新的判斷模式既有得也有失,因為判斷的倫理背景——評價歌曲是決定社交場合的性質和一個人在其中的適當舉止的問題——現在可以暫時擱置。

 

For those who were willing, in certain contexts, to dispense altogether with moral and ethical considerations in assessing artistic merit, the loss of these criteria was compensated for by making linguistic form expressive in itself. “Song” had become “poetry,” and poetry was a special art of using language, the paradigmatic example of what we have called since the eighteenth century “literature.”19

對於那些在某些情況下願意在評估藝術價值時完全放棄道德和倫理考慮的人來說,這些標準的喪失可以透過使語言形式本身俱有表現力來補償。歌曲變成了詩歌,而詩歌是一種使用語言的特殊藝術,是十八世紀以來我們所說的文學的典型例子。19

 

The process by which performances were objectified, classified, entextualized, systematized as genre, and circulated (as, for example, in contests) was long and conflicted. By the time of the schools it resulted in a special mode of evaluation, systematically distinguished from ordinary judgments of ethical appropriateness or taste, practiced by sophists and philosophers. The increasing use of writing for song texts obviously played some role in the process, but it would be extremely reductive to think that the transformation could be explained by such simple categories as “oral” and “written.” The emergence of the critic required new conceptions of what a text was, what class of things it resembled (skilled artifacts), how it was related to a producer (poet), how it might be classified apart from its performance context. In each case, earlier conceptions had to be displaced in order to make room for new, critic-friendly categories such as genre. “It is Romantic to think of some fall from pure unstructuredness into genres,” Ford writes; “what the fourth-century literary theorists did was transform traditional religious and social structures that had had implications for form into literary and formal structures that had implications for society and religion.”20 What Ford’s analysis helps us to understand in concrete detail is that the role of the critic is not merely reading—that is, a relation between a knower and a text. It presupposes a complex history of entextualization and a reordering of social occasions.

化、系統化為流派並傳播的過程(例如, 比賽)是漫長而矛盾的。到了學校時代,它產生了一種特殊的評估模式,系統地區別於詭辯家和哲學家所實踐的道德適當性或品味的普通判斷。歌曲文字寫作的日益增多顯然在這一過程中發揮了一定作用,但如果認為這種轉變可以用「口頭」和「書面」這樣簡單的類別來解釋,那就太簡單了。批評家的出現需要對文本是什麼、它類似於哪一類事物(熟練的人工製品)、它與製作人(詩人)如何相關、如何從其表演背景中對其進行分類等問題有新的概念。在每種情況下,早期的概念都必須被取代,以便為新的、批評者友善的類別(例如流派)騰出空間。福特寫道:想到某些東西從純粹的無組織性落入流派是很浪漫的。「四世紀的文學理論家所做的就是將對形式有影響的傳統宗教和社會結構轉變為對社會和宗教有影響的文學和形式結構。」20福特的分析幫助我們具體理解的是,批評家的角色不只是閱讀──也就是認識者與文本之間的關係。它預設了複雜的語境化歷史和社交場合的重新排序

 

Adler and Van Doren demonstrate this unwittingly throughout How to Read a Book. At one point, for example, they offer a summary of four “rules” of analytical reading:

阿德勒和範多倫在《如何閱讀一本書》中無意中證明了這一點。例如,他們在某一時刻總結了分析閱讀的四個「規則」:

 

1.      Classify the book according to kind and subject matter. 2. State what the whole book is about with the utmost brevity. 3. Enumerate its major parts in their order and relation, and outline these parts as you have outlined the whole. 4. Define the problem or problems the author is trying to solve.21

2.      根據類型和主題對書籍進行分類。 2. 以最簡潔的方式陳述整本書的內容。 3. 依序和關係列舉其主要部分,並按照概述整體的方式概述這些部分。 4. 定義作者試圖解決的一個或多個問題。21

3.       

Anyone who attempts to gain critical distance on a text by means of such rules must be equipped with well-codified notions such as “book” and “author”; an assumed realm of discourse in which things are classified “according to kind and subject matter”; genres of propositional summary (“state what the whole book is about with the utmost brevity”) and a language ideology in which such derivative genres can be seen not as wholly separate texts but restatements of the same meaning, thus abstracting meaning from textual form; a vigorously delineated sense of totality (“outline these parts as you have outlined the whole”); an assumption that the text-object was created by the same canons of organization; and so on. Each of these steps posits a prior stage of reading, as the source of the comprehension that equips us to do all these things. (You must read the book before you can classify it by subject matter, for example.) The rules themselves are not about reading per se, but about the manipulation of a whole battery of entextualizing frames and form relationships. All of this apparatus must exist at least notionally as means to establish precisely a gap between critical knowledge and the prior, uncritical reading it posits, while also asserting that what is achieved is just “reading”—albeit of an especially rewarding and useful kind.

任何試圖透過此類規則在文本上獲得批判距離的人都必須具備良好的編碼概念,例如作者;一種假定的話語領域,其中事物「根據種類和主題」進行分類;命題摘要的類型(「以最簡潔的方式陳述整本書的內容」)和一種語言意識形態,在這種意識形態中,此類派生類型不能被視為完全獨立的文本,而是相同含義的重述,因此 從文本形式中抽象意義;強烈描繪整體感(「像概述整體一樣概述這些部分」);假設文字物件是由相同的組織規範所建立的;等等。每一個步驟都預設了一個閱讀的前階段,作為理解的源泉,使我們能夠做所有這些事情。 (例如,你必須先閱讀這本書,然後才能按主題對它進行分類。)這些規則本身並不是關於閱讀本身,而是關於對一整套語境化框架和形式關係的操縱。所有這些裝置至少在概念上必須作為一種手段而存在,以在批判性知識與先前的、不加批判的閱讀之間建立精確的差距,同時還斷言所獲得的只是「閱讀」——儘管是特別有益和有用的閱讀。

 

The more we learn about the history of reading, the more we learn how peculiar this formation is. For example, the culture of reading that rests on the idea of grasping the totality of a text might turn out to be a relatively minor episode in the overall history of reading. In a remarkable recent essay, Peter Stallybrass describes the importance of various styles of discontinuous reading. Like the idea of the text as totality, these fragmenting practices were enabled by the codex format, which allows readers to jump around in texts fairly freely, with indices and bookmarks and fingers wedged between pages. One very prestigious example would be the reading of scripture. John Locke once complained (in A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul) that the custom of printing scripture in verse/chapter divisions prevented common readers from grasping the sacred text as a whole.22 But Stallybrass shows that Locke’s idea was something of an innovation, and one that ran counter to the institutional practice of bible reading in church services. During the heyday of the genre of the novel, he suggests, the continuous paging through of a single text came to be taken as the normal way of reading, but this was not the case in earlier periods, and in the current development of screen literacies it may no longer be true. “When cultural critics nostalgically recall an imagined past in which readers unscrolled their books continuously from beginning to end, they are reversing the long history of the codex and the printed book as indexical forms. The novel has only been a brilliantly perverse interlude in the long history of discontinuous reading.”23

我們對閱讀的歷史了解得越多,就越了解這種形成的奇特之處。例如,基於掌握文本整體性的閱讀文化可能只是整個閱讀歷史中相對較小的一段插曲。彼得·斯塔利布拉斯(Peter Stallybrass)在最近發表的一篇引人注目的文章中描述了各種間斷閱讀風格的重要性。就像文本作為整體的想法一樣,這些碎片化的做法是透過手抄本格式實現的,它允許讀者相當自由地在文本中跳轉,索引、書籤和手指夾在頁面之間。一個非常著名的例子就是閱讀經文。約翰·洛克(John Locke)曾經抱怨(在《聖保羅書信釋義》和《聖保羅書信註釋》中),以詩句/章節的形式印刷經文的習慣阻礙了普通讀者從整體上理解神聖的文本。22但史塔利布拉斯表明,洛克的想法是某種東西。這是一項創新,也是一項與教會禮拜中閱讀聖經的製度實踐背道而馳的創新。他認為,在小說類型的鼎盛時期,連續翻閱單一文本被視為正常的閱讀方式,但在早期和當前螢幕讀寫能力的發展中情況並非如此這可能不再是真的。 「當文化批評家懷舊地回憶起想像中的過去時,讀者從頭到尾不斷地展開他們的書籍,他們正在顛倒手抄本和印刷書籍作為索引形式的悠久歷史。這本小說只是斷斷續續閱讀的漫長歷史中一段精彩而反常的插曲。」23

 

In imagining that one might try to grasp the Bible as a textual whole, the better to position oneself as its understanding reader, Locke was extending some recent innovations in scriptural commentary—the beginnings of what would eventually come to be called the Higher Criticism. (See Amy Hollywood’s essay in this volume for an account of how classical scholarship and scriptural exegesis converged in that history.) He was probably influenced in some measure by Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, published in 1670.24 Spinoza was well aware of the novelty of the method he there proposed for reading the Bible:

在想像一個人可能會嘗試將《聖經》作為一個文本整體來理解,以便更好地將自己定位為理解它的讀者時,洛克 擴展了聖經評論中最近的一些創新——最終被稱為「高級批評」的開端。 (請參閱本卷中艾米·好萊塢的文章,以了解古典學術和聖經註釋如何在這段歷史中融合。)他可能在某種程度上受到斯賓諾莎出版於1670.24 的《神學政治論》的影響。他在那裡提出了閱讀聖經的方法:

 

Now to put it briefly, I hold that the method of interpreting Scripture is no different from the method of interpreting Nature, and is in fact in complete accord with it. For the method of interpreting Nature consists essentially in composing a detailed study of Nature from which, as being the source of our assured data, we can deduce the definitions of the things of Nature. Now in exactly the same way the task of Scriptural interpretation requires us to make a straightforward study of Scripture, and from this, as the source of our fixed data and principles, to deduce by logical inference the meaning of the authors of Scripture.25

現在簡單地說,我認為解釋聖經的方法與解釋自然的方法沒有什麼不同,而且實際上是完全一致的。因為解釋自然的方法本質上在於對自然進行詳細的研究,而作為我們可靠數據的來源,我們可以從中推論出自然事物的定義。現在,以完全相同的方式,聖經解釋的任務要求我們對聖經進行直接的研究,並以此作為我們固定數據和原則的來源,通過邏輯推理來推斷聖經作者的含義。25

 

Text can be assimilated to natural objects, and thus become data for the detached analysis that is here explicitly modeled on scientific method. As Spinoza continues, it becomes clear that the codex format is necessary to his method. His second rule (following the necessity of philological understanding of ancient languages) is as follows:

文本可以被同化為自然物體,從而成為獨立分析的數據,這裡明確地以科學方法為模型。隨著斯賓諾莎的繼續,很明顯手抄本格式對於他的方法是必要的。他的第二條規則(遵循對古代語言的語言學理解的必要性)如下:

 

The pronouncements made in each book should be assembled and listed under headings, so that we can thus have to hand all the texts that treat of the same subject. Next, we should note all those that are ambiguous or obscure, or that appear to contradict one another. Now here I term a pronouncement obscure or clear according to the degree of difficulty with which the meaning can be elicited from the context, and not according to the degree of difficulty with which its truth can be perceived by reason. For the point at issue is merely the meaning of the texts, not their truth. (88)

每本書中的聲明應匯總並列在標題下,這樣我們就必須提交處理同一主題的所有文字。接下來,我們應該注意所有那些模稜兩可、晦澀難懂或看似相互矛盾的內容。現在,我在這裡將一個聲明稱為模糊或清晰,是根據從上下文中引出含義的困難程度,而不是根據理性感知其真理的難度。因為爭論的焦點只是文本的意義,而不是它們的真實性。 (88)

 

The ensuing analysis demonstrates vividly the sort of athletic collation necessary to analyze the contradictions, discrepancies, figurational patterns, shifts of address and pronomial usage, narrative redundancies and digressions, and other textual features that become the “data” of understanding. He does dwell on particular passages—worrying over what could be meant by the expression “God is fire,” for example—but the agency of interpretation is everywhere manifested by movement between passages, like the movement necessary to realize that “God is fire” contradicts other claims and must be understood in a special sense. Spinoza’s method thus foregrounds his own (critical) agility of movement, including a physical movement back and forth among numbered and indexed pages in a fixed sequence, at the same time that it backgrounds an ideal of (uncritical) continuous reading.

接下來的分析生動地展示了分析矛盾、差異、比喻模式、稱呼和代名詞用法的變化、敘述冗餘所必需的運動校對 題外話以及其他成為理解「資料」的文字特徵。他確實詳述了特定的段落——例如,擔心「上帝是火」這個表達的含義——但解釋的作用無處不在,透過段落之間的運動來體現,就像認識「上帝是火」所必需的運動一樣與其他主張相矛盾,必須在特殊意義上進行理解。因此,斯賓諾莎的方法突出了他自己的(批判性)運動敏捷性,包括以固定順序在編號和索引頁面之間來回的身體運動,同時它也體現了(非批判性)連續閱讀的理想。

 

In his reading of Jeremiah, that backgrounded ideal is the standard against which the text can be shown to fail, since Jeremiah begins narratives, drops them, gives multiple versions of the same story, loops back in apparent self-forgetfulness, “continuing to pile up prophecies with no regard of chronological order, until in chapter 38 he resumes what he began to relate in chapter 21, as if the intervening fifteen chapters were a parenthesis,” and so on. This is the sort of thing you can say about a text given the ease of discontinuous textual checking needed to discover the text’s apparent corruption. A great deal of page-turning and note-taking must have been involved in this project of evaluating the sacred text as a whole. It is the method of a scholar provided with ample learning, time, industry, paper, and finding aids.

在他對耶利米書的閱讀中,這種背景理想是文本可以被證明失敗的標準,因為耶利米開始敘述,放棄它們,給出同一個故事的多個版本,以明顯的自我忘記的方式循環回來,「繼續堆積不考慮時間順序的預言,直到第 38 章他恢復了他在第 21 章開始講述的內容,就好像中間的 15 章是一個括號一樣,」等等。考慮到發現文字明顯損壞所需的不連續文字檢查的便利性,您可以對文字進行這樣的評價。這個評估整個神聖文本的項目肯定涉及大量的翻頁和筆記。這是一個擁有充足的學識、時間、勤奮、論文和尋找幫助的學者所採取的方法。

 

Compare Spinoza’s reading of Jeremiah to that of his close contemporary, Mary Rowlandson. She, too, manipulated the codex format of the Bible in a way that she understood as enjoined upon her in the sincere effort at understanding. While held captive by an Amerindian war party in the woods of New England in the winter of 1676, she took up the Bible that had been given her by one of the Indians, opened its pages at random, and read what she understood to be the passages presented to her eye by Providence:

將斯賓諾莎對耶利米書的解讀與他同時代的瑪麗·羅蘭森的解讀進行比較。她也以她理解的方式操縱《聖經》的手抄本格式,這是她真誠地努力理解的方式。 1676 年冬天,當她在新英格蘭的樹林裡被一支美洲印第安人戰隊俘虜時,她拿起一位印第安人給她的《聖經》,隨意翻開幾頁,讀了她所理解的內容。普羅維登斯呈現在她眼前的段落:

 

I opened my Bible to read, and the Lord brought that precious scripture to me, Jeremiah 31.16. Thus saith the Lord, refrain thy voice from weeping, and thine eyes from tears, for thy work shall be rewarded, and they shall come again from the land of the enemy. This was a sweet cordial to me, when I was ready to faint, many and many a time have I sat down, and wept sweetly over this scripture.26

我打開聖經來讀,主把那段寶貴的經文帶給我,耶利米書 31.16。主如此說,不要讓你的聲音哭泣,不要讓你的眼睛流淚,因為你的工作將得到回報,他們將從敵人的土地上回來。這對我來說是甜蜜的甜言蜜語,當我快要暈倒的時候,我很多次坐下來,為這段經文甜蜜地哭泣。26

 

Rowlandson is just the sort of reader about whom Locke complained; the sense of the whole is not an aim of her reading. Sincere understanding, for her, does not require analytic collation, linguistic comparison, contextual framing, or any other effort at detachment from the rhetoric of address. The relevant unit is the verse. This might have something to do with the practice of memorization, since the verse divisions of scripture were convenient gobbets for internalization. But there is a richer normative program behind this apparently arbitrary selection as well. Her way of reading is enframed by the assumption that the text is everywhere uniformly addressed by God, in the vernacular, to the believer. Rowlandson performs the same ritual repeatedly throughout her captivity, and makes it clear that opening the Bible and lighting on a passage is, for her, the way to allow God to direct her reading. The apparently random movements offered by the codex format are the medium not of critical agency but of providential direction. The chance opening of the pages helps to ensure that her reading will not be an expression of her agency

羅蘭森正是洛克所抱怨的那種讀者。整體感並不是她閱讀的目的。對她來說,真誠的理解不需要分析整理、語言比較、語境框架或任何其他脫離演講修辭的努力。相關單位是詩句。這可能與記憶練習有關,因為經文的詩句劃分是內化的方便工具。但這種看似武斷的選擇背後也有更豐富的規範程序。她的閱讀方式是基於這樣的假設:文本在任何地方都是上帝用白話統一對信徒說的。羅蘭森在被囚禁期間反覆進行同樣的儀式,並明確表示,對她來說,打開聖經並照亮一段經文是讓上帝引導她閱讀的方式。手抄本格式提供的明顯隨機的運動不是批判機構的媒介,而是天意的指導。偶然打開頁面有助於確保她的閱讀不會成為她代理的表現

 

Of course, that does not mean that it is passive, either. Quite the contrary: it requires repetition, incorporation, and affective regulation. She sits down and weeps, and within the framework of her reading protocol this way of taking the text to heart is a necessary activity of understanding. Nor was Rowlandson’s method entirely naive. It was supported by an extensive and self-conscious literature of devotional manuals on the reading of scripture. As one scholar of that literature notes, “Going over the same biblical passages, putting oneself through the stages of the redemptive order, rereading favorite manuals again and again, produced a cumulative effect that our twentieth-century desire for novelty fails to comprehend.”27 An elaborate edifice of theology, of type and antitype, lies behind the (to us) unfathomable idea that second-person address in the verses of Jeremiah could be taken as directed immediately to a weeping hostage in the woods of an Anglo-American colony.

當然,這也不意味著它是被動的。恰恰相反:它需要重複、整合和情緒調節。她坐下來哭泣,在她的閱讀協議框架內,這種牢記文本的方式是一種必要的理解活動。羅蘭森的方法也並非完全天真。它得到了關於閱讀經文的大量、自覺的靈修手冊文獻的支持。正如一位研究該文獻的學者所指出的那樣,「回顧相同的聖經段落,讓自己經歷救贖秩序的各個階段,一遍又一遍地重讀最喜歡的手冊,產生了我們二十世紀對新奇事物的渴望無法理解的累積效應。」27 一個複雜的神學、類型和原型的大廈,隱藏在(對我們來說)深不可測的想法的背後,即耶利米詩中的第二人稱稱呼可以被視為直接針對英美殖民地樹林中哭泣的人質。

 

Rowlandson’s reading of Jeremiah foregrounds the elemental dyad of God and the soul as the situation of address. It is a situation rich with activity. Recognition of the text by the reader is among other things the medium of God’s agency in comforting and reviving her, and of her agency in obeying, placing trust, suppressing self, etc. She construes the text as immediate demand upon her, and upon her emotions. (It is Uncritical Reading 31 sometimes argued that this kind of ethicalization of address is typical of manuscript culture, but quite apart from the fact that Rowlandson was reading a printed Bible it would be hard to sustain the causal claims implied in that analysis.)

羅蘭森對耶利米書的解讀將上帝和靈魂的基本二元關係作為演講的情境。這是一個充滿活動的情況。讀者對文本的認識是上帝安慰和復興她的媒介,也是她服從、信任、壓抑自我等的媒介。她將文本解釋為對她的直接要求,以及對她的直接要求。情緒。 (《不加批判的閱讀》31 有時認為,這種稱呼的倫理化是手稿文化的典型特徵,但撇開羅蘭森正在閱讀印刷版《聖經》這一事實不談,很難支持該分析中隱含的因果關係主張。)

 

Spinoza, too, sees existential demands being placed on the reader by divine truth. But for him the situation of address in which divinity discloses itself to the soul requires that he objectify the text’s situation of address, its orientation to context, its historical occasion, the limited capacities of its original addressees, and so on. The critical reader must be prepared to extract the text from a context deemed to be its primary situation; in extreme versions texts can be judged in what is taken to be a context of no context. At any rate, the critic’s judgment is not in the first instance about context-appropriateness. Interpretation has been in this limited sense de-ethicalized; though in Spinoza’s case only by introducing a new ethical agency of interpretive objectification. Paradoxically, Spinoza’s reader becomes more responsible by considering himself less directly addressed.

斯賓諾莎也認為神聖真理對讀者提出了存在主義的要求。但對他來說,神性向靈魂揭示自己的稱呼情境要求他將文本的稱呼情境、它對脈絡的定位、它的歷史場合、它的原始收件人的有限能力等等具體化。批判性的讀者必須準備好從被認為是其主要情況的上下文中提取文本;在極端的版本中,文字可以在沒有上下文的上下文中進行判斷。無論如何,批評家的判斷首先並不是關於語境的恰當性。在這種有限的意義上,解釋已經被去道德化了。儘管在斯賓諾莎的例子中,只是透過引入一種新的解釋來客觀化的道德機構。矛盾的是,斯賓諾莎的讀者因為認為自己不那麼直接被提及而變得更加負責任。

 

To readers in the discipline of modernity, one of these ways of reading Jeremiah will count as critical, the other as uncritical. What is the difference? The answer to that question must have to do not just with the material object—though the physical Bibles in question already objectify a great many assumptions about text, held in common by both readers—but with the enframing, metapragmatic construal of the situation of reading, including the agency and affective subjectivity of the reader, the ends and means of reading, and the encompassing relationships of reading practice, the way the text is organized indexically around its reading. All of this is immanent to reading, an imaginary and therefore partially unconscious grasping of the situation of reading itself.

對於現代性學科的讀者來說這些閱讀耶利米書的方式之一將被視為批判性的,而另一種則被視為非批判性的。有什麼不同?這個問題的答案必須不僅與物質對像有關——儘管所討論的實體聖經已經客觀化了兩位讀者共同持有的關於文本的許多假設——而且與閱讀情境的框架、元語用解釋有關。 ,包括讀者的能動性和情感主體性、閱讀的目的和手段、閱讀實踐的包容性關係、文本圍繞閱讀進行索引組織的方式。這一切都是閱讀所固有的,是對閱讀本身情境的一種想像的、因此部分無意識的把握。

 

Scholars of literature are however seldom prepared to recognize in their own materials anything that they would have to describe as uncritical reading. So the ritual gesture, when confronted with a Rowlandson, is to show that this apparently uncritical reading really was critical in some sense or another. Thus Rowlandson can be said to read the way she does as a strategy for subverting ministerial authority, or as a means of self-positing.28 When critical reading is established as a global language of value, such maneuvers become necessary to rescue texts for any canon, even the anticanonical canon. We are very good at 32 Michael Warner assimilating texts and authors to the normative ideals of our own critical activity. But those normative dimensions of her reading practice that cultivate piety—precisely in the suppression of what we would call critical distance or agency—must be ignored or explained away.

然而,文學學者很少願意在他們自己的材料中認識到任何他們不得不描述為不加批判的閱讀的東西。因此,當面對羅蘭森時,儀式性的姿態是要表明這種看似不加批判的閱讀在某種意義上確實是批判性的。因此,羅蘭森可以說,她的閱讀方式是顛覆部長權威的一種策略,或者是一種自我定位的手段。28當批判性閱讀被確立為一種全球價值語言時,這種策略就變得有必要來拯救任何人的文本。正典,甚至是反正典的正典。我們非常擅長 32 邁克爾華納 (Michael Warner) 將文本和作者與我們自己的批評活動的規範理想同化。但她的閱讀實踐中那些培養虔誠的規範向度——恰恰是對我們所說的批判距離或代理的壓制——必須被忽視或解釋掉。

 

So one of the deepest challenges posed by rival, uncritical frameworks of reading is recognizing that they are just that, rival frameworks. The very specific culture of critical reading is not the only normatively or reflexively organized method of reading, to which all others should be assimilated. Because the historiography is still emerging, and because the tendency to project critical reading as the necessary implication of reason or agency is so great, we do not even know as much as we would like about what the alternative frameworks have been, are, or might become in a future of screen literacies. Uncritical reading is the unconscious of the profession; whatever worlds are organized around frameworks of reading other than critical protocols remain, for the most part, terra incognita.29

因此,競爭性的、不加批判的閱讀框架所帶來的最深刻的挑戰之一就是認識到它們只是競爭性的框架。批判性閱讀的特殊文化並不是唯一一種規範或反射性組織的閱讀方法,所有其他閱讀方法都應該被同化。由於史學仍處於新興階段,並且由於將批判性閱讀視為理性或代理的必然含義的傾向是如此之大,因此我們甚至對替代框架已經、現在或可能是什麼了解得不夠多。成為屏幕素養的未來。不加批判的閱讀是這個職業的無意識;除了關鍵協議之外,任何圍繞閱讀框架組織的世界在很大程度上仍然是未知領域。29

 

Any attempt to trace the history, extent, and limits of the culture of critical reading will face methodological issues that will force us to go beyond the current state of the history of the book. The new history of reading usefully defamiliarizes the picture of reading as the mere processing of preconstituted text, and leads us to consider the practices of entextualization. The “materiality of the text” has become something of a slogan for this project. But what needs to be defamiliarized is not just the materiality of the text. The history of reading encompasses the normative construal of the reading situation—including the agency of the reader—as an element of that reading situation. A history of “critical reading” in particular, therefore, would have to include rather more than the protocols of text-processing, cross-referencing, and citation that Spinoza so beautifully exemplifies; it would have to describe the way in which reading subjects can be imagined to assert their own agency and freedom in relation to maximally objectified texts.

任何追蹤批判性閱讀文化的歷史、範圍和限制的嘗試都將面臨方法論問題,這些問題將迫使我們超越書籍歷史的現狀。新的閱讀史有效地將閱讀的圖像陌生化為僅僅是對預先構成的文本的處理,並引導我們考慮語境化的實踐。 「文本的實質」已經成為這個項目的口號。但需要陌生化的不僅是文本的物質性。閱讀的歷史包含了閱讀情境的規範解釋──包括讀者的能動性──作為閱讀情境的一個要素。因此,特別是「批判性閱讀」的歷史,必須包括的不僅僅是斯賓諾莎如此完美地例證的文本處理、交叉引用和引用的協議;它必須描述閱讀主體可以想像如何在與最大限度客觀化的文本相關的情況下維護自己的代理權和自由。

 

In Spinoza’s case a significant part of that situation is right on the surface; he himself makes it clear that the basic interpretive posture behind his analysis is one that he expects not just of the erudite philosopher, and not just of the reader of scripture, but of the subject in a society of mutual benefit. He imagines a social order that is constituted out of individual acts of judgment, from the bottom up. Texts considered as quasi-natural objects serve as the foil for readers who can extract themselves from the immediate situation of address, exerting their own agency. Those readers are in relation to each other by means of derivative discourses of argument and analysis, so their reading can be at once the medium of internal differentiation and the common reference points in a world of difference. The Theological-Political Treatise is indeed remarkable for the clarity with which its exegetical method is explicitly linked to a picture of a market-based republican social order. That, of course, should not prevent us from seeing that in other ways the picture of agentialized subjectivity in critical reading is a structuring element in the social imaginary behind the treatise.30

在斯賓諾莎的例子中,這種情況的很大一部分就在表面上。他自己也明確表示,他的分析背後的基本解釋姿態不僅是博學的哲學家、聖經讀者的期望,也是對互惠互利社會中的主體的期望。他想像了一種由個人判斷行為自下而上所構成的社會秩序。文字 被認為是準自然的物體充當讀者的陪襯,他們可以從當前的演講情境中抽離出來,發揮自己的能動性。這些讀者透過論證和分析的派生話語相互聯繫,因此他們的閱讀既可以成為內部分化的媒介,又可以成為差異世界中的共同參考點。 《神學政治論》確實因其清晰的解經方法而引人注目,它與基於市場的共和社會秩序的圖景明確地聯繫在一起。當然,這不應該阻止我們看到,在其他方面,批判性閱讀中的代理化主體性圖景是該論文背後的社會想像的結構元素。30

 

Indeed, treatise form itself—as exemplified in the TheologicalPolitical Treatise—presupposes a certain reading culture, in which book-length texts are taken as systematized arguments to be attributed in toto to their authors as intellectual property, such that we can say, “In Spinoza we find x,”; or, “Spinoza holds that x,” and so on.31 As Pierre Hadot has recently pointed out, this conception of treatise form represents a watershed in the metaconception of philosophizing. As philosophy came to be more and more identified with this specialized textual form following Descartes, philosophy came to stand less and less for a counternormative way of living and became more and more an architecture of propositional property.32 The texts of philosophy came less and less to be artifacts of dialogue or scripts of spiritual exercise, and came instead to be models of objectifiable systematicity. In this role they began to serve as the ideal self-image of philosophizing—though of course philosophical writing could only play this role once texts had been conceived as intellectual property and as navigable totalities offered to readers for the performance of their own critical agency. In countless such ways, the entextualizing activity of the critical reader always lies beyond the grasp of critical reading.

事實上,論文形式本身——正如《神學政治論文》中所例證的那樣——預設了某種閱讀文化,在這種文化中,整本書的文本被視為系統化的論點,作為知識產權歸屬於其作者,因此我們可以說,「在斯賓諾莎我們找到x」;或者,斯賓諾莎認為 x”,等等。31 正如皮埃爾·阿多 (Pierre Hadot)最近指出的那樣,這種論文形式的概念代表了哲學元概念的分水嶺。隨著笛卡兒之後哲學越來越認同這種專門的文本形式,哲學越來越不再代表一種反規範的生活方式,而越來越成為一種命題財產的建築。32 哲學文本越來越少成為對話的人工製品或精神運動的腳本,而是成為可客觀化的模型 系統性。在這個角色中,它們開始充當哲學思考的理想自我形象——當然,哲學寫作只有在文本被視為知識產權並被視為提供給讀者以執行其自身批判機構的可導航整體時才能發揮這一作用。在無數這樣的方面,批判性讀者的語境化活動總是超出批判性閱讀的掌握範圍。

 

A systematic inquiry into the form-relationships of critical reading, in addition to opening up inquiry into the alternatives currently glossed as uncritical, might also help to break through a number of impasses in contemporary thinking. The discipline of subjectivity enjoined upon the critical reader, for example, is one thing that is often missed in contemporary critiques of the Kantian tradition, or of the critical reason that he is thought to exemplify. Perhaps the mistake here 34 Michael Warner is to identify a Kantian metalanguage with the culture he sought to codify, crediting him with too much. There is certainly a tendency in the liberal tradition to identify critical reason with something that cannot be given content, that is not a cultural form in itself, but that is conceived as mere negative potential, a kind of perpetual openness to further criticism. By the same token, critical reading can be imagined in negative terms as well, as reading that is open to reflection on its own presuppositions, for example. The importance of this receding horizon of critique to the culture of critical reading might help to explain why it seems so difficult for anyone to define or codify critical reading; to do so would be to expose oneself to further criticism, and thus fail to exhaust its meaning. This normative language is consequential and not to be waved away as trivial. But it distracts attention from the equally important reality that critical reading is a historically and formally mediated practice, with an elaborate discipline of subjectivity, and one that now confronts rivals as it has done in the past. That practice—as the example of Spinoza suggests—is by no means coextensive with the Kantian or neoKantian glossings of it. And the rich intensities it affords are obscured both by its own normative self-conception and by the most common criticisms of it.

對批判性閱讀的形式關係進行系統性的探究,除了對目前被視為非批判性的替代方案進行探究之外,也可能有助於打破當代思維中的一些僵局。例如,在當代對康德傳統或他被認為是例證的批判理性的批評中,經常忽略了對批判性讀者的主體性紀律。也許這裡的錯誤 34 麥可華納 (Michael Warner) 將康德元語言與他試圖編纂的文化等同起來,對他的貢獻太多。自由主義傳統中肯定有一種傾向,將批判理性等同於某種無法被賦予內容的東西,它本身不是一種文化形式,而是被視為純粹的負面潛力,一種對進一步批評的永久開放。基於同樣的原因,批判性閱讀也可以用負面的術語來想像,例如,可以對其自身預設進行反思的閱讀。這種批評視野的後退對批判性閱讀文化的重要性可能有助於解釋為什麼任何人似乎都很難定義或編纂批判性閱讀;這樣做只會讓自己受到進一步的批評,無法窮盡意義。這種規範性語言是重要的,不能因為微不足道而被忽視。但它分散了人們對同樣重要現實的注意力,即批判性閱讀是一種以歷史和形式為媒介的實踐,具有複雜的主體性紀律,並且現在像過去一樣面臨著競爭對手。正如斯賓諾莎的例子所表明的那樣,這種實踐絕不與康德主義或新康德主義同延。 它的註釋。它所提供的豐富強度被它自己的規範性自我概念和對其最常見的批評所掩蓋。

 

For example, Bernard Williams faults the Kantian conception of critical reason for what he sees as its essentially characterless disengagement. His comments would apply, mutatis mutandis, to some of the most powerful self-conceptions of critical reading:

例如,伯納德·威廉斯(Bernard Williams)批評康德的批判理性概念,認為其本質上是毫無個性的脫離。他的評論比照適用於批判性閱讀中一些最有力的自我概念:

 

This ideal involves an idea of ultimate freedom, according to which I am not entirely free so long as there is any ethically significant aspect of myself that belongs to me simply as a result of the process by which I was contingently formed. If my values are mine simply in virtue of social and psychological processes to which I have been exposed, then (the argument goes) it is as though I had been brainwashed: I cannot be a fully free, rational, and responsible agent. Of course, no one can control their upbringing as they receive it, except perhaps marginally and in its later stages. What the ideal demands, rather, is that my whole outlook should in principle be exposed to a critique, as a result of which every value that I hold can become a consideration for me, critically accepted, and should not remain merely something that happens to be Uncritical Reading 35 part of me. It presupposes a Platonic idea of the moral self as characterless. . . . If the aspiration makes sense, then the criticising self can be separated from everything that a person contingently is—in itself, the criticising self is simply the perspective of reason or morality.33

這種理想涉及一種終極自由的觀念,根據這種觀念,只要我自己有任何道德上重要的方面屬於我,而這些方面僅僅是我偶然形成的過程的結果,那麼我就不是完全自由的。如果我的價值觀只是因為我所經歷的社會和心理過程而成為我的,那麼(這個論點認為)我就好像被洗腦了:我不能成為一個完全自由、理性和負責任的代理人。當然,沒有人能夠在接受教育時控制自己的成長,除非是在邊緣階段和後期階段。相反,理想所要求的是,我的整個觀點原則上應該受到批判,這樣我所持有的每一個價值觀都可以成為我的考慮因素,被批判性地接受,而不僅僅是發生在我身上的東西。不加批判地閱讀我的35部分。它預設了柏拉圖式的道德自我觀念,認為道德自我是沒有性格的。 。如果這種願望有道理,那麼批判性的自我就可以與一個人偶然存在的一切分開——就其本身而言,批判性的自我只是理性或道德的視角。33

 

Whether this is an accurate objection to liberal philosophy I leave to others. What interests me here is that the endlessly receding ideal of critical reason described by Williams arises from a historically rich culture of reading in which the critical activity is anything but empty, characterless, or unmediated. The rigorous extraction of oneself from the ethical demands of direct textual address, for example, requires a manipulation of intergeneric relationships that can only seem characterless once they have become second nature—as to most of us they have. Critical reading is the pious labor of a historically unusual sort of person. If we are going to inculcate its pieties and techniques, we might begin by recognizing that that is what they are.

這是否是對自由主義哲學的準確反對,我留給別人去思考。我在這裡感興趣的是,威廉斯所描述的批判理性理想的不斷消退源於歷史悠久的豐富的閱讀文化,其中的批判活動絕不是空洞的、無個性的或無中介的。例如,要嚴格地將自己從直接文本地址的道德要求中抽離出來,就需要對屬間關係進行操縱,而這種關係只有在成為第二天性後才會顯得毫無特色——對於我們大多數人來說,它們已經成為第二天性。批判性閱讀是歷史上不尋常的人的虔誠勞動。如果我們要灌輸它的虔誠和技術,我們可能首先要認識到它們是什麼。

 

 

 

 

Notes 1. Henry Giroux, “Introduction” to Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo, Literacy: Reading the Word and the World (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Gervey, 1987), 15.

1. Henry GirouxPaulo Freire Donaldo簡介馬塞多,《識字:閱讀世界和世界》(馬薩諸塞州南哈德利:Bergin Gervey 1987 年),15

 

2. Barbara Johnson speculates on this possibility in The Critical Difference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 3–4 and passim.

2. Barbara Johnson The Critical Difference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 3-4 passim 中推測了這種可能性。

 

3. See Jean Marie Goulemot, Ces livres qu’on ne lit que d’une main (Paris: Editions Alinea, 1991), trans. by James Simpson for some reason as Forbidden Texts: Erotic Literature and Its Readers in Eighteenth-Century France (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).

3. 參見Jean Marie Goulemot Ces livres qu'on ne lit que d'une main(巴黎:Editions Alinea 1991),譯。出於某種原因,詹姆斯·辛普森(James Simpson)撰寫了《禁書:十八世紀法國的情色文學及其讀者》(費城:賓夕法尼亞大學出版社,1995)。

 

4. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading; or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Introduction is About You,” in Novel-Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction, ed. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 1–37.

4.「偏執閱讀和修復閱讀;或者,你太偏執了,你可能認為這篇介紹是關於你的,」《小說凝視:小說中的酷兒讀物》,編輯。 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick(達勒姆:杜克大學出版社,1997 年),1-37

 

5. Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). The idea that the disciplines of piety should be not simply understood to be criticized but understood in a way that will parochialize the knower’s assumptions is one that for Mahmood represents a higher and better understanding of critique: “Critique, I believe, is most powerful when it leaves open the possibility that we might also be remade in the process of engaging another’s worldview, that we might come to learn things that we did not already know before we undertook the engagement” (36–37).

5. 薩巴馬哈茂德,《虔誠的政治》(普林斯頓:普林斯頓大學出版社,2004 年)。對馬哈茂德來說,虔誠的紀律不應該被簡單地理解為被批評,而應該以一種將認識者的假設狹隘化的方式來理解,這一觀點代表了對批評的更高更好的理解:「我相信,當它留下了一種可能性,即我們也可能在接觸他人世界觀的過程中被重塑,我們可能會學到一些我們在接觸他人之前所不知道的東西」(36 -37)。

 

6. Guglielmo Cavallo and Roger Chartier, eds., A History of Reading in the West (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999): introduction, 9. 36 Michael Warner

6.古列爾莫 Cavallo Roger Chartier編輯,《西方閱讀史》(阿默斯特:馬薩諸塞大學出版社,1999 年):簡介,9. 36 Michael Warner

 

7. Jesper Svenbro, “Archaic and Classical Greece: The Invention of Silent Reading,” in Cavallo and Chartier, History of Reading, 37–63.

7.傑斯珀 Svenbro 古希臘和古典希臘:默讀的發明,載於CavalloChartier ,閱讀史,37-63

 

8. Here I owe much to Michael Silverstein and others. See Natural Histories of Discourse, ed. Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

8. 在此,我要感謝麥可西爾弗斯坦和其他人。參見《自然話語史》,編。邁克爾·西爾弗斯坦和格雷格·厄本(芝加哥:芝加哥大學出版社,1996 年)。

 

9. Martin Irvine, The Making of Textual Culture: ‘Grammatica’ and Literary Theory, 350–1100 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

9. 馬丁歐文,文本文化的形成:「文法」與文學理論, 350-1100(劍橋:劍橋大學出版社,1994)。

 

10. Irvine, Making of Textual Culture, p. 461.

10. 歐文,《文本文化的形成》,第 14 頁。 461.

 

11. See Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450–1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

11. 參見 Anthony Grafton,《文本的捍衛者:科學時代的學術傳統,1450-1800 年》(麻薩諸塞州劍橋:哈佛大學出版社,1991 年)。

 

12. Walter Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913–1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 116–200, quotation at p. 159.

12. 華特班雅明,《德國浪漫主義批評的概念》,《著作選集》,第 1 卷:1913-1926 年,編者。馬庫斯·布洛克 (Marcus Bullock) 和邁克爾·詹寧斯 (Michael Jennings)(劍橋:哈佛大學出版社,1996 年),116–200,引述於第 14 頁。 159.

 

13. On the changing social meaning of the critic’s role, see Joan Dejean, Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 31–77.

13. 關於批評者角色不斷變化的社會意義,參見 Joan Dejean Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 31-77

 

14. Benjamin, “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” p. 117.

14. 本雅明,德國浪漫主義中的批評概念,第 14 頁。 117.

 

15. Mortimer J. Adler and Charles Van Doren, How to Read a Book (1940), rev. ed. 1972 (New York: Simon and Schuster), 8.

15. 莫蒂默J阿德勒 (Mortimer J. Adler) 與查爾斯多倫 (Charles Van Doren ),《如何讀書》(1940),修訂版。編輯。 1972 年(紐約:西蒙和舒斯特),8

 

16. Harold Bloom, How to Read and Why (New York: Scribner, 2001), 21.

16. 哈羅德布魯姆,《如何閱讀與為何閱讀》(紐約:斯克里布納,2001 年),21

 

17. In Publics and Counterpublics I have argued that one of the most important frameworks for allowing reading to count as the use of reason in Kant’s sense is in fact an intergeneric field of circulation ideologized as a public. “The attribution of agency to publics works in most cases because of the direct transposition from private reading acts to the sovereignty of opinion. All of the verbs for public agency are verbs for private reading, transposed upward to the aggregate of readers. Readers may scrutinize, ask, reject, opine, decide, judge, etc. Publics can do exactly these things. And nothing else. Publics, unlike mobs or crowds, remain incapable of any activity that cannot be expressed through such a verb. Activities of reading that do not fit the ideology of reading as silent, private, replicable decoding, curling up, mumbling, fantasizing, gesticulating, ventriloquizing, writing marginalia, etc. also find no counterparts in public agency.” Thus where the modern imaginary of the public sphere is the background of literate practice, this hierarchy of faculties will acquire a certain inevitable force.

17. 在《公眾與反公眾》一書中,我認為,讓閱讀算是康德意義上的理性運用的最重要框架之一,實際上是一個被意識形態化為公眾的跨屬流通領域。 「在大多數情況下,將代理權歸於公眾是有效的,因為從私人閱讀行為到輿論主權的直接轉換。所有表示公共機構的動詞都是私人閱讀的動詞,向上轉換為讀者群體。讀者可以審視、詢問、拒絕、發表意見、決定、判斷等等。公眾正是可以做這些事。沒有別的。與暴徒或人群不同,公眾仍然無法進行任何不能透過此類動詞表達的活動。那些不符合閱讀意識形態的閱讀活動,如無聲的、私人的、可複製的解碼、蜷縮、自言自語、幻想、打手勢、腹語、寫旁注等,在公共機構中也找不到對應的活動。因此,當公共領域的現代想像成為文學實踐的背景時,這種能力的等級制度將獲得某種不可避免的力量。

 

18. Andrew Ford, The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Authority in Classical Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 266.

18. 安德魯福特, 《批評的起源:古典希臘的文學文化和詩歌權威》(普林斯頓:普林斯頓大學出版社,2002),266

 

19. Ford, Origins, p. 22. Ford makes similar points throughout his study, as for example p. 155: “what might be called an increasing ‘textualization’ of song through the fifth century abetted the formal study of its ‘inner’ properties.”

19. 福特,《起源》,第 19 頁。 22. 福特在他的整個研究中提出了類似的觀點,例如第 22 頁。 155整個五世紀,所謂的歌曲文本化不斷增加,促進了對其內在屬性的正式研究。

 

20. Ford, Origins, p. 251.

20. 福特,《起源》,第 14 頁。 251.

 

21. Adler and Van Doren, How to Read a Book, p. 95.

21. 阿德勒與範多倫, 《如何閱讀》,第 14 頁。 95.

 

22. See Patrick Collinson, “The Coherence of the Text: How it Hangeth Together: The Bible in Reformation England,” in The Bible, the Uncritical Reading 37 Reformation and the Church, ed. W. P. Stephens (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 84–108.

22. 參見帕特里克·柯林森 (Patrick Collinson)文本的連貫性:它如何組合在一起:英國宗教改革中的聖經,載於《聖經,不加批判的閱讀》37 宗教改革與教會,編輯。 WP Stephens(謝菲爾德:謝菲爾德學術出版社,1995),84-108

 

23. Peter Stallybrass, “Books and Scrolls: Navigating the Bible,” in Jennifer Andersen and Elizabeth Sauer, eds., Books and Readers in Early Modern England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 42–79, quotation at p. 47.

23. Peter Stallybrass 書籍和捲軸:聖經導航,載於 Jennifer Andersen Elizabeth Sauer,編輯,早期現代英格蘭的書籍和讀者(費城:賓夕法尼亞大學出版社,2002 年),42-79,引自 p 47.

 

24. On the transmission and impact of this early work of Spinoza’s, see Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

24. 關於斯賓諾莎早期著作的傳播和影響,請參閱喬納森·以色列 (Jonathan Israel),《激進啟蒙:哲學與現代性 1650-1750》(牛津:牛津大學出版社,2002 年)。

 

25. Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 87.

25. 巴魯克斯賓諾莎,神學政治論文,譯。塞繆爾·雪莉(印第安納波利斯:哈克特,2001),87

 

26. Mary Rowlandson, The Sovereignty and Goodness of God (1682), in Myra Jehlen and Michael Warner, eds., The English Literatures of America, 1500–1800 (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 357.

26. Mary Rowlandson,《上帝的主權與良善》(1682 年),載於 Myra JehlenMichael Warner 編輯,《美國英語文學,1500-1800 年》(紐約:Routledge1997 年),第 17 頁。 357.

 

27. Charles Hambrick-Stowe, The Practice of Piety: Puritan Devotional Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century New England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 159. Further information on the hermeneutic context can be found in Lisa M. Gordis, Opening Scripture: Bible Reading and Interpretive Authority in Puritan New England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), though unfortunately Gordis does not mention Rowlandson and does not raise the larger questions posed here. A very instructive piece of scholarship is the chapter by David D. Hall titled “Readers and Writers in Early New England,” in A History of the Book in America, Volume One: The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World, ed. Hugh Amory and David D. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117–51, as well as pp. 377–410 in the same work.

27. Charles Hambrick -Stowe, The Practice of Piety: Puritan Devotional Disciplines in Seventeenth-Century New England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 159. 有關詮釋學背景的更多信息,請參閱 Lisa M. Gordis ,開頭:新英格蘭清教徒的聖經閱讀和解釋權威(芝加哥:芝加哥大學出版社,2003年),儘管不幸的是戈迪斯沒有提到羅蘭森,也沒有提出這裡提出的更大問題。大衛·D·霍爾(David D. Hall) 在《美國圖書史》第一卷:大西洋世界的殖民圖書中題為早期新英格蘭的讀者和作家的一章是一項非常有啟發性的學術著作。 Hugh Amory David D. Hall(劍橋:劍橋大學出版社,2000 年),117-51,以及同一著作的第 377-410 頁。

 

28. The most ingenious such reading is Mitchell Breitweiser, American Puritanism and the Defense of Mourning: Religion, Grief, and Ethnology in Mary White Rowlandson’s Captivity Narrative (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).

28. 最巧妙的這類讀物是 Mitchell Breitweiser ,《美國清教主義和哀悼的辯護:瑪麗·懷特·羅蘭森的囚禁敘事中的宗教、悲傷和民族學》(麥迪遜:威斯康星大學出版社,1990年)。

 

29. For the most part; see such notable exceptions as Paul Griffiths, Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), a useful book though marred by its polemicizing dismissal of critical reading as “consumerist.”

29. 大部分情況下;保羅·格里菲斯(Paul Griffiths)的《宗教閱讀:閱讀在宗教實踐中的地位》(紐約:牛津大學出版社,1999)等值得注意的例外,是一本有用的書,但因其對批判性閱讀「消費主義」的爭論性駁斥而受到損害。

 

30. The relation between critical reading and modern social imaginaries is an enormous problem to which I can only gesture here; for an explanation of how the partly unconscious grasp of the social is linked to ideas of an order of mutual benefit, see Charles Taylor’s Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming). 31. This is arguably true in Spinoza’s case even though the text was published anonymously; it immediately sparked an attempt to identify its author. 32. This argument is advanced partly in his What Is Ancient Philosophy? trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), and also in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. ed. Pierre Hadot and Arnold I. Davidson. trans. Michael Chase (NY: Blackwell, 1995). 33. Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 158–59.

30. 批判性閱讀與現代社會想像之間的關係是一個巨大的問題,我只能在此指出;有關對社會的部分無意識的把握如何與互利秩序的觀念聯繫起來的解釋,請參閱查爾斯·泰勒的《現代社會想像》(達勒姆:杜克大學出版社,即將出版)。 31. 斯賓諾莎的案例可以說是正確的,儘管該文本是匿名發表的。它立即引發了查明其作者身份的嘗試。 32. 這論點在他的《什麼是古代哲學?》中得到了部分提出。反式。 Michael Chase(麻薩諸塞州劍橋:哈佛大學出版社,2002 年),以及《哲學作為一種生活方式:從蘇格拉底到福柯的精神練習》。編輯。皮埃爾·阿多和阿諾德·戴維森。反式。麥可·蔡斯(紐約:布萊克威爾,1995)。 33. 伯納德威廉斯,《羞恥與必要性》(柏克萊:加州大學出版社,1993 年),158-59