讀論文[中英對照]《尼采「完全不負責任」的意涵》

《尼采「完全不負責任」的意涵》
資料來源：de Jong, Johan. "The Senses of Nietzsche’s “Complete Irresponsibility”" Nietzsche-Studien, vol. 53, no. 1, 2024, pp. 67-105. https://doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2022-0030

 

The Senses of Nietzsche’s “Complete Irresponsibility”	尼采「完全不負責任」的意涵
Johan de Jong
From the journal Nietzsche-Studien	出自《尼采研究》期刊
https://doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2022-0030
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Abstract	摘要
With his doctrine of the “complete irresponsibility of man,” Nietzsche in different ways complicates the opposition between responsibility and irresponsibility. This article traces the different and conflicting senses of irresponsibility throughout Nietzsche’s development. First, the doctrine is shown to build on Nietzsche’s early study of Heraclitus (section I), whom Nietzsche admired for expounding and embodying a radical “innocence” that was both responsible and irresponsible in different senses. When presented as “philosophical conviction” in Human, All too Human, Nietzsche paradoxically speculates about the doctrine’s incorporation out of a sense of responsibility for the future of mankind (section II). Section III shows how Nietzsche’s later writings evince an increasing awareness of this paradox by explicitly positing complete irresponsibility as his own redemptive doctrine in Twilight of the Idols. After 1881, he has come to affirm a new notion of responsibility and criticizes a weak sense of irresponsibility as the abdication of one’s task. I end by discussing the relation of these different senses of irresponsibility, and argue that the fact that Nietzsche’s texts often deliberately complicate rather than clarify such distinctions is an important reflection of how he textually takes responsibility for “complete irresponsibility” (section IV).	透過「人類完全不負責任」的教義，尼采在不同的層面上複雜化了責任與不負責任之間的對立。本篇文章追溯尼采思想發展過程中不負責任的不同且相互矛盾的意涵。首先，本文展示該教義建基於尼采早期對赫拉克利特的研究（第一節），尼采因其闡述並體現了一種在不同意義上既負責任又不負責任的激進「純真」而欽佩他。當該教義作為《人性，太人性》中的「哲學信念」被提出時，尼采悖論地推測這種教義的吸收源於對人類未來的責任感（第二節）。第三節展示了尼采晚期作品愈加意識到這一悖論，並在《偶像的黃昏》中明確地將完全不負責任定位為他自己的救贖教義。1881年之後，尼采提出了一種新的責任觀，並批判了將不負責任作為一種逃避任務的軟弱態度。最後，我將討論這些不同的不負責任意涵之間的關係，並論證尼采的文本經常刻意複雜化而非簡單澄清這些區別，這一點在某種程度上反映了他如何在文本上對「完全不負責任」負起責任（第四節）。
Keywords: Innocence; Becoming; Heraclitus; Necessity; Doctrine	關鍵詞：純真；生成；赫拉克利特；必然性；教義
Introduction: On “Complete Irresponsibility”	引言：論「完全不負責任」
The “complete irresponsibility of a human being for his behavior and his nature” (HH I 107) seems to be one of Nietzsche’s most consistently held beliefs.[1] In Human, All too Human (1878–80), the idea is presented as a “doctrine” (HH I 105) and as the “philosophical conviction” of “the unconditional necessity of all actions and of their complete irresponsibility [die philosophische Ueberzeugung von der unbedingten Nothwendigkeit aller Handlungen und ihrer völligen Unverantwortlichkeit]” (HH I 133). Formulated as a doctrine, we still find it as late as the 1888 Twilight of the Idols, where Nietzsche presents as “our doctrine [unsre Lehre]”: “That nobody is held responsible anymore [Dass Niemand mehr verantwortlich gemacht wird].” Nietzsche consistently ties the idea of complete irresponsibility to “innocence.”[2] In Twilight of the Idols, the doctrine is presented as the “only way” to “restore” the “innocence of becoming” (TI, Errors 8).	「對於自己行為與本性的完全不負責任」（HH I 107）似乎是尼采最持久的信念之一。在《人性，太人性》（1878-1880）中，這一觀點被作為「教義」（HH I 105）以及「哲學信念」呈現，即「一切行為的無條件必然性及其完全不負責任的哲學信念」（HH I 133）。作為一種教義，即便在1888年的《偶像的黃昏》中，我們依然可以找到該觀點，尼采稱之為「我們的教義」：即「沒有人再被責備」（TI, Errors 8）。尼采始終將完全不負責任的觀點與「純真」緊密聯繫。在《偶像的黃昏》中，該教義被描述為「唯一的途徑」來「恢復生成的純真」（TI, Errors 8）。
What does irresponsibility mean? A strong “seduction on the part of grammar” (BGE, Preface) can make us believe that irresponsibility is a negative and therefore derivative concept: the inflexion “ir-” (the Un- of Unverantwortlichkeit) tells us that irresponsibility is the negation of the conceptually more primary notion of responsibility. But, like any negation, this negation is ambiguous. There are different ways to be irresponsible. First, one can be irresponsible by failing to live up to a pre-given responsibility or demand. This is irresponsibility as blameworthy negligence of a given task (regardless as to whether that task is moral, legal, role-based or otherwise). In this sense, I act irresponsibly if I fail to follow rules or adhere to demands that are in principle transparent and possible to articulate. This transparency makes this type of irresponsibility calculable: I know (or may be presupposed to know) what I ought to do and what it means (not) to do it. It also makes responsibility a matter of purity: I am responsible if I stick to the rules and adhere to my tasks. Conversely, I may be blamed and “held responsible” if I ignore or break said rules. Thus, irresponsibility here is a break with given responsibilities.	不負責任意味著什麼？ 語法上的強烈「誘惑」（BGE, Preface）可能會讓我們相信，不負責任是一個消極且因此派生的概念：該詞的前綴「ir-」（德語中的 Un-）告訴我們，不負責任是否定了更為基本的責任概念。然而，與所有否定概念一樣，這種否定具有模糊性。不負責任有不同的方式。首先，可以因未能履行既定的責任或要求而不負責任。這種不負責任是對既定任務的應受譴責的疏忽（無論該任務是否道德、法律或基於角色等）。在這種意義上，如果我未能遵守規則或履行要求，我就是不負責任的。這種透明性使得這類不負責任是可計算的：我知道（或可以假定我知道）我應該做什麼，以及不做它意味著什麼。這也使得責任生成一種純潔的問題：如果我堅持規則並履行我的任務，我就是負責任的。相反，如果我忽略或違反這些規則，我可能會被譴責並「被責備」。因此，這裡的不負責任是一種與既定責任的決裂。
Although this conception of responsibility has its necessity, things are not quite so simple, if only because, ironically, this very responsibility is a common way of evading one’s responsibility. Hiding behind prescribed duties is one popular way to avoid facing the music, like those who say: “don’t look at me, I just followed the rules, I have fulfilled my responsibility.” This is why we tend to think the most responsible person is actually not the one who sticks to the rules, but rather the one who is somehow able to choose or to judge in the absence of given criteria or rules – a conception of responsibility that is closer to the one held by Jean-Paul Sartre or Hannah Arendt.[3] In his thorough study of Nietzsche’s doctrine of complete irresponsibility, Richard Wisser calls this “situational” responsibility (situationelle Verantwortung), as opposed to the calculable responsibility before an already established instance or authority (instantielle Verantwortung). Rather than hiding behind preformulated answers or rules, situational responsibility demands the production of a responsible response in the absence of certainty about what such a response would entail, which means to stick one’s neck out or to “stand up for something with one’s existence.”[4]	儘管這種責任概念具有其必要性，事情並不那麼簡單，因為具有諷刺意味的是，這種責任本身就是一種逃避責任的常見方式。隱藏在既定責任背後，是一種流行的逃避責任的方式，類似於那些說「別看我，我只是遵守規則，我已經履行了我的責任」的人。因此，我們傾向於認為，最負責任的人實際上並不是遵循規則的人，而是能夠在沒有給定標準或規則的情況下選擇或判斷的人——這與讓-保羅·薩特或漢娜·鄂蘭特的責任概念更為接近。在對尼采「完全不負責任」教義的徹底研究中，理查德·維瑟將這種責任稱為「情境性責任」（situationelle Verantwortung），以區別於面對已確立的實例或權威時的「即時責任」（instantielle Verantwortung）。情境性責任要求在沒有給定標準的情況下，產生負責任的回應，這意味著挺身而出或以自身的存在去「堅持某件事情」。
The paradox of situational responsibility is that it necessarily involves a measure of irresponsibility. It can mean a break with given responsibilities, this time not in the sense of reckless negligence, but because it is demanded by some higher responsibility. Alternatively, it can mean being in a situation in which no responsibilities are articulated or given to begin with. Then, the “ir-” of irresponsibility is no longer a counter-movement or opposition, but an absence or lack of given responsibilities. This lack can in turn be conceived in different ways. It may be the lack of given duties that enables someone to stick out their neck and assume a situational responsibility that was not previously given. Or this lack may be conceived radically, as that which falls entirely outside of the sphere of responsibility. Granite is irresponsible but, clearly, not in the sense that it fails to live up to given responsibilities or that it fails to assume situational ones; it seems rather to exist outside of the sphere of responsibilities at all. If it sounds semantically awkward to call granite irresponsible, then consider that one of our questions will precisely be how to understand Nietzsche’s claim in Human, All too Human that the cruel man is “no more responsible than a piece of granite is for being granite” (HH I 43), which is one formulation of Nietzsche’s idea of complete irresponsibility.[5]	情境性責任的悖論在於它必然涉及某種程度的不負責任。它可以意味著與既定責任的決裂，這一次不是以魯莽疏忽的意義，而是因為某種更高的責任所要求的。或者，它可以意味著處於一種沒有責任被明確或給定的情境中。在這種情況下，「ir-」前綴的不負責任不再是一種對立的反動，而是一種給定責任的缺乏。這種缺乏又可以以不同的方式來理解。它可能意味著缺乏既定的義務，使人能夠挺身而出，承擔一種先前未曾給定的情境性責任。或者，這種缺乏可以被徹底地理解為，完全超出責任範疇的事物。花崗岩是不負責任的，但顯然不是因為它未能履行既定的責任，或未能承擔情境性責任；它似乎根本存在於責任範疇之外。如果稱花崗岩[1]為不負責任聽起來語義上不合適，那麼我們的問題正是如何理解尼采在《人性，太人性》中提出的觀點，即殘酷之人「不比花崗岩為自己是花崗岩負更多責任」（HH I 43），這是尼采完全不負責任觀念的一種表述。
From these considerations, we can derive a final sense of irresponsibility. If irresponsibility can also refer to something that falls entirely outside of the sphere of responsibility, then in another sense it names something that can no longer be adequately grasped through the opposition of responsibility to irresponsibility – something neither responsible nor irresponsible. Indeed, Nietzsche’s idea of irresponsibility is also a reinterpretation (Umdeutung) and a revaluation (Umwertung). This is most clearly the case when the opposition between responsibility and irresponsibility either becomes undecidable (as we shall see, for example, in the play of the child and the artist) or paradoxical (as we shall see in the different ways in which Nietzsche, over time increasingly explicitly, takes responsibility for complete irresponsibility). Our more customary word for the irresponsibility of the child, perhaps also of the granite, is innocence. Innocence is conceptually similar to irresponsibility in the sense of also being a negative concept, denoting the negation of guilt (reflected more clearly in the German Un-schuld). It thus suffers all the same ambiguities: one can be innocent by sticking to given rules, or because no rule applies, or because the very opposition of innocence to guilt becomes undecidable or paradoxical.	從這些考量中，我們可以推導出無責任感的最終意涵。如果無責任感也可以指涉完全位於責任範疇之外的某種東西，那麼在某種意義上，它所命名的東西便無法再通過責任與無責任之間的對立來充分理解——這樣的東西既不負責任也不無責任。事實上，尼采的無責任概念也是一種重新詮釋（Umdeutung）與價值重估（Umwertung）。這種情況最明顯地表現於當責任與無責任的對立變得無法決定（例如我們將會看到的，在孩子與藝術家的遊戲中）或矛盾（正如我們將會看到的，隨著時間的推移，尼采愈加明確地對完全的無責任承擔責任）之時。對於孩子的無責任，或許還包括對花崗岩的無責任，我們更習慣使用的詞語是**「純真」。純真在概念上與無責任相似，它同樣是一個否定性的概念**，表達一種對罪的否定（在德語中更清晰地體現為「Un-schuld」）。因此，它也遭受著相同的模糊性：人可以通過遵循既定規則保持純真，或是因為沒有規則適用而純真，抑或因為純真與罪的對立變得無法決定或充滿矛盾而純真。
Following the ambiguity of the concept of irresponsibility, we can look at Nietzsche’s “doctrine” in different ways. On the one hand, Nietzsche employs the doctrine as a counter-idea in his critique of morality, determining the meaning of irresponsibility in its oppositional relation to responsibility. But that critique shows that “responsibility” has a specific and limited history. This already points to the fact that the ideas of irresponsibility and of innocence exceed the oppositional relation to responsibility and guilt as they arise in the context of the specific history of European morality. Thus, in this article, I will not follow Nietzsche’s critique of morality and the immanent critique of responsibility; of its characteristics, genealogy and limits.[6] Rather than study the critique of responsibility, I will focus on those texts where “complete irresponsibility” and “innocence” are treated in a sense that is somehow non-derivative and no longer only determined solely by their opposition to responsibility. Nietzsche mainly proceeds in three ways: (1) by studying the innocence and irresponsibility in the Greeks that precede the development of moral responsibility in Europe under the influence of Platonism and Christianity; (2) by speculatively envisioning a future type of irresponsible human after that history; and (3) on a conceptual level by showing how “complete irresponsibility” not only excludes or opposes responsibility, but in various ways complicates the opposition between responsibility and irresponsibility. This latter point involves recognizing that in spite of Nietzsche’s apparently unequivocal positing of complete irresponsibility as a doctrine, he also (a) criticizes specific forms of irresponsibility as a weak evasion or abdication of one’s task; (b) allows for a more affirmative notion of responsibility after 1881; and (c) shows where the determination of irresponsibility becomes undecidable and paradoxical.	隨著無責任概念的模糊性，我們可以從不同角度來看待尼采的「教義」。一方面，尼采在他的道德批判中使用這一教義作為對立的觀點，將無責任的意涵置於與責任的對立關係中來理解。但這樣的批判表明，「責任」有其特定且有限的歷史。這已經指出了無責任與純真的概念超出了責任與罪在歐洲道德歷史中特定脈絡中的對立關係。因此，本文不會沿著尼采的道德批判以及對責任的內在批判進行探討，即不會探討其特徵、系譜與限制。【註釋6】相反，我將集中於那些尼采在其中以一種不再僅僅由與責任對立來決定的意義來處理「完全無責任」與「純真」的文本。尼采主要通過三個方面進行探討：(1) 通過研究希臘人在柏拉圖主義與基督教影響下的歐洲道德責任發展之前所表現出的純真與無責任；(2) 通過推測性地想像一種在該歷史之後的未來無責任人類；(3) 在概念層面上展示「完全無責任」不僅排除或反對責任，還在各種方式上複雜化了責任與無責任之間的對立。這最後一點涉及認識到儘管尼采顯然將完全無責任作為教義進行肯定，但他也(a) 批判某些特定形式的無責任，認為這是一種對自身任務的軟弱逃避或放棄；(b) 1881年之後允許一種更積極的責任觀念；(c) 顯示出在何種情況下無責任的界定變得無法決定與矛盾。
It should come as no surprise that the “doctrine” of complete irresponsibility does not function in Nietzsche’s writings as an unequivocal doctrine. His writings are rarely, if ever, theoretically doctrinal in such a way. As we will see, when he first presents the doctrine of complete irresponsibility as a “philosophical conviction” in Human, All too Human, he does so in the same work in which he criticizes convictions as such. Nietzsche’s interest is not simply to teach the doctrine as an unequivocal claim to knowledge. In his excellent and impressive study, Silvio Pfeuffer has convincingly shown that with the doctrine Nietzsche “does not superficially follow theoretical paths” or express “universal knowledge [allgemeine Erkenntnis].”[7] Rather, expressing a “paradox,”[8] the doctrine “disturbs” and “irritates,” thus preventing one “from legitimizing one’s own deeds through it.”[9] Its function lies in its “potential for self-examination” on the part of the reader. Pfeuffer is entirely right that with the doctrine Nietzsche “does not simply offer the reader a new morality with new theorems [Lehrsätze] that would replace Christian European morality.” My aim in this paper is to supplement Pfeuffer’s account in two ways: by showing how the doctrine is not just set up as the “counter-hypothesis to christian-European morality”[10] but is rooted in Nietzsche’s early engagement with Heraclitean “innocence,” and by showing that Nietzsche gradually came to understand and value man’s irresponsibility differently, textually positioning the doctrine and his relation to it differently over time.	完全無責任的「教義」在尼采的著作中並未以一種明確無誤的教義運作，這一點不應讓人感到驚訝。他的著作幾乎從未以理論性的教義方式存在。正如我們將看到的，當他在《人性，太人性》中首次將完全無責任提出為一種「哲學信念」時，他也是在同一作品中批判了信念本身。尼采的興趣不僅僅在於將這一教義作為一種無誤的知識主張進行教導。正如Silvio Pfeuffer在其卓越且令人印象深刻的研究中所令人信服地指出的，尼采對教義的處理並非「表面上沿著理論的道路前行」或表達「普遍知識【allgemeine Erkenntnis】」。【註釋7】相反，通過表達一種「矛盾」【註釋8】，這一教義「擾亂」並「刺激」讀者，從而防止讀者「通過這一教義來合法化自己的行為」。【註釋9】其功能在於它對讀者的「自我反思潛力」。Pfeuffer完全正確地指出，尼采並非簡單地向讀者提供一套用來取代基督教-歐洲道德的新道德理論【Lehrsätze】。本文的目標是以兩種方式補充Pfeuffer的論述：一是展示這一教義不僅僅是基督教-歐洲道德的對立假說【註釋10】，還根植於尼采早期對赫拉克利特「純真」的探討；二是展示尼采如何逐漸對人類的無責任有了不同的理解，並在文本中重新定位這一教義及其與教義的關係。
I will structure my argument around three moments that I take to exemplify both the continuity as well as the development of Nietzsche’s insistence on the complete irresponsibility of human beings. I will argue that Nietzsche’s engagement with irresponsibility starts avant la lettre with his foundational early study of Heraclitus, where he develops the idea that he will later designate as the “innocence of becoming [die Unschuld des Werdens].” In the first section, I will show how Nietzsche admires Heraclitus both for expounding and for embodying a radical innocence. Here, too, Nietzsche’s interest is not simply doctrinal, but lies in Heraclitus’ doctrine of innocence insofar as it reflects a type of personality characterized by strength, pride and divinely intuitive insight that he believes is no longer possible in modern Europe. I will also argue that what Nietzsche admires in Heraclitus’ innocence paradoxically contains the latent contours of a responsibility-in-irresponsibility that Nietzsche will later explicitly affirm, especially with regard to Heraclitus’ refusal to take shelter from the abyssal truth of becoming. And with the corresponding model of the play of the child and the artist, Nietzsche pushes innocence beyond the opposition of responsibility and irresponsibility. The second section focuses on Human, All too Human, where Nietzsche turns Heraclitus’ divinely intuitive insight into an explicit philosophical conviction and “doctrine” but one that he, crucially, does not teach. Instead, he speculatively and experimentally envisions the possibilities for its future incorporation, thereby opening complete irresponsibility up to a responsibility for the future liberation of mankind. In the third section, I discuss a number of later passages that demonstrate a more acute awareness of this reflexive entanglement of responsibility and irresponsibility. I focus on how the doctrine of irresponsibility is now posited as “our teaching” out of a paradoxical responsibility for the “redemption of the world” in TI, Errors 8, as well as on how Nietzsche now criticizes weak forms of irresponsibility, focusing on BGE 21 and GS 285.	我將根據三個片段來結構化我的論證，這三個片段既體現了尼采對人類完全無責任感的堅持的連續性，也體現了其發展。我將主張，尼采對無責任的探討可以追溯到其早期對赫拉克利特的基本研究，在那裡他發展了後來被稱為「生成的純真（die Unschuld des Werdens）」的觀念。在第一部分，我將展示尼采如何欣賞赫拉克利特，不僅因為他闡述了純真，也因為他體現了一種激進的純真。在這裡，尼采的興趣不僅僅是教義性的，而在於赫拉克利特的純真教義反映出一種具有力量、自豪感和神聖直覺洞察力的個性，尼采認為這在現代歐洲已不再可能實現。我還將主張，尼采在赫拉克利特的純真中所欣賞的東西，矛盾地包含了後來尼采明確肯定的「在無責任中的責任」的潛在輪廓，特別是關於赫拉克利特拒絕逃避生成的深淵真理。通過對應的孩子和藝術家的遊戲模型，尼采將純真推向了責任與無責任對立之外。第二部分聚焦於《人性，太人性》中，尼采將赫拉克利特的神聖直覺洞察轉化為明確的哲學信念與「教義」，但這一教義他並未具體教導。相反，他推測並實驗性地設想了這一教義未來被納入的可能性，從而為人類未來解放開啟了無責任感的責任。第三部分則討論了一些後期的段落，這些段落顯示出尼采對責任與無責任之間反身糾結的更深意識。我將重點探討《偶像的黃昏》中，尼采如何以一種對「世界的救贖」的悖論性責任提出無責任的教義（TI, Errors 8），以及尼采如何批判弱形式的無責任，尤其是《善惡的彼岸》第21段（BGE 21）和《快樂的科學》第285段（GS 285）。
How is it that all these complications should surround what superficially seems like an unequivocal doctrine? The complication lies in the fact that not just what Nietzsche writes, but also how he writes it is itself an expression of (ir)responsibility. Nietzsche’s writings display an increasing performative awareness of this complication – one that he not only recognized, but actively exploited in his texts for maximum tension. The fourth section addresses how the different, often contradictory senses of irresponsibility in Nietzsche’s texts are related to each other. I will give an account of the senses of irresponsibility, but I will argue above all that such categorization must ultimately remain inadequate. That Nietzsche’s texts often do more to complicate than to clarify such distinctions is an important performative reflection of how Nietzsche paradoxically takes responsibility for “complete irresponsibility.”	為何這些複雜之處圍繞著表面上看來似乎明確無誤的教義？複雜之處在於，不僅僅是尼采寫下了什麼，更在於他如何書寫，這本身便是對（無）責任的表達。尼采的著作顯示出他對這一複雜性的逐漸增強的表演意識——這種複雜性他不僅意識到，而且在其文本中積極利用以達到最大的張力。第四部分探討了尼采文本中不同且常常矛盾的無責任意涵是如何相互關聯的。我將給出對無責任感的意涵的解釋，但我將主張，這種分類最終仍將不可避免地是不足的。尼采的文本往往更多地在複雜化而非澄清這些區別，這是一個重要的表演性反映，顯示出尼采如何以悖論的方式承擔「完全的無責任」。
I “A Star without Atmosphere”: Irresponsibility and the “Innocence of Becoming” in Nietzsche’s Early Reading of Heraclitus	一、「無大氣層的星星」：尼采早期解讀赫拉克利特中的無責任與「生成的純真」
Heraclitus remains a pivotal figure throughout Nietzsche’s development, and Nietzsche never breaks with one of the most important ideas he takes from him: that of the “innocence of becoming [die Unschuld des Werdens].” Although that phrase is not coined until 1883, the insight clearly originates in Nietzsche’s early interpretation of Heraclitus. We find this interpretation in the lecture series The Pre-Platonic Philosophers which he taught in 1872, 1873 and 1876 (= PPP), and also in a condensed and sharpened form in the unpublished text Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks from 1873. There is no doubt about what Nietzsche saw as Heraclitus’ teaching: Nietzsche hails Heraclitus as the teacher of “law in becoming and of play in necessity [die Lehre vom Gesetz im Werden und vom Spiel in der Nothwendigkeit]” (PHG 8, KSA 1.835). The pre-Platonic philosophers comprehended “the eternal problems and also their eternal solutions” (Nachlass 1871/72, 14[28], KSA 7.387), and with his teaching in particular Heraclitus “raised the curtain” on the “greatest of all dramas.” His teaching “must be seen from now on in all eternity” (PHG 8).	赫拉克利特在尼采的發展中始終是一個關鍵人物，尼采從未放棄從赫拉克利特那裡汲取的最重要的觀點之一：即「生成的純真（die Unschuld des Werdens）」這一觀念。儘管這一短語直到1883年才被創造出來，但這一洞察顯然起源於尼采早期對赫拉克利特的解釋。我們可以在尼采於1872年、1873年和1876年所教授的系列講座《前柏拉圖哲學家》中發現這一解釋（=PPP），並且在1873年未出版的《希臘悲劇時代的哲學》中也有更加精簡和尖銳的表述。毫無疑問，尼采所認為的赫拉克利特教義是什麼：尼采讚頌赫拉克利特是「生成中的法則與必然性中的遊戲（die Lehre vom Gesetz im Werden und vom Spiel in der Nothwendigkeit）」的導師（PHG 8, KSA 1.835）。這些前柏拉圖哲學家理解了「永恆的問題及其永恆的解決方案」（Nachlass 1871/72, 14[28], KSA 7.387），赫拉克利特通過其教義「揭開了『所有劇本中最偉大的』的帷幕」。他的教義「從此在所有的永恆中必須被看到」（PHG 8）。
Why does Nietzsche regard this doctrine so highly? The central premise of Nietzsche’s approach in these lectures is to ask “how the ‘philosopher’ appeared among the Greeks, not just how philosophy appeared among them” (PPP, KGW II 4.212). It is the philosophers and their work only as it relates to their personality which interests Nietzsche. Their doctrines belong to what is “refutable” about them; it is their characters that are “irrefutable.”[11] Even though several Heraclitean ideas can be seen to find their way into Nietzsche’s works (such as becoming or strife), the most profound influence of Heraclitus on Nietzsche does not lie in the refutable specifics of Heraclitus’ doctrine but in the “irrefutable”[12] aspects of his personality.[13] What, then, is irrefutable about a character expounding the innocence of becoming?	為什麼尼采如此看重這一教義？尼采在這些講座中的核心前提是問：「哲學家如何在希臘人中出現，而不僅僅是哲學如何出現」（PPP, KGW II 4.212）。對尼采來說，只有當哲學與哲學家的個性相關時，他們的教義才會引起他的興趣。這些哲學家的教義屬於他們可以被駁斥的部分，而他們的個性則是「無法駁斥」的。【註釋11】儘管赫拉克利特的若干觀念（如生成或爭鬥）可以說是滲透進了尼采的著作，但赫拉克利特對尼采的最深遠影響並不在於他的教義中的可駁斥細節，而在於他個性中「不可駁斥」的部分。【註釋12】【註釋13】那麼，一個宣揚「生成的純真」的個性中，什麼是不可駁斥的？
The first thing to notice is that innocence does not apply to persons but to becoming as such, i. e., to the “everlasting and exclusive coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual, which constantly acts and comes-to-be but never is [Das ewige und alleinige Werden, die gänzliche Unbeständigkeit alles Wirklichen, das fortwährend nur wirkt und wird und nicht ist]” (PHG 5, KSA 1.824). Heraclitus thus severs a connection we quickly take to be self-evident, namely: that between reality or actuality (Wirklichkeit) and being. Actuality is not what “is,” it is only ever what “acts” or “works” (wirkt) and “becomes.” Becoming, as an eternal process of growth and decay, never “is” insofar as it nowhere solidifies into fixed stability. The appearance of stability comes only from the short-sightedness of man. Outside of that short-sightedness, there is no land anywhere in “the ocean of coming-to-be and passing away” (PHG 5). In this way, “innocence” applies to an actuality that, although in principle accessible to everyone, remains inaccessible “to the common human eye” (PHG 7).	首先要注意的是，純真並不適用於人，而是適用於「生成本身」，即「持續不斷的唯一生成，一切現實的無常性，它們不斷地運作與生成，但永遠不會『是』【Das ewige und alleinige Werden, die gänzliche Unbeständigkeit alles Wirklichen, das fortwährend nur wirkt und wird und nicht ist】」（PHG 5, KSA 1.824）。赫拉克利特因此斷開了我們所認為的自明聯繫，即現實或實在（Wirklichkeit）與存在（being）之間的聯繫。現實不是「是」的東西，它僅僅是「運作」或「生成」的東西。生成作為一個永恆的成長與衰亡的過程，永遠不會「是」，因為它從未穩固成固定的穩定性。穩定性的表象僅僅來自於人的短視。離開這種短視，就不再有任何「在生成與消逝的海洋中」的「陸地」（PHG 5）。這樣一來，「純真」便適用於一種雖然原則上對每個人都可得但實際上卻「無法被『普通人眼』所看到」（PHG 7）的現實。
Why is the insight into actuality as becoming so compelling? It is not because there are good reasons to conceive of actuality in that way. Nietzsche stresses that the insight is not “attained by the rope ladder of logic” (PHG 9). Heraclitus “knows but does not calculate.” His is the truth as “grasped in intuitions.” In fact, his insight is “a truth of the greatest immediate self-evidence for everyone.” It corresponds not only to “the present many-colored and changing world that crowds in upon us in all our experiences” (PHG 5), but also to our intuition of time and space as conditions for knowing that very world. Everything we know, we know in time and space, and everything in time and space only has “relative existence [ein relatives Dasein],” that is to say: relative in relation to something else that, in turn, is relative again in the same way. Nietzsche here generalizes to the level of a condition for knowledge that familiar failure to hold onto any moment that seems to slip through our fingers as soon as we try to grasp it. Heraclitus’ ability to articulate this is what made him god-like (dem beschaulichen Gotte ähnlich). This near-divine “extraordinary power” to think or imagine intuitively (höchste Kraft der intuitiven Vorstellung) is, writes Nietzsche, Heraclitus’ “regal possession” (PHG 5, KSA 1.823).	為什麼對現實作為生成的洞察如此具有吸引力？這並不是因為有充分的邏輯理由來這樣構想現實。尼采強調，這一洞察並非「通過邏輯的繩梯獲得」（PHG 9）。赫拉克利特「知曉但不計算」。他的真理來自於「直觀中的把握」。事實上，這一洞察是一種「對每個人來說具有最大的直接自明性」的真理。它不僅與「我們所有經驗中擁擠於我們眼前的多彩且不斷變化的當前世界」（PHG 5）相一致，也與我們作為認識世界的條件的時間與空間直覺相一致。我們所知的一切都在時間與空間中，而在時間與空間中的一切僅有「相對的存在【ein relatives Dasein】」，即：它相對於其他事物，而其他事物也以同樣的方式再次相對。尼采在此處將我們所熟悉的無法把握任何似乎在我們試圖掌握時便滑落的片刻的失敗，概括為認識的條件。赫拉克利特能夠表達這一點，使他類似於「默觀的神（dem beschaulichen Gotte ähnlich）」。這近乎神性的「直觀想像的極致力量（höchste Kraft der intuitiven Vorstellung）」，尼采寫道，是赫拉克利特的「帝王般的財富」（PHG 5, KSA 1.823）。
But what is irrefutable about Heraclitus, is not only this highest power of intuition. It is also a very specific strength. It is this strength which underlies the law in becoming. Because what is the effect of seeing in actuality nothing but becoming?	但赫拉克利特的不可駁斥性，不僅僅在於這種最高的直觀力量。它也包含了一種非常特殊的力量。正是這種力量支撐了生成中的法則。因為在現實中看到的僅僅是生成，其效果是什麼呢？
The everlasting and exclusive coming-to-be, the impermanence of everything actual, which constantly acts and comes-to-be but never is, as Heraclitus teaches it, is a terrible, paralyzing thought. Its impact on men can most nearly be likened to the sensation during an earthquake when one loses one’s familiar confidence in a firmly grounded earth. It takes astonishing strength to transform this reaction into its opposite, into sublimity and the feeling of blessed astonishment. Heraclitus achieved this by means of an observation regarding the actual process of all coming-to-be and passing away. He conceived it under the form of polarity, as being the diverging of a force into two qualitatively different opposed activities that seek to re-unite (PHG 5, KSA 1.824–5).	持續不斷且唯一的生成，一切現實的無常性，不斷地運作與生成，但從未「是」的樣態，如同赫拉克利特所教導的，是一種可怕而震憾的觀念。其對人類的影響最接近於地震時的感覺，當人們失去了對於堅固大地的熟悉信任時，所體驗的震撼感。要將這種反應轉化為相反的狀態，即轉化為崇高和幸福驚奇的感受，需要驚人的力量。赫拉克利特透過對一切生成與消逝過程的觀察，並將其理解為一種兩極性形式的力量，將這種轉化達成：一種力量分裂為兩種質量上不同的、相互對立的活動，並尋求再次統一（PHG 5, KSA 1.824–5）。
Das ewige und alleinige Werden, die gänzliche Unbeständigkeit alles Wirklichen, das fortwährend nur wirkt und wird und nicht ist, wie dies Heraklit lehrt, ist eine furchtbare und betäubende Vorstellung und in ihrem Einflusse am nächsten der Empfindung verwandt, mit der Jemand, bei einem Erdbeben, das Zutrauen zu der festgegründeten Erde verliert. Es gehörte eine erstaunliche Kraft dazu, diese Wirkung in das Entgegengesetzte, in das Erhabne und das beglückte Erstaunen zu übertragen. Dies erreichte Heraklit durch eine Beobachtung über den eigentlichen Hergang jedes Werdens und Vergehens, welchen er unter der Form der Polarität begriff, als das Auseinandertreten einer Kraft in zwei qualitativ verschiedne, entgegengesetzte und zur Wiedervereinigung strebende Thätigkeiten.	「持續且唯一的生成，所有現實的完全無常性，不斷地只在作用和生成中，而非存在，如赫拉克利特所教導的，這是一種可怕且震撼的觀念，其影響最接近於一個人在地震中失去對堅固大地信任的感覺。需要驚人的力量，才能將這種效果轉化為相反的感受，即崇高和喜悅的驚奇。赫拉克利特通過對每一個生成與消逝過程的觀察來達成這一點，他將這個過程理解為一種極性形式，作為一股力量分裂成兩種質上不同的、對立的並且努力重新統一的活動。」(與上英文同，此處列出德文原句)
The idea that actuality is becoming, and is nowhere stable, does not mean that becoming is unordered. On the contrary: growth and decay are ever “flowing upward and downward in brazen rhythmic beat” (PHG 5). As such, they follow unwritten laws. Becoming is structured, and its structure is oppositional: growth and decay operate “under the form of polarity.” A power divides into two qualitatively different, opposing activities that strive to be reunited. What appears to people as light and dark or bitter and sweet belongs together “like wrestlers of whom sometimes the one, sometimes the other is on top” (PHG 5). The appearance of stability (say, the sweetness of honey) is but the temporary victory, the momentary prevalence of one of these two wrestlers within the eternal strife. All becoming derives from this eternal war of opposites, which constitutes the “law in becoming” that determines one side of Heraclitus’ teaching. But what grounds the insight into the polarity of the law of becoming? It is the ability – the strength – to recognize in the intuitively grasped actuality as becoming nothing but the innocence and the justice of becoming itself: in the “everlasting wavebeat and rhythm of things,” Heraclitus found “Lawful order [Gesetzmäßigkeiten], unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness [immer gleiche Bahnen des Rechtes], […] the whole world the spectacle of sovereign justice [die ganze Welt das Schauspiel einer waltenden Gerechtigkeit]” (PHG 5, KSA 1.822).	「現實是生成，並且沒有任何穩定之處，但這並不意味著生成是無序的。相反，成長與衰退總是在『銅製的節奏拍打中上下流動』（PHG 5）。因此，它們遵循未成文的法則。生成是有結構的，而這種結構是對立的：成長與衰退在『極性的形式』之下運作。一種力量分裂為兩種質上不同、對立的活動，並努力重歸合一。對人們而言，光與暗、苦與甜看似對立，但實際上它們彼此相連，就像摔跤手，有時這一方佔上風，有時那一方佔上風（PHG 5）。穩定的表象（比如蜂蜜的甜）僅是這兩位永恆鬥爭者中的一方短暫的勝利。在這永恆的對立戰爭中，所有的生成都是源自這種『生成中的法則』，這也構成了赫拉克利特教義的一部分。然而，這生成法則的極性洞見根源於何？它源於一種力量——一種能夠在直觀地把握現實為生成的過程中，認識到生成自身的純真與公正的力量：在『萬物持久的波動與節奏中』，赫拉克利特發現了『法則的秩序（Gesetzmäßigkeiten）、無懈可擊的確定性、持久的法則軌跡（immer gleiche Bahnen des Rechtes），[…] 整個世界是一場莊嚴的正義之景（die ganze Welt das Schauspiel einer waltenden Gerechtigkeit）』（PHG 5, KSA 1.822）。
What therefore grounds the insight into the “innocence” of becoming is not primarily that it is theoretically convincing or rationally necessary, nor that the flux of becoming precludes any fixed norm for responsibility. What grounds it is the irrefutable strength of Heraclitus’ personality which enabled him to see nothing but sublime justice in the most abysmal, destabilizing thought – the thought that all actuality only ever becomes and never is – a thought that in turn could present itself to Heraclitus only because of his near-divine power of intuitive representation.[14]	因此，對生成『純真』的洞見，其根源並非在於它在理論上令人信服或在理性上必然，而在於生成的流動阻礙了任何固定責任的規範。這一洞見的根源在於赫拉克利特無可爭辯的個人力量，使他能夠在最深沉、最具破壞性的思維中看到一種崇高的正義——即所有現實僅僅生成而從未『存在』的想法。這一想法反過來也正因赫拉克利特近乎神聖的直觀表達力而得以顯現。
The idea of becoming’s innocence is therefore not an ontological knowledge-claim, nor merely a negative claim about the absence of moral criteria. It is a positive idea about Heraclitus’ ability – faced with the “paralyzing thought” and losing the ground beneath his feet – to not try to escape it or judge it, but to recognize in this intuitive, abyssal truth a divine justice. In this refusal to seek shelter in the illusion of stability, we can already recognize the latent contours of what much later for Nietzsche will constitute an affirmative responsibility in the very idea of complete innocence and irresponsibility.	生成純真的觀念因此不是一種本體論的知識主張，也不僅僅是一種關於道德標準缺乏的消極主張。它是一種積極的觀點，關於赫拉克利特——面對『震撼的思想』並失去腳下穩固的根基時——選擇不逃避或評判，而是直觀地認識這深邃真理中的神聖正義。在這種拒絕尋找穩定的幻象中，我們可以隱約看見後來在尼采的完全純真與不負責任的觀念中所構成的一種肯定性的責任。
But if there are no criteria with which to judge becoming, surely there are no criteria to call becoming “just” either. So how exactly are the two spheres – of strife and justice, of human (ir)responsibilities and divine innocence – related? Is strife ultimately harmony? Or harmony ultimately strife? Does Nietzsche’s Heraclitus “sublate” the opposition?	然而，如果沒有標準來判斷生成，那麼同樣也沒有標準來稱生成為『公正』。那麼，對立與公正、人類的（無）責任感與神聖的純真，這兩個領域到底如何相關？對立最終是和諧嗎？還是和諧最終是對立？尼采的赫拉克利特是否超越了這種對立？
The answer is: none of the above. The law in becoming applies also to the world as a whole. Nietzsche believed that, following Anaximander, Heraclitus proclaimed a periodic renewal of the world through an all-consuming world-fire.[15] For Nietzsche, the decisive question is what one takes this periodic renewal to signify. He explains that because the time leading up to it is characterized as desire, and the consumption of the world through fire as saturation, Heraclitus had in late Antiquity become known as the “weeping philosopher” because the world-process was interpreted as a process of punishment for hybris, following the Greek adage that “satiety gives birth to hybris.” Nietzsche wants to save Heraclitus from this reading by arguing that for Heraclitus the periodic destruction of the world is emphatically not the “punishment of what has come-to-be [Bestrafung des Gewordenen],” but rather the “justification” of becoming (Rechtfertigung des Werdens):	答案是：以上皆非。生成之法適用於整體的世界。尼采認為，赫拉克利特追隨阿那克西曼德，宣稱透過一場吞噬一切的宇宙大火實現世界的週期性更新。對尼采來說，關鍵問題在於如何理解這種週期性更新的意義。他解釋道，因為在這段時間內，宇宙進程被欲望所特徵化，而世界的毀滅則被火焰所飽和，赫拉克利特在晚期古代被稱為「哭泣的哲學家」，因為世界進程被理解為對過度（hybris）的懲罰，這源於希臘的諺語「飽足滋生過度」。尼采希望將赫拉克利特從這種解讀中拯救出來，他認為赫拉克利特對世界的週期性毀滅明確地並非對已然存在之物的「懲罰（Bestrafung des Gewordenen）」，而是對生成的「正當化（Rechtfertigung des Werdens）」。
That dangerous word hybris is indeed the touchstone for every Heraclitan. Here he must show whether he has understood or failed to recognize his master. Do guilt, injustice, contradiction and suffering exist in this world?	那個危險的詞語「過度」的確是每位赫拉克利特門徒的試金石。在這裡，他必須證明自己是否理解或者誤解了他的導師。這個世界上是否存在罪惡、不公正、矛盾和痛苦呢？
They do, proclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human mind which sees things apart but not connected, not for the con-tuitive god. For him all contradictions run into harmony, invisible to the common human eye, yet understandable to one who, like Heraclitus, is related to the contemplative god (PHG 7, KSA 1.830).	「是的，赫拉克利特宣稱，但那僅僅對於有限的人類心智而言，這些心智將事物視為分離而非聯結。而對於那位擁有直觀理解力的神來說，一切矛盾都融匯於和諧之中，雖然對普通人的眼睛來說這是無形的，但對於像赫拉克利特這樣接近默觀之神的人而言，這卻是可以理解的。」（PHG 7, KSA 1.830）
Jenes gefährliche Wort, Hybris, ist in der That der Prüfstein für jeden Herakliteer; hier mag er zeigen, ob er seinen Meister verstanden oder verkannt hat. Giebt es Schuld Ungerechtigkeit Widerspruch Leid in dieser Welt?	「那個危險的詞語——傲慢（Hybris），確實是每一位赫拉克利特學者的試金石；在此，他們可以展示自己是否理解或誤解了其師。這個世界上是否存在罪惡、不公正、矛盾和痛苦呢？
Ja, ruft Heraklit, aber nur für den beschränkten Menschen, der auseinander und nicht zusammen schaut, nicht für den contuitiven Gott; für ihn läuft alles Widerstrebende in eine Harmonie zusammen, unsichtbar zwar für das gewöhnliche Menschenauge, doch dem verständlich, der, wie Heraklit, dem beschaulichen Gotte ähnlich ist.	是的，赫拉克利特回答道，但這些僅僅是對於那些有限的人類而言，他們只能看到分離的事物而非其聯繫。對於那位擁有直觀理解力的神而言，一切對立都融匯於和諧之中，雖然這對普通人的眼睛來說是無形的，但對於像赫拉克利特這樣接近默觀之神的人來說卻是可以理解的。」
According to Nietzsche, Heraclitus does not relapse into an Anaximandrian two-world view that would posit the one law as somehow behind the many as its eternal truth, which would mean to negate the pervasive nature of becoming. Nor does he maintain that stability is the mere appearance of a reality that is becoming. Instead, for Heraclitus, the one is the many, and the law is in becoming. But this also means that becoming is never “justified” in any colloquial sense. Becoming is indeed the “spectacle of a sovereign justice [Schauspiel einer waltenden Gerechtigkeit],” but not in order to conform to some criterion or principle of justice (i. e., this justice is neither rewarding nor punishing), but by conceiving all opposition itself as harmony.[16]	根據尼采的看法，赫拉克利特並未倒退回類似阿那克西曼德的「兩個世界觀」，這種觀點會將「一個法則」設想為隱藏在多樣事物背後的某種永恆真理，這意味著否定了生成的普遍本質。他也並不認為穩定性僅僅是生成的現實之表象。對赫拉克利特來說，「一」即是「多」，法則存在於生成之中。然而，這也意味著生成並不以任何通俗的意義來「正當化」。生成的確是「一場主宰之正義的壯觀景象（Schauspiel einer waltenden Gerechtigkeit）」，但這並非是為了符合某種正義的標準或原則（例如，這種正義既不獎勵也不懲罰），而是透過將所有的對立本身視作和諧。
So why does pure fire periodically release itself into the impure and limited multitude? Clearly not in order to tear it down again, nor to punish the world. The right answer, according to Nietzsche, is: for no reason. Innocence also signifies this lack of reason. Nothing or no one is accountable for the world. Heraclitus articulated this innocence through the image of fire or Zeus playing a game with and for themselves, exhibiting “coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence” (PHG 7). With this, Heraclitus becomes not just the teacher of the “law in becoming,” but also of “play in necessity.”	那麼，為什麼純粹的火會週期性地釋放自身到不純粹且有限的多樣性中呢？顯然這並不是為了再次將其摧毀，也不是為了懲罰這個世界。根據尼采的說法，正確的答案是：沒有理由。純真也意味著這種缺乏理由。這世界並沒有什麼或誰應該負責。赫拉克利特以火或宙斯玩弄自己這一意象，表達了「生成與消逝，結構與毀滅，沒有任何道德的附加，在永恆的純真中」（PHG 7）。因此，赫拉克利特不僅是「生成之法則」的導師，還是「必然之遊戲」的導師。
For two reasons, I have emphasized that this notion of justice-in-opposition also is not a dialectical solution: the first reason is that, as we have seen, the insight into actuality as becoming is not a rational but an intuitive insight; the second reason is (and for Nietzsche this is crucial) that Heraclitus’ solution is not only not rational but in an important sense absurd.	我強調這種對立中的正義概念並非一種辯證解決的原因有兩點：首先，正如我們所見，對生成的現實的洞察不是一種理性的，而是一種直觀的洞察；其次（對尼采來說這是至關重要的），赫拉克利特的解決方案不僅非理性，而且在某種重要意義上是荒謬的。
The idea that the world-process is Zeus or fire playing a game with itself is a ludicrous proposition that undoubtedly belongs to the refutable part of the system. Nevertheless, Nietzsche emphasizes that, with this idea, Heraclitus has joined his most intuitive insight with the most counter-intuitive possibility, one that nobody could guess “by dialectic detective work nor figured out with the help of calculations.” It is “a rarity even in the sphere of mystic incredibilities and unexpected cosmic metaphors” (PHG 6). In explaining this teaching, Heraclitus expounded something that is wildly contrary to all common sense and public opinion. This is another sense of Heraclitus’ innocence, and a large part of his irresponsibility: he was unaccountability incarnate. Nietzsche’s admiration for the pre-Platonic philosophers in general lay in their being “pure types,” in contrast to the emergence of a “mixed” culture after Plato that Nietzsche still found prevalent in modern Europe when knowledge had become a goal in itself severed from its essential ties to life. But for the pure types, there was a strict necessity binding their thought to their character, which drove them to lead solitary lives devoted to knowledge through a one-sidedness or “unity of style” that Plato and his successors lacked. But for Nietzsche, even among the pre-Platonic philosophers, Heraclitus’ solitude was radical. Unlike Empedocles or Pythagoras, who’s connection to the people was restored through their compassion or sense of the unity of life, Heraclitus’ writings convey no “feeling of compassionate emotions, no desire to help, to heal, to save” whatsoever (PHG 8). Heraclitus showed no interest in redeeming the world. He was, writes Nietzsche, “a star without atmosphere.” Heraclitus’ will to solitude, reflected in his will to conjoin the most intuitive with the most counter-intuitive insight, was a symptom of his pride: “Heraclitus was proud, and when a philosopher exhibits pride, it is a great pride indeed” (PHG 8). Of the pure types, Heraclitus was possibly the purest: where Pythagoras was “the wise man as religious reformer” and Socrates “the wise man as the eternal investigator of all things,” Heraclitus was “the wise man as proud, solitary searcher after truth [der Weise als stolz-einsamer Wahrheitsfinder],” the proud-lonely truth-finder (PPP, KGW II 4.265).	世界過程是宙斯或火與自身玩弄遊戲的想法是一種荒謬的命題，毫無疑問，它屬於系統中可被駁斥的部分。然而，尼采強調，通過這一想法，赫拉克利特將其最直觀的洞察與最反直觀的可能性聯結起來，這種可能性既不能通過辯證的偵探工作猜出來，也無法藉助計算得出。這是一種即便在神秘不可思議和意外的宇宙隱喻領域中也罕見的概念（PHG 6）。在解釋這一教義時，赫拉克利特闡述了一種完全違背常識和公眾觀點的東西。這是赫拉克利特純真的一個層面，也是其不負責任的一個重要部分：他就是一個不負責任的化身。 尼采對前柏拉圖哲學家的一般崇敬在於他們是「純粹的類型」，相較之下，柏拉圖之後出現的「混合」文化在現代歐洲依然盛行，這種文化使知識成為一個自我目的，脫離了與生命的本質聯繫。然而，對於純粹的類型來說，他們的思想與性格之間有著一種嚴格的必然聯繫，驅使他們過著孤獨的生活，致力於通過某種偏執或「風格的統一性」來追求知識，而這正是柏拉圖及其繼承者所缺乏的。 然而，在前柏拉圖哲學家中，赫拉克利特的孤獨是徹底的。與恩培多克勒或畢達哥拉斯不同，他們通過憐憫或對生命之統一性的認識重新與人們建立聯繫，赫拉克利特的著作中並沒有表達任何「憐憫的情感，沒有幫助、治癒或拯救的願望」（PHG 8）。赫拉克利特對拯救世界毫無興趣。尼采寫道，他是一顆「無大氣層的星星」。赫拉克利特對孤獨的意志，反映在他將最直觀的洞察與最反直觀的洞見相結合的意志中，這是他自豪的表現：「赫拉克利特是驕傲的，而當一位哲學家展現驕傲時，那就是極大的驕傲」（PHG 8）。在這些純粹的類型中，赫拉克利特可能是最純粹的：在畢達哥拉斯作為「宗教改革者的智者」和蘇格拉底作為「一切事物的永恆探求者」的對比下，赫拉克利特則是「作為驕傲的、孤獨的真理探求者的智者（der Weise als stolz-einsamer Wahrheitsfinder）」，即這位驕傲且孤獨的真理尋求者（PPP, KGW II 4.265）。
Finally, we should stress that however counter-intuitive Heraclitus’ explanation was, it did rest on an insight that is itself highly intuitive. Here we encounter a final type of irresponsibility that will remain decisive throughout Nietzsche’s development. This type, too, puts the conventional opposition between irresponsibility and responsibility in question. The counter-intuitive notion of Zeus’ divine play has, writes Nietzsche, analogues in “this world.” These analogues of eternal innocence are found in the play of the child and of the artist. This model of play will inform many of Nietzsche’s later ideas:	最後，我們必須強調，儘管赫拉克利特的解釋是多麼反直觀，它仍然依賴於一種高度直觀的洞察。在這裡，我們遇到了一種在尼采發展過程中始終至關重要的最後一種類型的不負責任。這種類型同樣質疑了傳統上對不負責任與責任之間的對立。尼采指出，宙斯神聖遊戲的反直觀觀念在「這個世界」中有其類比。這些永恆純真的類比存在於孩子和藝術家的遊戲之中。這種遊戲的模型將成為尼采許多後來思想的基礎：
And as children and artists play, so plays the ever-living fire. It constructs and destroys, all in innocence. […] Not hybris but the ever self-renewing impulse to play calls new worlds into being. The child throws its toys away from time to time – and starts again, in innocent caprice. But when it does build, it combines and joins and forms its structures regularly, conforming to inner laws (PHG 7, KSA 1.830–1).	「如同孩子和藝術家遊戲那樣，永恆活生生的火也在遊戲。它以純真的方式建造與摧毀……不是由於傲慢（hybris），而是因為不斷自我更新的遊戲衝動，召喚出新的世界。孩子時不時地把玩具丟開——但很快它又開始了，出於無邪的興致。然而，一旦開始建造，它便會依照內在的規律組織、結合並塑造其結構。」（PHG 7, KSA 1.830–1）
Und so, wie das Kind und der Künstler spielt, spielt das ewig lebendige Feuer, baut auf und zerstört, in Unschuld – […]. Nicht Frevelmuth, sondern der immer neu erwachende Spieltrieb ruft andre Welten ins Leben. Das Kind wirft einmal das Spielzeug weg: bald aber fängt es wieder an, in unschuldiger Laune. Sobald es aber baut, knüpft fügt und formt es gesetzmäßig und nach inneren Ordnungen.	同上
I restrict myself here to the model of the artist.[17] What do we learn about play and necessity from the artist? The central terms are those that are the central concepts of any traditional theory of responsibility: freedom and necessity. In the creation of the work of art, we see:	在這裡，我只限於討論藝術家的模型【註釋17】。我們從藝術家那裡可以學到什麼有關遊戲與必然性的知識？這裡的核心術語，是任何傳統責任理論的核心概念：自由與必然。在藝術創作的過程中，我們可以看到：
how the struggle of the many can yet carry rules and laws inherent in itself, how the artist stands contemplatively above and at the same time actively within his work, how necessity and random play, oppositional tension and harmony, must pair to create a work of art (PHG 7, KSA 1.831).	「多樣性的鬥爭如何能夠在自身之內仍然承載規則與法則，藝術家如何在作品之上觀照地處於其作品之中，同時又積極參與其作品之中；必然與隨意的遊戲、對立的張力與和諧，必須結合起來，才能創造出一件藝術作品。」（PHG 7, KSA 1.831）
wie der Streit der Vielheit doch in sich Gesetz und Recht tragen kann, wie der Künstler beschaulich über und wirkend in dem Kunstwerk steht, wie Nothwendigkeit und Spiel, Widerstreit und Harmonie sich zur Zeugung des Kunstwerkes paaren müssen.	同上
The work of art combines contradiction (Widerstreit) and harmony, necessity and play because the artist both stands “contemplatively above [beschaulich über]” the work of art and is efficacious in (wirkend in) the work of art. How can we understand this and why does it complicate the distinction of responsibility from irresponsibility?	藝術作品結合了對立（Widerstreit）與和諧、必然性與遊戲，因為藝術家同時以「觀照之姿（beschaulich über）」站立於藝術作品之上，並且在藝術作品中有效地運作（wirkend in）。我們該如何理解這一點，為什麼它會使責任與不負責任的區別變得複雜？
On one level, the artist is undoubtedly “responsible” for the work of art. Consider a painting: it is undoubtedly the artist who is responsible for the stroke of the brush, for the fact that it comes out in the way that it does. This is the moment of freedom. Especially in the domain of art, this freedom is radical: what we call the autonomy of art is that the work in principle does not serve any purpose or conform to a demand. However, precisely for this reason, cracks appear in this model of responsibility: art may be autonomous in this respect, but the artist is not since the form of self-legislation involved is not reducible to rational autonomy. The artist will be unable to give reasons why every stroke is there in the precise way that it is. No true work of art is the simple externalization of a prior intention, the realization of a blueprint, or any type of application or externalization. But the absence of reasons does not make the stroke arbitrary, as if it could have been on the canvas in any other way. On the contrary: for the artist, the stroke must go there. This is the moment of necessity. The actions of the artist are no longer fully the result of conscious intent. In that sense, they are no longer “actions” strictly speaking, for which the artist could take or assume responsibility. Nor can we say that the artist “decides” that the stroke goes there, for such a decision is not legislated by some rule or criterion. Artistic freedom is therefore a freedom-in-necessity that is irreducible to “freedom of the will” or “freedom of choice.” Therefore, rather than in terms of decisions Nietzsche – in later works (in a language that is especially prominent in and after Thus Spoke Zarathustra) – will work out this moment in terms of commanding (Befehlen). As such, the radical innocence of the play of the artist in this experience is such that the artist is just as much responsible (because beschaulich über) as not responsible for (because wirkend in) the work.[18]	在某個層面上，藝術家無疑對藝術作品負有「責任」。以一幅畫為例：無疑是藝術家對筆觸負責，對畫筆以某種特定方式下的筆觸負責。這就是自由的時刻。尤其在藝術領域中，這種自由是激進的：我們所稱的藝術的自主性，在原則上是指作品不服從於任何目的或要求。然而，正是因為這個原因，這種責任的模型開始出現裂痕：藝術在這方面可能是自主的，但藝術家並不是，因為自我立法的形式無法簡單地化約為理性的自主性。藝術家無法給出每一筆劃出現於其確定位置的理由。任何真正的藝術作品都不是某種事先意圖的簡單外化、某個藍圖的實現，或任何類型的應用或外在化。然而，理由的缺乏並不意味著這筆劃是隨意的，彷彿它可以以任何其他方式出現在畫布上。相反地：對藝術家來說，這筆劃必須落在那裡。這就是必然的時刻。藝術家的行為不再完全是有意識的意圖的結果。從這個意義上說，嚴格來講，它們已不再是藝術家可以承擔或接受責任的「行為」。我們也不能說藝術家「決定」了這筆劃該落在那裡，因為這樣的決定並非依據某個規則或標準所立法。藝術的自由因此是一種內在於必然性的自由，無法簡單地還原為「意志自由」或「選擇自由」。因此，尼采在其後期作品中（特別是在《查拉圖斯特拉如是說》之後），與其以決策來描述這一時刻，他更傾向於以命令（Befehlen）的語言來闡述這一時刻。由此可見，藝術家在這一經驗中的遊戲式激進純真，使得藝術家對作品既負有責任（因為beschaulich über）又不負責任（因為wirkend in）。
By relegating all judgement to the rank of human short-sightedness, Heraclitus’ teachings reflected for Nietzsche his intuitive power to see the world in complete innocence, but also his strength to recognize harmony and justice in the abyssal thought of becoming. Heraclitus personified irresponsibility in his bold and proud conjoining of his divine intuition with the most counter-intuitive possibility, but in this bold truth-seeking and in his refusal to take shelter in stability from the abyssal truth of becoming, one can paradoxically recognize the latent contours of what Nietzsche will later identify as the kind of “higher responsibility” of which only higher men are capable. Finally, in the play of the child and the artist we see the structure of an experience of innocence that is neither fully irresponsible nor fully responsible: a freedom in commanding necessity.	透過將所有判斷降格為人類的短視，赫拉克利特的教義對尼采而言，反映了他以完全純真的方式看待世界的直觀力量，以及在生成的深淵思想中識別和諧與正義的力量。赫拉克利特將他的神聖直覺與最違反直覺的可能性大膽而自豪地結合起來，化身為無責任的象徵，但在這種大膽的真理追求中，以及他拒絕以穩定性來避開生成的深淵真理時，我們可以悖論性地看到後來尼采將識別的一種「更高責任」的潛在輪廓，而這種責任只有「更高的人」才能承擔。最後，在孩子與藝術家的遊戲中，我們看到一種既不完全無責任也不完全負責任的純真經驗結構：一種在命令必然性中的自由。
If everyone were as enlightened as Heraclitus, everyone would live “in accordance with the eye of the artist.” This would involve recognizing that, insofar as there is no simple freedom of the will, everything about the human is “completely necessary.” This notion of complete necessity will return in Human, All too Human, when Nietzsche first formulates the complete irresponsibility and innocence of humans as a doctrine, but it can already be found in Nietzsche’s reading of Heraclitus:	如果所有人都像赫拉克利特那樣具有啟蒙之見，那麼每個人都會「依照藝術家的眼光而生活」。這將涉及到認識到，在沒有簡單的意志自由的情況下，有關人類的一切都是「完全必然的」。這種完全必然的概念將在《人性，太人性》中再次出現，當時尼采首次將人類的完全無責任與純真作為一種教義提出，但它早在尼采對赫拉克利特的解讀中就已經出現。
Man is necessity down to his last fibre, and totally “unfree,” that is if one means by freedom the foolish demand to be able to change one’s essentia arbitrarily, like a garment – a demand which every serious philosophy has rejected with the proper scorn (PHG 7, KSA 1.831).	人類在其最深處都是必然的，完全「不自由」——如果我們將自由理解為一種愚蠢的要求，即能夠像更換衣服一樣隨意改變自身的本質（essentia），這是一種所有嚴肅的哲學都以適當的嘲諷予以拒絕的要求。
Der Mensch ist bis in seine letzte Faser hinein Nothwendigkeit und ganz und gar „unfrei“ – wenn man unter Freiheit den närrischen Anspruch, seine essentia nach Willkür wie ein Kleid wechseln zu können, versteht, einen Anspruch, den jede ernste Philosophie bisher mit dem gebührenden Hohne zurückgewiesen hat.	同上
II Complete Irresponsibility and the “Necessity of all Actions” in Human, All too Human	第二部分：完全不負責任與《人性，太人性》中「一切行為的必然性」
The next big step in Nietzsche’s thinking of irresponsibility comes in the second half of the 1870’s, and its culmination can be found in Human, All too Human. We will see that we can recognize the main themes of the reading of Heraclitus but with modifications. Whereas in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks Nietzsche read the Greeks as the epitomes of a culture no longer possible in modern Europe, he now speculatively asks what form of human life would result if modern Europeans were to incorporate Heraclitean insights. In both cases, Nietzsche confronts his modern readers with an extreme thought, showing them how radically demanding the ideas of complete innocence, complete irresponsibility and complete necessity are, how incomprehensibly near-divine Heraclitus was, and how unfathomably demanding their incorporation would be.	尼采對於不負責任的思考在1870年代後期邁出了重要的一步，其巔峰體現在《人性，太人性》之中。我們將看到，儘管尼采在解讀赫拉克利特時的主要主題依然存在，但這些主題經歷了一些修改。與《希臘悲劇時代的哲學》中尼采將希臘人視為一種在現代歐洲已無法實現的文化典範不同，他現在推測性地詢問：如果現代歐洲人吸收了赫拉克利特的洞見，那會形成什麼樣的人類生活？在這兩種情況下，尼采都向他的現代讀者提出了一種極端的思想，展示了完全純真、完全不負責任和完全必然性的思想有多麼徹底地要求人，赫拉克利特有多麼近乎神性，以及這些思想的吸收會多麼難以理解。
Nietzsche seems to shift his attention from the innocence of becoming to the innocence of humans and their actions, although, as we will see, the latter is presented as rooted in the former and thus continues Nietzsche’s commitment to the innocence of becoming. The biggest change is that man’s complete irresponsibility is now approached as a “conviction,” as “doctrine” and as “knowledge,” namely: as the “philosophical conviction of the unconditional necessity of all actions and of their complete irresponsibility [die philosophische Ueberzeugung von der unbedingten Nothwendigkeit aller Handlungen und ihrer völligen Unverantwortlichkeit]” (HH I 133); as “the doctrine [Lehre] of everyone’s complete lack of responsibility and innocence” (HH II, WS 81) and as the knowledge (Erkenntnis) that “All is necessity – so says the new knowledge […]. All is innocence: and knowledge is the way to insight into this innocence” (HH I 107). We will see, however, that Nietzsche does not explicitly teach the conviction or theoretically posits this knowledge. Instead, he experimentally and speculatively asks what would happen if the thought of complete irresponsibility were to be incorporated as conviction and what type of human would be capable of it. With this, Human, All too Human hints at a different kind of responsibility out of which the doctrine of complete irresponsibility would be taught.	尼采似乎將注意力從生成的純真轉移到了人類及其行為的純真上，然而正如我們將看到的，後者被呈現為根植於前者，因而延續了尼采對生成純真的堅持。最大的變化在於，尼采現在將人類的完全不負責任作為一種信念、一種「教義」以及一種「知識」來處理，即：一種「對一切行為無條件必然性及其完全不負責任的哲學信念」（HH I 133）；作為「每個人完全缺乏責任感與純真的教義」（HH II, WS 81）以及作為「新知識所宣稱的『一切都是必然的』...一切皆為純真：而知識是通往這純真洞見的道路」（HH I 107）。然而，我們將看到，尼采並未明確教授這種信念或理論性地提出這一知識。相反，他以實驗性和推測性的方式問道：如果完全不負責任的思想被吸收為信念，那將會發生什麼？而什麼樣的人類能夠擁有這種信念？通過這樣的思考，《人性，太人性》暗示了一種不同的責任感，這種責任感可能是教授完全不負責任教義的出發點。
It should not be overlooked that in Human, All too Human I Nietzsche spends a significant amount of time criticizing convictions as such. Convictions are a greater danger to truth than lies (HH I 483), because they represent an unwillingness to examine or change one’s ideas (HH I 511).[19] Rather than explicitly teaching the doctrine, or endorsing the conviction, of complete irresponsibility, Nietzsche is interested in the efficacy and consequences of convictions. He therefore experiments with them, and asks what might be the consequences if the conviction or doctrine that “everything is necessary” were incorporated as “a new gospel” (HH I 107). At this point, he presents the doctrine as counter-doctrine to the opposite doctrines that determine modern European culture, to wit: the “doctrine of free will”[20] (to which he opposes the unconditional necessity of all actions and their irresponsibility) and the “doctrine of everyone’s complete responsibility and guilt,” in other words the Christian doctrine of original sin (HH II, WS 81), to which he opposes the complete irresponsibility and innocence of everyone. It should also not go overlooked that at least in one sense the doctrine of original sin achieved the same thing that Nietzsche thinks its opposite (which we could call the doctrine of original innocence, i. e., the innocence of becoming) would achieve, namely: “to turn worldly justice upside down [die weltliche Gerechtigkeit aus den Angeln zu heben]” (HH II, WS 81).[21] We recognize the Heraclitean view of a divine justice: the teaching of Christ and that of complete irresponsibility both deny the validity of “worldly” judgement and worldly justice. The doctrine of irresponsibility and the Christian doctrine both show the vacuity of all merely human moral praise and blame. The difference is that the Christian view retains judgement: according to Nietzsche, Christ (as God himself) held himself to be the supreme judge (HH II, WS 81).	值得注意的是，在《人性，太人性》第一卷中，尼采花了大量篇幅批判信念本身。信念對真理的危險超過謊言（HH I 483），因為它代表著對檢驗或改變自己思想的抗拒（HH I 511）。尼采並非在明確教授完全不負責任的教義或信念，而是對信念的效力與後果感興趣。因此，他以實驗的方式探討它們，並詢問如果「一切皆為必然」的信念或教義被納入為「新福音」，將會有什麼結果（HH I 107）。此時，他將這一教義作為與現代歐洲文化所主導的對立教義的對立教義，即「自由意志的教義」（他反對一切行為的無條件必然性及其不負責任）和「每個人完全負責與有罪的教義」，換句話說，就是基督教的原罪教義（HH II, WS 81），而他則反對每個人的完全不負責任與純真。 還應該注意的是，在某種意義上，原罪教義達到了尼采認為其對立面（我們可以稱之為原初純真的教義，即生成的純真）所能達到的同樣的效果，即：「顛覆世俗的正義」（HH II, WS 81）。我們可以認出赫拉克利特對神聖正義的看法：基督的教導與完全不負責任的教義都否認了「世俗」審判與世俗正義的有效性。不負責任的教義和基督教教義都展示了所有僅僅是人類的道德讚譽與譴責的空虛。不同之處在於，基督教觀點保留了審判：根據尼采的說法，基督（作為神本身）認為自己是最高的審判者（HH II, WS 81）。
The doctrines or convictions of irresponsibility concern three different, though inherently related, subjects: that all actions are necessary; that praise and blame are not justified; that guilt is not justified. I start with the first. In what sense are all actions necessary?	不負責任的教義或信念涉及三個不同但內在相關的主題：所有行為都是必然的；讚譽與譴責都是不正當的；罪惡感是不正當的。我將從第一個主題開始討論：所有行為在何種意義上是必然的？
The argument in Human, All too Human is based on the notion of the complete necessity of actions already articulated in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. Nietzsche’s use of the concept of necessity is many-layered and not easy to interpret. In Human, All too Human alone, the concept points to several tendencies that Nietzsche does not resolve conclusively. In my view, this is at least partly because Nietzsche is translating Greek ideas into Kantian-Schopenhauerian terminology. Specifically, he is fusing the Heraclitean “law in becoming and play in necessity” (the necessity of cosmic harmony, fate and play) with Schopenhauer’s (and eo ipso Kant’s) notion of calculable causal necessity as expressed in the laws of empirical nature (as opposed to the noumenal or intelligible character of freedom). Regarding the necessity of human actions, Nietzsche now credits Schopenhauer with the insight “that all human action is preceded by necessity” (HH I 39; cf. HH II, VM 33). A clear enough picture of the type of causal necessity that Nietzsche has in mind here can be found at HH I 106. He writes there that the movements of the waterfall are all necessary in the sense of being in principle mathematically calculable and predictable. Nietzsche’s thesis in Human, All too Human is that the realm of human action is no different from that of the waterfall. The cruel man is not responsible for his cruelty any more than the granite is for being granite (HH I 43). The necessity or fatality pervading nature extends without exception to human action: “A real person is something absolutely and entirely necessary [Ein wirklicher Mensch ist etwas ganz und gar Nothwendiges]” (HH I 160). Nietzsche suggests elsewhere that even man’s opinions are “as necessary and irresponsible as their actions” (HH I 376). But whereas Schopenhauer retained the Kantian idea of intelligible freedom by deducing it from the existence of remorse (the feeling of guilt) and the sense of responsibility that the acting agent has, Nietzsche rails against Schopenhauer for smuggling freedom (as “intelligible”) in through the “back door” (HH II, VM 33). According to Nietzsche, the feeling of remorse could well be (and in fact is) irrational.[22] Remorse (and with that guilt, and thus responsibility) is learned, and it can be unlearned. The mere existence of the feeling proves nothing. In fact, according to Nietzsche, even the very fact that the agent has this illusion of free will is itself not exempt from this calculable mechanism (HH I 106). Nietzsche is very clear on the matter in HH I 133: if man were to become convinced of the “unconditional necessity of all actions and of their complete irresponsibility” and were to succeed in incorporating that conviction and absorbing it “into his flesh and blood,” then all remorse and guilty conscience would completely disappear.	《人性，太人性》的論點基於在《希臘悲劇時代的哲學》中已經闡述的行為完全必然性的概念。尼采對「必然性」的使用是多層次的，並且不易解釋。僅在《人性，太人性》中，這一概念就指向了幾個尼采未能最終解決的趨勢。依我看，這至少部分是因為尼采將希臘思想翻譯成了康德-叔本華的術語。具體來說，他將赫拉克利特的「生成中的法則與必然性中的遊戲」（宇宙和諧、命運與遊戲的必然性）與叔本華（從而也是康德）的可計算因果必然性概念相融合，後者體現在經驗自然法則中（相對於自由的「物自體」或「可知性」的特徵）。 關於人類行為的必然性，尼采現在將叔本華的觀點歸功於認識到「所有人類行為都以必然性為前提」（HH I 39；參見HH II, VM 33）。尼采在這裡所指的因果必然性類型可以在《人性，太人性》I的第106節找到清晰的描述。他在該處寫道，瀑布的運動都是必然的，因為這些運動在原則上都是可以數學計算和預測的。尼采在《人性，太人性》中的論點是，人類行為的領域與瀑布的領域沒有區別。殘酷的人對他的殘酷不負責任，就像花崗岩對其作為花崗岩不負責任一樣（HH I 43）。貫穿於自然中的必然性或命定性毫無例外地延伸到人類行為：「一個真實的人是完全且絕對必然的事物」（HH I 160）。尼采在其他地方指出，甚至人的觀點也「與其行為一樣，既是必然的，也是不負責任的」（HH I 376）。 然而，叔本華保留了康德的「可知性」自由的觀念，通過悔恨（罪惡感的感受）和行動者所擁有的責任感來推導它。對此，尼采對叔本華表示不滿，認為他通過「後門」偷偷引入了自由（作為「可知的」）（HH II, VM 33）。尼采認為，悔恨感可能（事實上也確實是）非理性的。悔恨（以及隨之而來的罪惡感，進而責任）是學習而來的，而它也可以被遺忘。單單這種感覺的存在並不能證明任何事情。事實上，根據尼采的說法，即便行動者擁有這種自由意志的錯覺本身也不例外，仍屬於這種可計算的機制（HH I 106）。尼采在HH I 133中非常明確地表示：如果人類能夠確信「所有行為的無條件必然性及其完全不負責任性」，並成功地將這種信念融入自己的血肉之中，那麼所有的悔恨和內疚感將徹底消失。
The “necessity” of all actions seems therefore at first to mean calculability, and therefore it seems to imply a type of determinism. By denying even “intelligible” freedom, this determinism seems radical. But things are not so simple. Most importantly because we will see that, as the absence of guilt, complete necessity is for Nietzsche above all a liberating notion, in a sense that it is neither simply freedom of choice nor intelligible freedom. Moreover, in Nietzsche’s critique of the distinction of phenomena from noumena (thus of Schopenhauer and Kant) we see a different, Heraclitean sense of necessity – the necessity inherent in the play of opposing forces that forms Heraclitus’ “law in becoming” is not the same as the calculable necessity of modern natural laws.[23] Nietzsche criticizes the distinction between appearances and things in themselves on the grounds that it presupposes that life or experience lay before one like a finished painting, whereas life and experience are the results of a process of becoming and remain at all times involved in that process (HH I 16). Therefore, everything that we project onto this process of becoming is just that: mere projection or representation (Vorstellung). This includes the idea of free will, which is “an atomistics in the realm of willing and knowing” insofar as it presupposes the possibility to discriminate between discrete actions, which “is incompatible with the representation of a continuous, homogeneous, undivided, indivisible flowing” (HH II, WS 11).	「一切行為的『必然性』」起初似乎意味著可計算性，因此看似暗示了一種類似決定論的觀點。透過否認甚至「可理解的」自由，這種決定論似乎極為激進。但事情並不如此簡單。最重要的是，我們將看到，對於尼采來說，作為一種無罪的狀態，完全的必然性首先是一種解放性的概念，這並非僅僅是選擇自由或理智自由的簡單表達。此外，尼采在對現象與物自體區分的批判中（因而對叔本華和康德的批判），我們看到了不同的、赫拉克利特式的必然性——赫拉克利特「生成的法則」中對立力量之間的遊戲所蘊含的必然性，與現代自然法則中的可計算必然性並不相同。【註釋23】尼采批判了現象與物自體之間的區分，理由是這一區分預設了生命或經驗像一幅完成的畫卷一般擺在我們面前，而實際上生命與經驗是生成過程的結果，並在所有時刻都處於這一過程中（HH I 16）。因此，我們投射到這一生成過程中的一切，僅僅是：單純的投射或表象（Vorstellung）。這包括自由意志的概念，它在「意願與知識領域中的原子主義」範疇內，因為它預設了將離散行為加以區分的可能性，而這種預設「與持續、同質、未分割且不可分割的流動之表象相矛盾」（HH II, WS 11）。
Everything is thus necessity in the sense that the Heraclitean flow excludes free will, a reproduction of the insight Nietzsche already articulated in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks as the claim that “man is necessity down to his last fibre, and totally ‘unfree’” (PHG 7). Nietzsche also uses a different term for this necessity of the flowing of becoming: Fatum. Through his discussions of fatalism, we learn that even though science can force us to believe in fatalism, the important part is what the consequences of such a belief would be:	一切事物因此在赫拉克利特式的流動中呈現為必然性，排除了自由意志，這重申了尼采在《希臘悲劇時代的哲學》中所闡明的觀點，即「人類的每一纖維都是必然的，完全不自由」（PHG 7）。尼采對於這種生成之流的必然性使用了另一個術語：命運（Fatum）。透過他對宿命論的討論，我們了解到，即使科學可以迫使我們相信宿命論，但更重要的問題是，這種信仰將為我們帶來什麼結果：
The fatalist. – You have to believe in fate – science can force you to do so. What then grows out of this belief for you – cowardice and resignation or grandeur and sincerity – that bears witness to the soil in which that seed has been spread; but not to the seed itself, for it can turn into anything and everything (HH II, VM 363).	宿命主義者——你必須相信命運——科學可以迫使你這樣做。那麼，這種信仰為你帶來了什麼？是怯懦和放棄，還是崇高和真誠——這見證了種子所撒播的土壤，而非種子本身，因為它可以變成任何東西（HH II, VM 363）。
Der Fatalist. – Du musst an das Fatum glauben, – dazu kann die Wissenschaft dich zwingen. Was dann aus diesem Glauben bei dir herauswächst – Feigheit, Ergebung oder Grossartigkeit und Freimuth – das legt Zeugniss von dem Erdreich ab, in welches jenes Samenkorn gestreut wurde; nicht aber vom Samenkorn selbst, denn aus ihm kann Alles und Jedes werden.	同上
Note that it is not the truth or falsity of fatalism that Nietzsche seeks to establish here. Here, too, Nietzsche is not being simply doctrinal. Even if science can force one to accept fatalism, even if fatalism entails the belief in a determinism so radical that it even excludes intelligible freedom, then still “anything and everything” can follow from this, depending on the person in question. Different people still relate to this belief in different ways; a relation that is no longer a choice that would itself be external to fate.[24] Rather, one’s response (cowardly submission or liberating boldness) testifies to the “soil” in which this idea takes root. The idea – the fear – that resignation is the only possible result from fatalism (that there is no sense in doing anything because fate always wins) is only one particular type of fatalism that Nietzsche dismisses as “Turkish fatalism [Türkenfatalismus]” (HH II, WS 61).	需要注意的是，尼采並非試圖在此確立宿命論的真偽。在這裡，尼采同樣不是在簡單地提出教義。即使科學能迫使人接受宿命論，即使宿命論包含了一種如此激進的決定論，以至於它甚至排除了理性上的自由，即便如此，「任何事情」都可以隨之而來，這取決於具體的人。不同的人對這種信仰有不同的回應，而這種回應不再是外在於命運的選擇。相反，一個人對這種信念的回應（怯懦的屈從或解放的勇敢）見證了這個思想所紮根的「土壤」。那種認為宿命論只能帶來消極放棄的觀點（認為做任何事都沒有意義，因為命運總會勝出）只是尼采所摒棄的一種特殊形式的宿命論，即「土耳其式宿命論（Türkenfatalismus）」（HH II, WS 61）。
What would the consequences be of the incorporation of the idea of complete irresponsibility? The effects for responsibility are worked out by Nietzsche through a sketch of the “phases” of the “history of moral feelings” or the feelings through which we hold someone accountable or find someone responsible. Nietzsche holds that man attributed the good and the bad to feelings, but then forgot that he was himself the source of this attribution. Nietzsche likens this mechanism to the linguistic misunderstanding, “as when language describes the stone itself as hard, the tree itself as green,” and the mechanism is also reminiscent of the oblivion through which truths are held to be valuable in On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873) (namely, as illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions). In this way in Human, All too Human, people are held responsible first for the consequences or effects (Wirkungen) of their actions, then for the acts themselves as their causes, then the motives behind these acts, and ultimately for their “whole being.” But no one can be responsible for any of these, as this being, too, is wholly necessary, in the sense of being a necessary effect of “the elements and influences of past and present things.” That knowledge shows the history of moral feelings to be the history of an error:	那麼，若完全無責任的觀念被吸收，會有什麼後果呢？尼采通過對「道德情感的歷史」的「階段」進行描述來解釋對責任的影響，這些情感決定我們如何追究或認定某人的責任。尼采認為，人們將善與惡歸因於情感，卻忘記了這些歸因的來源是自己。尼采將這種機制類比於語言的誤解，「就像語言將石頭本身描述為堅硬，將樹木本身描述為綠色」，這一機制也讓人聯想到《論道德之外的真理與謊言》（1873）中提到的那種遺忘：我們忘記了那些被認為是有價值的真理其實是幻象。於是在《人性，太人性》中，人們首先對行為的後果或效果（Wirkungen）負責，接著對作為原因的行為本身負責，再對這些行為背後的動機負責，最終則是對自己的「整體存在」負責。但事實上，任何人都無法對這些負責，因為這一存在同樣是完全必然的，是「過去和現在事物的元素和影響」所造成的必然結果。這一認識顯示了道德情感的歷史其實是一個錯誤的歷史：
No one is responsible for his actions, no one for his nature; judging is the same as being unjust. This holds equally true when the individual judges himself. The principle is as clear as daylight, and yet here everyone prefers to go back into the shadows and into untruth: from fear of the consequences (HH I 39).	沒有人對自己的行為負責，也沒有人對自己的本性負責；判斷就等同於不公正。這同樣適用於個體對自己的判斷。這一原則如日光般清晰，但在這裡，每個人卻更願意回到陰影和謊言中去：因為害怕後果（HH I 39）。
Niemand ist für seine Thaten verantwortlich, Niemand für sein Wesen; richten ist soviel als ungerecht sein. Diess gilt auch, wenn das Individuum über sich selbst richtet. Der Satz ist so hell wie Sonnenlicht, und doch geht hier Jedermann lieber in den Schatten und die Unwahrheit zurück: aus Furcht vor den Folgen.	同上
Nietzsche emphasizes that the distinction of responsibility for actions from responsibility for what one is, is not relevant. In all these senses, man is completely irresponsible. In “judging is the same as being unjust” we recognize the aforementioned parallel with Christianity: all “worldly” judgement, all praise and blame (no matter whether one holds others, oneself, history, God or destiny responsible) is unjust (HH II, VM 78).	尼采強調，將對行為的責任與對自我本性的責任區分開來，是毫無意義的。在所有這些意義上，人都是完全不負責任的。在「判斷等同於不公正」中，我們可以看出前面提到的與基督教的類似之處：所有「世俗的」判斷、所有的讚美與譴責（無論人是將責任歸咎於他人、自己、歷史、上帝或命運）都是不公正的（HH II, VM 78）。
If the claim that all judgement is unjust is “as clear as daylight,” then why do people persist in the error? What consequences do they fear? Nietzsche gives different answers. First of all, if no regret, remorse or guilt were to follow upon bad deeds, then no feeling of reward or achievement would follow good ones. Nietzsche makes the latter point in HH I 91: much enjoyment (Vergnügen) and agreeable tears (angenehme Tränen), indeed much of the charm or appeal (Reiz) of life, would disappear if the belief in complete irresponsibility took hold. Worse still, since all actions are guided by their prospects of pleasure or pain (Lust und Unlust), one would ultimately be forced to reconsider the value of acting at all and ultimately the value of living over not-living. Removing responsibility has nothing less than potentially suicidal consequences.[25]	如果說所有判斷都是不公正的這一主張「如日光般清晰」，那麼為什麼人們仍堅持這一錯誤？他們害怕什麼後果？尼采給出了不同的回答。首先，如果對於壞事不再有悔恨、懊悔或內疚，那麼對於好事也就不再會有成就感或回報的感覺。尼采在《人性，太人性》I 91中指出了這一點：若完全無責任的信念占據了人心，許多的快樂（Vergnügen）、愉悅的淚水（angenehme Tränen），乃至於生活的魅力（Reiz）都會隨之消失。更糟的是，因為所有行為都是由快樂或痛苦的前景所引導（Lust und Unlust），人們最終會被迫重新考慮行動的價值，並最終考慮生存是否優於不生存。取消責任甚至可能帶來潛在的自殺後果。
A second answer is more genealogical: man will not be able to resist much longer the insight that behind every back door there is “the glittering bronze wall of fate;” that we are “in prison” and that we can at best “dream that we are free, not make ourselves free” (HH II, VM 33). Moral man is cracking at the seams. But praise and blame have been incorporated for so long, that man comes up with the most “despairing and unbelieving postures and contortions” to maintain the faith in free will, such as the idea that, if individual man – “the poor wave caught up in the necessary play of the waves of becoming” – is not responsible, then this wave-play itself is held responsible, blaming world-history or God himself; a position Nietzsche calls “Christianity turned on its head” – for then it is God who is guilty and man who is the innocent redeemer of God (HH II, VM 33).	第二個答案更具系譜學意涵：人們無法再長久地抵抗這樣的認識，即在每一道背後的門後都有一面「閃閃發光的銅牆命運之牆」；我們「身處牢獄」中，最多只能「夢想自己是自由的，卻無法讓自己變得自由」（HH II, VM 33）。道德人正逐漸崩解，但讚美與譴責已經融入人類生活太久，以至於人們為了維持對自由意志的信仰，編造了各種「絕望且無信的姿態與扭曲」，如認為如果個體人——「那個被卷入生成之波的必然遊戲的可憐浪花」——並不負責任，那麼這個波浪遊戲本身就該被責備，把責任歸咎於世界歷史或上帝本身；尼采將此稱為「顛倒的基督教」，因為這樣一來，便是上帝有罪而人是上帝的無辜救贖者（HH II, VM 33）。
So, people adhere to the illusion of responsibility as a justification for praise and blame because it has been incorporated for centuries and because removing it could deprive life of its perceived worth.[26] But the possibility of suicide is merely the immediate response to embracing the knowledge of the necessity of action and our complete irresponsibility. Indeed, if man were to incorporate man’s complete necessity and irresponsibility, then “all these motives, however lofty the names we give to them, have grown from the same roots in which we think evil poisons reside” (HH I 107). To be sure, this would make the complete irresponsibility of man for his actions “the bitterest drop that the man of knowledge must swallow.” But even so, they are still only growing pains:	因此，人們堅持責任的幻象作為讚美與譴責的正當理由，是因為它已經被吸收了幾個世紀，而且取消它可能會剝奪生命的價值感。但自殺的可能性僅僅是接受行動的必然性與我們完全無責任的知識之後的直接反應。事實上，如果人類吸收了人類完全必然性與無責任的觀念，那麼「所有這些動機，不論我們賦予它們多麼崇高的名字，都來自於我們認為邪惡毒素居住的相同根源」（HH I 107）。可以肯定的是，這將使得人對其行為的完全無責任成為「知識者必須吞下的最苦澀的一滴」。然而，即便如此，這仍然只是成長的陣痛。
The butterfly wants to break through its sheath, it pulls at it, it tears it apart: then the unknown light, the kingdom of freedom, blinds and confuses it. In such people, ones who are capable of that sorrow – how few it will be! – the first attempt is being made to see whether humanity could transform itself from a moral into a wise humanity (HH I 107).	蝴蝶試圖突破它的外殼，它拉扯著、撕裂著外殼：隨後，那未知的光明，那自由的王國，使它感到眩目和困惑。在那些有能力承受這種悲痛的人身上——而這樣的人將會非常少——第一次嘗試轉變人類，從一個道德的人類變為一個智慧的人類，已經開始了（《人性，太人性》 I 107）。
Der Schmetterling will seine Hülle durchbrechen, er zerrt an ihr, er zerreisst sie: da blendet und verwirrt ihn das unbekannte Licht, das Reich der Freiheit. In solchen Menschen, welche jener Traurigkeit fähig sind – wie wenige werden es sein! – wird der erste Versuch gemacht, ob die Menschheit aus einer moralischen sich in eine weise Menschheit umwandeln könne.	同上
With that, we catch a glimpse of what Nietzsche will slowly start to designate after 1882 as a “higher” or “greater” responsibility. With this move, Nietzsche places his own thought on a grand scale of no less than thousands of years and its effects in the light of nothing less than the future or destiny of humanity.[27] In this remarkable closing passage, Nietzsche describes the effect of embracing complete irresponsibility for the very few who would be capable of swallowing that bitterest drop – capable, that is, of the immense sadness of losing the possibility of praise and blame, guilt or achievement, as follows. Liberation from responsibility does not stand in opposition to the suffering of giving up responsibility. Liberation follows only for those who are capable of this suffering and sadness: the man capable of this sadness is presented by Nietzsche as “the necessary, preliminary stage” and “not [the] opposite” of a new kind of human being. This is consistent with the very knowledge that fuels the transition: “All is necessity – so says the new knowledge: and this knowledge itself is necessity.” As a stage leading up to the new man, the very illusion of responsibility was itself no less necessary. Because the knowledge that everything is necessary and innocent collapses the difference between good and bad deeds, everything pertaining to morality becomes “changeable, unsteady”: “everything is in flux, it is true,” writes Nietzsche, “but everything is also streaming: toward a single goal” (HH I 107).	隨著這一點，我們瞥見了尼采在1882年之後慢慢開始稱之為「更高的」或「更偉大的」責任。通過這樣的變動，尼采將自己的思想置於一個無不涉及人類未來或命運的宏大尺度之上，影響的時間跨度更是數千年。在這段非凡的結語中，尼采描述了接受完全無責任的影響，那些少數能夠吞下這最苦澀的一滴——能夠承受失去讚美與譴責、內疚或成就可能性所帶來的巨大悲痛的人。擺脫責任並不意味著與放棄責任的痛苦對立。解放僅僅隨之而來，對於那些能夠承受這種痛苦與悲痛的人而言：對於能承受這種悲痛的人來說，他在尼采筆下成為「一種必然的、初步的階段」，並且「並不是」一種新型人類的對立面。這與支撐這一過渡的知識非常一致：「一切都是必然的——這是新的知識所言；而這知識本身也是必然的。」作為邁向新人的階段，責任的幻象本身也同樣是不可或缺的。由於一切事物的必然性和純真的知識消除了善與惡行為的區別，道德上的一切變得「易變、不穩定」：「一切確實都在流動，」尼采寫道，「但一切也都在向著一個目標湧動」（《人性，太人性》 I 107）。
The necessary goal in question is the type of man capable of incorporating the necessity of everything. Such a man is conscious of his innocence and irresponsible in the sense of being beyond praise and blame. As has been noted, at this stage Nietzsche formulates his ideal in Spinozistic terms.[28] What names this non-judgmental mode is no longer Heraclitus’ intuition, strength and pride, but wisdom or comprehending: a “new habit of comprehending, not loving, not hating [des Begreifens, Nicht-Liebens, Nicht-Hassens],” replaces the old one “of erroneously evaluating, loving, hating” (HH I 107). We can still recognize, however, Heraclitus’ divine insight into the limited standpoint of judgement. But Nietzsche will abandon this conception of non-judgmental wisdom soon after, and already at BGE 198 he will deride Spinoza’s intellectual notion of wisdom for dismissing the affects.	這裡所指的必然目標是指一種能夠吸納一切必然性的人類。這樣的人意識到自己的純真，並在遠離讚美與譴責的意義上是不負責任的。如前所述，在這個階段，尼采以斯賓諾莎的語言來表述他的理想。這種無判斷的狀態不再是赫拉克利特式的直觀、力量與驕傲，而是智慧或理解：一種「新的理解習慣，而非愛或恨（des Begreifens, Nicht-Liebens, Nicht-Hassens）」取代了舊的「錯誤評價、愛、恨」的習慣（《人性，太人性》 I 107）。然而，我們仍然可以辨認出赫拉克利特對判斷立場的有限性之神聖洞察。但尼采很快就會放棄這種非判斷性的智慧觀點，並在《善惡的彼岸》198段中嘲諷斯賓諾莎以智性方式理解智慧，因為這樣的智慧忽視了情感。
Ultimately, although in a different way than Nietzsche’s reading of Heraclitus, Human, All too Human also paints an ambiguous picture with respect to the thought of complete irresponsibility and the necessity of all actions. Rather than as intuitive Heraclitean insight, Nietzsche now considers the thought as a philosophical conviction and asks experimentally: what if it were incorporated? On the one hand, such incorporation can still yield many types of man, and the outcome is speculative. On the other hand, after meeting with strong resistance initially, the incorporation of the doctrine of complete necessity is also itself said to be necessary. Finally, through that self-fulfilling dynamic of necessity and its incorporation, man is to find his true liberation, but in a paradoxical sense of freedom that remains undetermined in Human, All too Human[29] – a liberation from a freedom that is opposed to necessity, to a freedom in necessity. In this way, Nietzsche’s speculation about the liberation involved in incorporating the conviction of complete irresponsibility paradoxically evinces, at least implicitly, a sense of responsibility for the fate of humanity. Rather than solve the paradox, Nietzsche will come to textually account for it more explicitly. He will do this, on the one hand, by no longer experimentally considering the thought of complete irresponsibility as philosophical conviction but instead by blatantly declaring it “our doctrine,” while on the other hand acknowledging that such a teaching cannot but proceed from a specific kind of responsibility: one for the “future of mankind” and the “redemption of the world.”	最終，儘管與尼采對赫拉克利特的解讀方式有所不同，《人性，太人性》對於完全無責任的思想與一切行為的必然性也呈現出一幅模棱兩可的圖景。尼采不再將這種思想視為赫拉克利特式的直觀洞察，而是作為一種信念進行實驗性的探問：假如這種信念被納入生活中會怎樣？一方面，這種納入仍可能產生許多不同的人類類型，結果具有很大的不確定性。另一方面，在最初遭遇強烈抵抗後，完全必然性教義的納入本身也被視為是必然的。最終，通過這種自我實現的必然性及其納入的動態過程，人類將找到其真正的解放，但這種解放是一種與必然性對立的自由，轉化為在必然性中的自由。在這種方式下，尼采對納入完全無責任信念所伴隨的解放的思考，至少在某種程度上隱含著一種對人類命運的責任感。尼采沒有解決這一悖論，而是逐漸在文本中更加明確地表達它。他這樣做的方式是，一方面，不再實驗性地將完全無責任視為一種信念，而是直言不諱地稱之為「我們的教義」；另一方面，承認這種教義必須來自某種特定的責任感：對「人類未來」和「世界救贖」的責任感。
III The Twilight of the Idols: Complete Irresponsibility and the Redemption of the World	三、偶像的黃昏：完全無責任與世界的救贖
We have seen that in Human, All too Human the question remains whether the insight into man’s complete irresponsibility can be incorporated fully and whether such incorporation would be liberating, albeit in a sense yet to be determined. Elsewhere, Nietzsche will write that the insight provides relief (erleichtert).[30] In a remarkable autobiographical passage – that Nietzsche first wrote in 1883 when looking back and critically reflecting on The Birth of Tragedy (1872) (Nachlass 1883, 7[7], KSA 10.237–40), then rewrote and edited in 1885 (Nachlass 1885, 36[10], KSA 11.553) for the new edition of Human, All too Human[31] but ultimately did not select for publication – Nietzsche identifies as a guiding thread running through his own development his attempt to prove the innocence of becoming to himself: “How long has it been that I have made an effort to prove the complete innocence of becoming to myself! [Wie lange ist es nun her, daß ich bei mir selber bemüht bin, die vollkommne Unschuld des Werdens zu beweisen!] And what strange paths I have already walked in doing so!”[32] The paths he mentions are the aesthetic justification of existence; the idea that all morality is mere appearance; that all concepts of guilt are objectively worthless; his denial of all natural purposes (Zwecke) and the unknowability of causality. All of these now appear as ways in which Nietzsche has time and again attempted to prove the innocence of becoming to himself. Before adding:	我們看到，在《人性，太人性》中，關於人類完全無責任的洞察是否能夠被完全納入，這一問題仍然存在，而這種納入是否能夠帶來解放仍然尚待確定。在其他地方，尼采曾寫道，這種洞察提供了「解脫」（Erleichtert）的感受。在一段非凡的自傳性文字中——尼采最早於1883年撰寫這段文字，反思並批判性地回顧其早期著作《悲劇的誕生》（1872年）（Nachlass 1883, 7[7], KSA 10.237–40），並於1885年對《人性，太人性》新版進行了修訂（Nachlass 1885, 36[10], KSA 11.553），但最終未選擇出版——尼采指出，一個貫穿他自身發展的指導線索便是他試圖向自己證明生成的純真：「我已經努力向自己證明生成的完全純真有多久了！【Wie lange ist es nun her, daß ich bei mir selber bemüht bin, die vollkommne Unschuld des Werdens zu beweisen!】而為此我已走過了多少奇特的道路！」 他提到的這些道路包括：對存在的美學辯護、認為所有道德都是僅僅表象、所有罪惡觀念客觀上毫無價值、否認一切自然目的（Zwecke），以及因果關係的不可知性。這些現在看來都是尼采一次次試圖向自己證明生成的純真的方式。他接著補充道：
And why did I do all this? Was it not to provide myself with the feeling of complete irresponsibility – to position myself outside of any praise and blame, independent of all formerly and today, in order to pursue my goal in my way? – (Nachlass 1885, 36[10], KSA 11.553)	「而我為什麼要這麼做呢？難道不是為了給自己創造一種完全無責任的感覺——將自己置於任何讚美與責備之外，獨立於所有過去與當下，以便按照我自己的方式追求我的目標嗎？」
Und wozu dies Alles? War es nicht, um mir selber das Gefühl völliger Unverantwortlichkeit zu schaffen – mich außerhalb jedes Lobs und Tadels, unabhängig von allem Ehedem und Heute hinzustellen, um auf meine Art meinem Ziele nachzulaufen? –	同上
Even if it turns out to be impossible to incorporate complete irresponsibility, Nietzsche has consistently tried to sell himself on the idea, because the feeling of irresponsibility could still be productive. Productive for what? The 1883 version is a bit more specific: Nietzsche wanted to give himself that feeling, make himself independent of praise and blame, not just because science shows it to be true, but “in order to pursue goals that concern the future of humankind” (Nachlass 1883, 7[7], KSA 10.238).[33] In this remarkable passage we see Nietzsche applying his own distrust of conscious motives to himself. What did he find? The advocation of complete irresponsibility, including the denial of all purposes (Zwecke) was not an end in itself. It was a means to pursue a higher goal (Ziel). Nietzsche catches himself in the act, and the passage expresses Nietzsche’s awareness of the reflexive character of his own endeavor. His denial of all purposes itself served a purpose.	儘管最終可能無法將完全無責任的概念完全納入實踐，尼采始終嘗試說服自己接受這一理念，因為這種無責任的感覺依然具有生產性。生產性指的到底是什麼？1883年的版本提供了更明確的答案：尼采希望給自己這種感覺，使自己擺脫讚美與譴責的束縛，不僅因為科學證明這是正確的，更是「為了追求那些與人類未來相關的目標」（Nachlass 1883, 7[7], KSA 10.238）。在這段非凡的文字中，我們看到尼采應用他對於意識動機的懷疑來反思自身。他發現什麼？對完全無責任的倡導，包括對一切目的（Zwecke）的否認，並非是自我目的，而是達成更高目標（Ziel）的手段。尼采在行動中捕捉到自己，這段文字表達了他對自己努力的反思性特徵的覺察。他對一切目的的否認本身即是為了達成某種目的。
Whence that purpose? Should we say that Nietzsche gave himself the feeling of irresponsibility out of a sense of responsibility for the future of mankind? This would be consistent with one shift in Nietzsche’s use of the concept of responsibility. Although the expression “the innocence of becoming” stays with Nietzsche and is an important candidate-title for a theoretical work during and after the period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, from about 1882 onwards Nietzsche adds a new, less pejorative, “higher” sense of responsibility to his register. This culminates for example in Beyond Good and Evil’s (1886) definition of the philosopher as “someone of the most comprehensive responsibility [der Mensch der umfänglichsten Verantwortlichkeit]” (BGE 61), or in Twilight of the Idols’s definition of freedom: “For what is freedom! That we have the will to self-accountability [Dass man den Willen zur Selbstverantwortlichkeit hat]” (TI, Skirmishes 39).[34] In his later works, the doctrine of complete irresponsibility does not disappear, but Nietzsche’s late writings increasingly evince his awareness that a consistent application of the doctrine would entail new kinds of responsibilities.[35] This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in one of the most emphatic affirmations of the doctrine, in the final section of Twilight of the Idols (TI, Errors 8), written in 1887–88.	那麼，這一目的是從哪裡來的呢？我們是否應該說，尼采給予自己這種無責任的感覺是出於對人類未來的責任感？這與尼采對責任概念的使用變化是一致的。儘管「生成的純真」這一表達始終伴隨著尼采，並且在《查拉圖斯特拉如是說》時期及之後曾被視為理論作品的候選標題，但自大約1882年起，尼采在其語彙中加入了一個不再具貶義的「更高的」責任感。這在《善惡的彼岸》（1886年）中達到高潮，他將哲學家定義為「一個最具全面責任感的人」（BGE 61），或在《偶像的黃昏》中將自由定義為：「什麼是自由！就是擁有自我責任的意志」（TI, Skirmishes 39）。在晚期作品中，完全無責任的教義並未消失，但尼采的晚期著作越來越顯示出他對這一教義的一致應用所帶來的新型責任的覺察。
The four great errors in question are: (1) confusing cause with effect; the belief in (2) false or (3) imaginary causes and in (4) free will. The belief in false, imaginary or confused causes is rooted in two psychological mechanisms. With this, Nietzsche expands the familiar critique of free will and responsibility. The belief in free will psychologically does not just facilitate judgement (as in Human, All too Human), but it is above all the “most disreputable theologians’ artifice” that makes man dependent by making him guilty in order to unleash upon him the instinct for punishment and revenge: “everywhere that responsibilities are looked for, it tends to be the instinct of wanting to punish and judge that is doing the looking” (TI, Errors 7). Aside from this instinct for punishment, the other mechanism for the belief in confused or false causes is psychological reassurance. False and imagined are all the causes of actions that are of the order of consciousness: the mind, the self, and especially the will (TI, Errors 3). We only believe in the efficacy of motives, the authority of the self and free will (without which there would be no responsibility) because of their reassuring psychological effect. Nietzsche argues that morality and religion belong to this “psychology of error” in their entirety (TI, Errors 6): at bottom they confuse cause and effect by promising a state of well-being or happiness as attainable through specific actions or a particular morality or politics. Nietzsche turns this around: one’s morality is already an expression of one’s well-being or degeneration (TI, Errors 2). What Nietzsche therefore criticizes is the very possibility to judge actions on the basis of any given purpose (whether happiness, well-being, moral good, religious duty, divine authority, etc.). In this sense, man is radically irresponsible in a very basic sense because there is, quite simply, nothing that anyone “should be” (a thought that Nietzsche also forcefully defends in the subsequent section of Twilight of the Idols, against The “Improvers” of Humanity). This is the thought that TI, Errors 8 insists on, but also radicalizes.	這一點在他於《偶像的黃昏》結尾部分所做出的最有力的肯定中表現得尤為明顯（TI, Errors 8）。尼采列舉的四大錯誤是：(1) 混淆了因果關係；(2) 對虛假的原因的信仰；(3) 對虛構原因的信仰；(4) 對自由意志的信仰。對虛假、虛構或錯誤原因的信仰根植於兩種心理機制。尼采借此擴展了對自由意志與責任的熟悉批判。他指出，自由意志的信仰不僅心理上促進了判斷（如在《人性，太人性》中所述），而且它主要是「最不名譽的神學詭計」，通過讓人感到有罪來使人依賴，以便釋放其內心對懲罰與報復的本能：「凡是尋找責任的地方，通常都是懲罰與判斷的本能在背後作祟」（TI, Errors 7）。 尼采的批評進一步指出，宗教與道德的根本錯誤在於混淆了因果關係，承諾通過特定行為或某種道德或政治可以實現某種幸福或美好狀態。他反過來認為，人們的道德本身就已經是他們幸福或衰敗的表達。換句話說，尼采批判的核心是：依據任何既定目的（如幸福、福祉、道德善、宗教義務、神聖權威等）來判斷行為的可能性本身是無效的。這意味著，人類在一個非常基本的意義上是完全不負責任的，因為根本沒有什麼人應該「成為」的東西。 這就是《偶像的黃昏》中「我們的教義」所堅持的觀點：「沒有人賦予人類他們的特徵」，尼采強調這一點甚至包括人類自身：「既不是上帝，也不是社會，也不是父母和祖先，更不是他們自己」（TI, Errors 8）。責任問題因此不僅僅在於存在外部的約束（如道德或社會或傳統或宗教所規定的）。對於這一問題的解決可能是某種個人自主的模式，但尼采的批判更為徹底。他所揭示的「錯誤心理學」表明，內部約束（即我們自己決定我們是什麼或將成為什麼）這一概念本身是那些外部約束的工具。因此，無責任教義並不意味著我們可以自行決定自己該成為什麼。
What is posited as “our doctrine” is “that nobody gives a human their characteristics,” and Nietzsche crucially emphasizes that this includes man himself: “neither God, nor society, nor parents and ancestors, nor they themselves” (TI, Errors 8, italics in the original). The problem of responsibility is therefore not just that there are external constraints to what one should be (whether prescribed by morality or society or tradition or religion). The solution to this could be some model of individual autonomy, but Nietzsche’s critique is much more radical. What the psychology of errors showed was that the very idea of internal constraints (that we decide for ourselves who and what we are or will be) was invented as a tool for those external constraints. The doctrine of irresponsibility therefore emphatically does not entail that we get to decide for ourselves who or what we should be. Consistent with the thought of the necessity of all actions found in the early reading of Heraclitus as well as in Human, All too Human, Nietzsche calls the idea that I would give myself my properties the very “nonsense [Unsinn]” of “intelligible” freedom. Instead:	尼采所提出的「我們的教義」是「沒有人賦予一個人其特徵」，並且尼采特別強調，這其中也包括人自身：「既不是上帝，也不是社會，也不是父母和祖先，更不是他們自己」（TI, Errors 8，斜體字為原文）。因此，責任的問題並不僅僅在於是否存在外部的約束（不論是由道德、社會、傳統還是宗教所規定的）。這一問題的解決可能涉及某種個人自主的模式，但尼采的批判更加徹底。「錯誤心理學」所揭示的是，內部約束（即我們決定自己是什麼或將成為什麼）的想法，其實本身是那些外部約束的工具。因此，無責任的教義強調並不意味著我們能夠自行決定自己應該是什麼或將成為什麼。與尼采早期閱讀赫拉克利特時的觀點一致，也與《人性，太人性》中所發現的所有行為的必然性觀點相一致，尼采稱這種認為自己賦予自身特徵的觀點為「理智自由的荒謬【Unsinn】」。相反：
Nobody is responsible for the fact that they are there at all, that they are created in such and such a way, that they are in these circumstances and in this environment. The fatality of our nature cannot be separated from the fatality of all that has been and will be. We are not the consequence of an intention, a will, a purpose; with us the attempt is not made to achieve an “ideal human” or “ideal happiness” or “ideal morality” – it is absurd to want to offload our nature into a purpose of some sort (TI, Errors 8, translation amended).[36]	沒有人對自己之所以存在、之所以被創造成某種樣子、之所以處於這些環境中負有責任。我們的本性命運無法與一切曾經和將來的命運分開。我們並非一種意圖、意志或目的的結果；在我們身上，並沒有嘗試達到一個「理想的人」或「理想的幸福」或「理想的道德」——想要將我們的本性推卸到某種目的之上是荒謬的（TI, Errors 8）。
Niemand ist dafür verantwortlich, dass er überhaupt da ist, dass er so und so beschaffen ist, dass er unter diesen Umständen, in dieser Umgebung ist. Die Fatalität seines Wesens ist nicht herauszulösen aus der Fatalität alles dessen, was war und was sein wird. Er ist nicht die Folge einer eignen Absicht, eines Willens, eines Zwecks, mit ihm wird nicht der Versuch gemacht, ein „Ideal von Mensch“ oder ein „Ideal von Glück“ oder ein „Ideal von Moralität“ zu erreichen, – es ist absurd, sein Wesen in irgend einen Zweck hin abwälzen zu wollen.	現在我們熟悉了尼采如何在命運的觀念中解構所有的外部或內部約束。接下來，我將圍繞一個在此處特別重要的詞語進行一些說明，那就是 abwälzen：推卸、卸責或移轉。尼采認為，將人的（不負責任的）存在推卸到某個目的之上是荒謬的。追溯這個詞語的語義，我們可以看到尼采如何同時闡釋和複雜化完全無責任的概念。
We are by now familiar with how Nietzsche dissolves all constraints, whether external or internal, in the notion of fatality. In the space I have left, I will be making a few remarks around one term that is of special interest here, and that is abwälzen: to abdicate, offload or devolve. It is absurd to offload man’s (irresponsible) existence into a purpose.[37] Tracing the connotations of this term will allow us to show how complete irresponsibility is here both expounded and complicated.	現在我們熟悉了尼采如何在命運的觀念中解構所有的外部或內部約束。接下來，我將圍繞一個在此處特別重要的詞語進行一些說明，那就是 abwälzen：推卸、卸責或移轉。尼采認為，將人的（不負責任的）存在推卸到某個目的之上是荒謬的。追溯這個詞語的語義，我們可以看到尼采如何同時闡釋和複雜化完全無責任的概念。
First of all, abwälzen is a term that Nietzsche typically reserves for the shirking, abdicating or offloading of a responsibility that one should take.[38] He makes this point for example in BGE 21, where he distinguishes a weak will to responsibility from a weak will to irresponsibility (or so I submit, contrary to some commentators).[39] There, Nietzsche discusses the “unfreedom of the will” as being equally “mythological” as the “free will.” Much like how the seed of fatalism can still grow differently in different soils, here the decisive question is what feeling is evoked by the notion of the unfree will: if causality or psychological necessity evoke “some kind of compulsion, need, being forced to follow, pressure, unfreedom [etwas von Zwang, Noth, Folgen-Müssen, Druck, Unfreiheit],” then a weak-willed personality shows itself. Nietzsche then presents two examples of this weak will that come from contrary directions. The first refuse such an unfree will out of vanity: they display a will to “responsibility” (in quotes in the text because such vain self-interest is hardly responsibility) because they are unwilling to give up the possibility of accomplishment and merit (Verdienst). The second are those that “conversely, motivated by inner self-contempt, want to be responsible for nothing and guilty of nothing [wollen umgekehrt nichts verantworten, an nichts schuld sein], and wish they were able to shift responsibility for themselves to some other place [sich selbst irgend wohin abwälzen zu können]” (BGE 21). Nietzsche calls this: “fatalism of the weak-willed.” These people equally experience the unfree will as coercive, but this time because it exculpates them. This is why Nietzsche writes that the latter position expresses itself in literature as sympathy for criminals: the poor criminal was forced by circumstance, upbringing, etc. – it was not their fault.	首先，abwälzen 是一個尼采通常用來指代推卸或逃避應當承擔的責任的詞語。例如，在《善惡的彼岸》第21節中，他區分了一種對責任的弱意志和一種對無責任的弱意志（與某些評論者相反，我的解讀如此）。在這裡，尼采討論了「意志的不自由」與「自由意志」一樣，是一種神話。就像宿命論的種子可以在不同的土壤中成長出不同的結果一樣，這裡的關鍵問題是，對於不自由意志的觀念，所引發的是何種感受：如果因果性或心理必然性引發「某種強制感、必須追隨的壓力、不自由【etwas von Zwang, Noth, Folgen-Müssen, Druck, Unfreiheit】」，那麼這就表明了一種弱意志的個性。 尼采接著舉出了兩個來自相反方向的例子。第一類人出於虛榮，拒絕接受這種不自由意志：他們顯示出一種對「責任」的意志（在文本中以引號標註，因為這種虛榮的自利行為並不是真正的責任），因為他們不願意放棄成就和功績的可能性。第二類人則相反，由於內在的自我蔑視，他們「希望對任何事情都不負責，對任何事情都無罪【wollen umgekehrt nichts verantworten, an nichts schuld sein】，並且希望能夠將責任推卸到其他地方【sich selbst irgend wohin abwälzen zu können】」（BGE 21）。尼采稱這種情況為「弱意志的宿命論」。這類人同樣感受到不自由意志的壓迫，但這一次因為這種觀念可以為他們開脫責任。因此，尼采指出，這類人通常會在文學中表達出對罪犯的同情：這個可憐的罪犯是由於環境、成長背景等被迫如此——這並非他的錯。
Some surprising insights follow from this. First, apparently embracing complete irresponsibility is not necessarily a sign of strength: there is also a weak will to complete irresponsibility that does the opposite of what Nietzsche’s doctrine intends. Secondly, and conversely, apparently there is a kind of responsibility that these weak people are fleeing from but should not be fleeing from.[40] What would it mean not to devolve oneself into something else?	這段文字帶來了一些令人驚訝的見解。首先，顯然接受「完全無責任」並不一定是力量的象徵：也存在一種對「完全無責任」的弱意志，它所起的作用與尼采的教義所意圖的完全相反。其次，相反地，似乎存在一種責任，這些弱意志的人正在逃避，而這卻是他們不應該逃避的責任。 那麼，什麼叫做不將自己推卸成他物呢？
A remarkable passage from The Gay Science (1882–87) may be taken to paint a vivid picture of precisely what it would mean not to devolve oneself into something else (GS 285). It addresses a “man of renunciation” or of abnegation (Mensch der Entsagung) who is asked to renounce all “resting places,” whether they be prayer or worship, wisdom or power, guardians or love – anything in which to find “ultimate peace” or any type of finality. Nietzsche does not specify what these resting places entail and the passage is open to interpretation, but it may be read as the kind of unburdening whereby a weight is shifted or abdicated from oneself to some external authority. The renunciation of “avengers” and “improvers” certainly suggests some form of displacement of all worldly judgement and justification that we saw in Heraclitus and in Human, All too Human. Rather than using the concept abwälzen, Nietzsche presents an image of it in the form of a lake that one day refused to flow off (abzufließen), that formed a dam and has been rising higher ever since (the section is titled Excelsior!). The section ends as follows: “Perhaps this very renunciation will lend us the strength to bear renunciation; perhaps man will rise ever higher when he no longer flows off into a god [vielleicht wird der Mensch von da an immer höher steigen, wo er nicht mehr in einen Gott ausfliesst]” (GS 285). This reflects two important thoughts.	尼采在《快樂的科學》（1882-1887）中的一段引人注目的文字或許可以生動地描繪出「不將自己推卸成他物」的意涵（GS 285）。他針對一位「放棄的人」（Mensch der Entsagung）進行了探討，要求他放棄一切的「安息之地」，無論是祈禱、崇拜、智慧或力量、守護者或愛情——任何尋求「終極安寧」或某種終結的東西。尼采並未明確指出這些安息之地的具體內容，但這段話可以解釋為一種負擔的卸下，即將重擔或責任轉移或推卸給某種外部權威的過程。這裡所放棄的「復仇者」和「改善者」暗示了一種世俗審判和正當性的轉移，這種轉移我們在赫拉克利特和《人性，太人性》中已經看見過。尼采沒有使用「推卸」的概念，而是以一個湖泊的形象來呈現：有一天，這個湖拒絕繼續流走（abzufließen），築起了一道堤壩，從此不斷上升（這一段被命名為「更高！Excelsior!」）。這一節的結尾寫道：「也許正是這種放棄會賦予我們承受放棄的力量；也許人類將不斷上升，從此不再流逝於神中」（GS 285）。這反映了兩個重要的思想。
First, for the later Nietzsche, Heraclitus can no longer furnish the model of strength. To be sure, what guides Nietzsche’s critique up to Twilight of the Idols is still the Heraclitean insight that man is judged only on the basis of his own fictional creations (“We have invented the concept ‘purpose’: in reality, purpose is lacking,” TI, Errors 8) and that in reality man is part of the whole which cannot itself be judged:	首先，對於晚期的尼采來說，赫拉克利特不再是力量的典範。當然，在《偶像的黃昏》中，尼采的批判依然受到赫拉克利特的啟發，即人類只能在自身虛構的創造物的基礎上進行判斷（「我們發明了『目的』的概念：在現實中，目的是缺乏的」，《偶像的黃昏》，錯誤 8），而在現實中，人類是整體的一部分，無法對整體進行判斷：
You are necessary, a piece of fate, you belong to the whole, you are in the whole – there is nothing that could judge, measure, compare, condemn our being, for that would mean judging, measuring, comparing, condemning the whole … But there is nothing except for the whole! (TI, Errors 8)	「你是必然的，是命運的一部分，你屬於整體，你在整體之中——沒有什麼能夠對我們的存在進行判斷、衡量、比較、譴責，因為那就意味著對整體進行判斷、衡量、比較、譴責……但除了整體之外，什麼也不存在！」（《偶像的黃昏》，錯誤 8）
Man ist nothwendig, man ist ein Stück Verhängniss, man gehört zum Ganzen, man ist im Ganzen, – es giebt Nichts, was unser Sein richten, messen, vergleichen, verurtheilen könnte, denn das hiesse das Ganze richten, messen, vergleichen, verurtheilen … Aber es giebt Nichts ausser dem Ganzen![41]	同上
Since judgement arises only in man’s misconceptions, Nietzsche still presents as his teaching the restoration of Heraclitus’ “innocence of becoming” through the complete renunciation of all responsibility. The difference is, however, that there is so much more to renounce for modern Europeans than for the ancient Greek. Christian morality, with all its mechanisms of reassurance, has been incorporated so much longer. Precisely for that reason, there is now the opportunity for an unprecedented build-up of strength:[42] “No one yet has had the strength!” (GS 285) – and that includes Heraclitus. The same is true for the doctrine of irresponsibility: it requires not just the strength to see divine justice and cosmic harmony in the experience of becoming, but rather the strength to renounce all those purposes, responsibilities, goals, causes, free will, etc. that have been incorporated over centuries into European (Christian) culture. At the time of Twilight of the Idols, it has become crystal clear to Nietzsche what today stands in the way of Heraclitean wisdom. It is the ultimate idol,[43] God himself, as a false criterion for the judgement of the whole: “The concept ‘God’ has hitherto been the greatest objection to existence … We repudiate God, we repudiate responsibility in God [Wir leugnen Gott, wir leugnen die Verantwortlichkeit in Gott]” (TI, Errors 8). Ultimately, the resting-place given by Christianity is the belief in some responsible entity (whether God or history or society or oneself) in which to offload oneself or in which to flow off like the lake. This means that it is not enough to simply avoid making the great errors, it is a matter of harnessing the tension that comes from exposing and fighting against them. The ideal that Nietzsche sketches at GS 285 is to not offload or devolve in such a way, but that of an ever-building tension. Or as he writes a bit further on: “a continual sense of ascending stairs and at the same time of resting on clouds [ein beständiges Wie-auf-Treppen-steigen und zugleich Wie-auf-Wolken-ruhen]” (GS 288).	由於判斷只源於人類的錯誤觀念，尼采依然將恢復赫拉克利特的「生成的純真」作為他的教義，通過完全放棄所有責任來實現。然而，不同之處在於，現代歐洲人比古希臘人有更多的東西需要放棄。基督教道德及其一切安慰機制已被納入得更久。因此，正因為如此，現在有了前所未有的機會去積累力量：「還沒有人擁有過這樣的力量！」（GS 285）——包括赫拉克利特在內。這同樣適用於無責任的教義：它不僅需要看到生成中的神聖正義和宇宙和諧的力量，還需要放棄那些歷經數世紀納入歐洲（基督教）文化中的所有目的、責任、目標、因果、自由意志等因素。當到了《偶像的黃昏》時，尼采已經非常清楚地知道今天阻礙赫拉克利特智慧的東西是什麼。那就是終極偶像——神本身——作為對整體進行判斷的虛假標準：「『神』這個概念至今仍是對存在的最大反對……我們否認神，我們否認神中的責任」（《偶像的黃昏》，錯誤 8）。最終，基督教賦予的安息之地是一種信念，即相信某種負責的存在（無論是神、歷史、社會還是自己），並將自己卸下或像湖水一樣流向其中。這意味著不僅僅是簡單地避免犯錯，而是要利用這些錯誤暴露出的張力並與之抗爭。尼采在GS 285中描繪的理想，是不再進行這種推卸或移交，而是持續累積張力。或者，正如他在後面的一節中寫道：「持續地像在爬樓梯，同時又像在雲端休息」（GS 288）。
The second thought that can be taken from this reading in GS 285 is that such renunciation of resting-places, such a refusal to offload oneself, could itself be interpreted as a way of taking responsibility, but a responsibility of a very different order. It would be consistent with the aforementioned affirmative use of responsibility we find later in Beyond Good and Evil and Twilight of the Idols. But one can also find such formulations in the Nachlass, for example at Nachlass 1887, 9[43], KSA 12.356. There, nihilism is said to consist not in moral responsibility (as one might think) but in the abdication of responsibility: “one wants to abdicate responsibility (– one would accept fatalism) [man möchte die Verantwortung abwälzen (– man würde den Fatalism acceptiren)].” Is that not precisely what TI, Errors 8 teaches us? But here the acceptance of fatalism and renunciation of responsibility are symptoms of the greatest weakness. They constitute the attempt to avoid “willing;” that is to say: to avoid “willing a goal [das Wollen eines Zieles]” or to avoid “the risk of giving oneself a goal [das Risico, sich selbst ein Ziel zu geben].” The nihilistic question “for what? [Wozu?]” arises only out of the common assumption that some goal or purpose must be found somewhere, the assumption that such a goal or purpose is externally posited, given or demanded. One desires such given commands or purposes “merely to avoid having to will [nur um nicht wollen zu müssen],” to not have to risk “having to posit the ‘what-for’ for oneself [sich selbst das „Wozu“ setzen zu müssen].”[44]	「第二個可以從《歡愉的科學》第285節中讀取的思路是：這種放棄依託之處、這種拒絕將自身負擔轉移的行為，本身可以被解釋為一種責任的承擔，但這是一種完全不同層次的責任。這與我們在《超越善惡》和《偶像的黃昏》中發現的積極責任用法是一致的。此外，我們也可以在手稿中找到類似的表述，例如在1887年的手稿（Nachlass 1887, 9[43], KSA 12.356）中，虛無主義被認為並不體現在道德責任上（如同人們可能以為的那樣），而是表現為責任的退讓：『人們希望卸下責任（——人們會接受宿命論）[man möchte die Verantwortung abwälzen (– man würde den Fatalism acceptiren)]。』這不正是《偶像的黃昏·錯誤》第8節教導我們的嗎？但在這裡，接受宿命論和放棄責任被視為極度的軟弱的表現，它們構成了一種試圖逃避『意志』的企圖；也就是說，逃避『賦予自身目標的風險』[das Risico, sich selbst ein Ziel zu geben]。虛無主義的問題——『為了什麼？[Wozu?]』——正是出自一個普遍的假設，即某種目標或目的必須在某處被發現或給定的假設，以及這樣一個外在的命令或目標是給定的、要求的。人們渴望這些給定的命令或目的『僅僅是為了避免必須意志[um nicht wollen zu müssen]』，為了避免不得不『自己設定「為什麼」[sich selbst das „Wozu“ setzen zu müssen]。』[44]
After following the connotations of abwälzen we can see how the doctrine of irresponsibility is now complicated in two ways: (1) there is also a weak will to irresponsibility, and this weak will is (2) an attempt to flee from a strong (affirmative, higher) responsibility. That a more affirmative responsibility is paradoxically implicit in these later formulations of the doctrine of complete irresponsibility, comes out especially in TI, Errors 8, if we approach that text from a performative perspective. Let me make two remarks on this point.	在追溯了“abwälzen”這一術語的內涵後，我們可以看到，不負責任的教義現在在兩個方面變得更加複雜：(1) 存在一種軟弱的、不負責任的意志，這種軟弱的意志(2) 是試圖逃避一種強而有力（肯定的、更高的）責任。這一更為積極的責任在這些後期表述中的隱含，尤其在《偶像的黃昏·錯誤》第8節中表現得尤為明顯，若我們從一種表演性視角來看待該文本。我在這裡提出兩點看法。
First, we might ask whether the text of TI, Errors 8 does not – in the name of a rejection of all judgement – performatively still precisely pass judgement on judgement? Nietzsche is well aware of this problem that he calls a problem of “desirability [Wünschbarkeit]”, of “every ‘thus it should be, but it is not’”:	首先，我們或許可以問，是否《偶像的黃昏·錯誤》第8節的文本——以拒絕所有判斷的名義——依然在表演性地對判斷進行判斷？尼采對此問題非常清楚，他稱之為一種『可欲性[Wünschbarkeit]』的問題，或者說『每一個「它應該如此，但卻並非如此」的立場』：
But when we say this, we do what we renounce; the standpoint of desirability, of playing judge without authority, is comprehended in the character of the movement of things (Nachlass 1886/87, 7[62], KSA 12.316).	但當我們說這句話時，我們所做的正是我們所譴責的；可欲性的立場、未經授權的判官角色，屬於事物運動的特徵之一（Nachlass 1886/87, 7[62], KSA 12.316）。
Aber, indem wir dies sagen, thun wir das, was wir tadeln; der Standpunkt der Wünschbarkeit, des unbefugten Richterspielens gehört mit in den Charakter des Gangs der Dinge.	同上
Nietzsche does not solve this problem, but he does respond to it: this line of thinking would end up declaring desirability itself to be unavoidable, to be the basic phenomenon: “is desirability perhaps the driving force itself? Is it – deus?” But this would be saying that “everything” is ultimately desirability, and Nietzsche’s response is precisely:	尼采並未解決這個問題，但他對此做出了回應：這樣的思考方式最終會宣稱可欲性本身是無法避免的，是一種基本現象：「可欲性或許正是驅動力本身？它是——神嗎？」但這就等於說『一切』最終都是可欲性，而尼采的回應正是：」
It seems important to me to get rid of the all, of unity, of some power, some unconditioned; it would be impossible to avoid taking it as the highest instance and baptizing it God. One must shatter the all; unlearn the respect for the all; what we have given away to the unknown and the whole must be taken back for the closest, for what is ours (Nachlass 1886/87, 7[62], KSA 12.316, my translation).	「對我來說，擺脫『一切』、擺脫統一、擺脫某種力量或某種無條件的東西似乎是重要的；不然我們將無法避免把它視作最高的權威，並為其冠上『神』的名號。我們必須將『一切』粉碎；必須忘卻對『一切』的敬畏；我們所交付給未知和整體的東西，必須取回到最親近的、屬於我們自己的範疇中。」（手稿 1886/87, 7[62], KSA 12.316, 我的翻譯）
Es scheint mir wichtig, daß man das All, die Einheit los wird, irgend eine Kraft, ein Unbedingtes; man würde nicht umhin können, es als höchste Instanz zu nehmen und Gott zu taufen. Man mu<ß> das All zersplittern; den Respekt vor dem All verlernen; das, was wir dem Unbekannten <und> Ganzen gegeben haben, zurücknehmen für das Nächste, Unsre.	同上
Is this possible? This exhortation to destroy “the all” (zersplittern: to shatter or to fragment the whole) does not, as Maurice Blanchot suggests,[45] undermine the fatalism in TI, Errors 8 that declares there is “nothing except for the whole,” but it is in fact in line with Nietzsche’s declaration in Twilight of the Idols “that the nature of being [die Art des Seins] may not be traced back to a causa prima, that the world is neither a unity of sensation nor of ‘mind’ [dass die Welt weder als Sensorium, noch als „Geist“ eine Einheit ist] – this alone is the great liberation” (TI, Errors 8, translation amended).	這是可能的嗎？這種破壞「一切」的呼籲（「zersplittern」：打碎或分裂整體），並沒有像莫里斯·布朗肖所建議的那樣，[45] 破壞《偶像的黃昏·錯誤》第8節中宣稱「除了整體之外什麼都沒有」的宿命論，反而與尼采在《偶像的黃昏》中宣告的觀點一致，即「存在的本性[die Art des Seins] 不能被追溯至一個最初的因；世界既不是一個感覺的統一體，也不是一個『精神』的統一體[dass die Welt weder als Sensorium, noch als „Geist“ eine Einheit ist]——這才是真正的解放。」（《偶像的黃昏·錯誤》第8節，經修訂的翻譯）
Second, perhaps the biggest textual difference between Twilight of the Idols and the early and middle works is that in Twilight of the Idols the doctrine is finally posited explicitly as “our doctrine.”[46] The speculation about what might follow from the incorporation of the doctrine in Human, All too Human is replaced by a much more direct involvement, explicitly taking up the perspective of the teacher. With that, through this text, Nietzsche performatively takes upon himself the responsibility for the future of mankind.[47] How could “complete irresponsibility” be taught, if not out of such a sense of responsibility? If irresponsibility were absolute, why teach at all? This problem is reflected especially in the final sentence of the passage: “We repudiate God, we repudiate responsibility in God: only with that do we redeem the world. –” Recall that it was a fundamental characteristic of Heraclitus’ pride that he was not interested in helping or redeeming anyone. But now, complete irresponsibility is explicitly no longer an end in itself, but it is placed in the service of the redemption of the world. These questions bring us back to the question of what kind of freedom is involved in the relief, the Erleichterung, of the renunciation of all judgement and guilt. How to posit for oneself a “for what? [Wozu]” if this cannot follow the model of individual autonomy rejected in TI, Errors 8? What form of self-legislation is involved here? In Human, All too Human, the doctrine of irresponsibility only implicitly hinted at a new, affirmative responsibility. But in Twilight of the Idols, this paradox is radicalized into a most unexpected result: a critique of irresponsible freedom, in the name of freedom as a capacity for responsibility. There, what passes for freedom is an “irresponsible” life that lives only for today: “one lives for today, one lives at great speed – one lives very irresponsibly: and precisely this is called ‘freedom’” (TI, Skirmishes 39). Instead: “For what is freedom! That we have the will to self-accountability [Dass man den Willen zur Selbstverantwortlichkeit hat]” (TI, Skirmishes 39).	第二，或許《偶像的黃昏》與尼采早期及中期著作之間最大的文本差異在於，《偶像的黃昏》中，這一教義終於被明確地闡述為「我們的教義」[46]。《人性，太人性》中對於教義的納入可能帶來的後果的推測，被一種更直接的介入取代，明確地採取了教師的視角。由此，透過這一文本，尼采以表演的方式承擔了對人類未來的責任。[47] 如果「完全的無責任」是真正的終極目標，那麼為什麼還要去教導呢？如果無責任是絕對的，那為何要進行教導？這一問題尤其體現在該段落的最後一句話：「我們否定上帝，否定上帝的責任：唯有如此，我們才能救贖世界。——」回想一下，赫拉克利特的驕傲的一個基本特徵在於，他並不熱衷於幫助或救贖他人。但如今，完全的無責任明確地不再是其本身的目的，而是被置於救贖世界的服務之中。這些問題將我們帶回到對所有判斷和罪責的放棄所帶來的解脫（Erleichterung）中涉及的自由問題。如果這種「為什麼？[Wozu]」無法遵循《偶像的黃昏·錯誤》第8節中所拒斥的個人自主模式，那麼它要如何為自己建立一種形式的自我立法呢？在《人性，太人性》中，無責任的教義僅暗示了一種新的、肯定性的責任。但在《偶像的黃昏》中，這一悖論被激進地推向了一個最為出人意料的結果：對不負責任的自由的批判，這是一種以責任能力名義進行的自由批判。在那裡，自由被視為「今天而活，一味追求速度，過著非常不負責任的生活——而這恰恰被稱為『自由』」（《偶像的黃昏·爭鬥》第39節）。相反地，「什麼是自由！自由即我們有意願為自己負責[Dass man den Willen zur Selbstverantwortlichkeit hat]」（《偶像的黃昏·爭鬥》第39節）。
What grounds the responsibility to redeem the world? And how does it relate to the free will to self-responsibility? Answering these questions requires a closer look at the development of Nietzsche’s more affirmative notion of a “higher” or “greater” responsibility, and this is a task that must be left for another time. In any case, it cannot be done without taking Nietzsche’s own development into account: how he finds that for himself a more rudimentary model of aimless freedom (as negatively free from the constraints of the old morality) developed into a more sophisticated freedom as finding oneself in one’s task,[48] and how with that also the model of the strong individual shifts. Goethe exemplifies this richer model. To be sure, we still clearly recognize the Heraclitean rejection of the partial in favor of a fatalist affirmation of the whole:	這種救贖世界的責任的根基是什麼？它如何與自由意志的自我責任相聯繫？要回答這些問題，必須更仔細地檢視尼采「更高」或「更大」責任的更為肯定的概念的發展，而這是一個必須留待他日再討論的課題。無論如何，這無法避開尼采自身發展的考量：他如何發現對於自己而言，一種更加基本的、毫無目標的自由模式（即消極地擺脫舊道德的束縛）發展成一種更為精緻的自由，即在自己的任務中找到自己，[48] 並且隨之轉變的還有強大個體的模型。歌德體現了這種更豐富的模型。可以肯定的是，我們依然清晰地認識到赫拉克利特對部分事物的拒絕，而更傾向於對整體的宿命式肯定：
Such a spirit who has become free stands with joyful and trusting fatalism in the midst of the universe, in the belief that only what is isolated is to be shunned, and that in the whole, everything is redeemed and affirmed – he no longer negates … But such a belief is the highest of all possible beliefs: I have baptized it with the name of Dionysus. – (TI, Skirmishes 49)	「這樣一種精神，在宇宙的中心，以喜悅和信任的宿命論姿態屹立，堅信只有那些孤立的東西才應被避免，而在整體中，一切皆被救贖和肯定——他不再否定……但這種信念是所有可能信念中最高的：我為其冠上了酒神的名字。——」（《偶像的黃昏·爭鬥》第49節）
Ein solcher freigewordner Geist steht mit einem freudigen und vertrauenden Fatalismus mitten im All, im Glauben, dass nur das Einzelne verwerflich ist, dass im Ganzen sich Alles erlöst und bejaht – er verneint nicht mehr … Aber ein solcher Glaube ist der höchste aller möglichen Glauben: ich habe ihn auf den Namen des Dionysos getauft. –	同上
But where Heraclitus’ virtue was to be unmixed and cut from a single cloth, Goethe represents the excelsior-model: a cultivation of a maximum inner complexity and tension. Such an individual is certainly irresponsible, but also assumes responsibility in the sense of the refusal to flow out. And the doctrine of complete irresponsibility is now taught by Nietzsche out of an exhortation to redeem the world, while the early Nietzsche still admired Heraclitus for rejecting just such a desire for redemption.	然而，赫拉克利特的美德在於其純粹和一以貫之的特質，而歌德則代表了一種「不斷向上」（excelsior）模式：一種最大程度內在複雜性與緊張感的培養。這樣的個體無疑是無責任的，但也在拒絕流散的意義上承擔了責任。而如今，尼采通過對「完全無責任」的教義進行教導，來呼籲救贖世界，而早期的尼采則仍然欽佩赫拉克利特，因為他拒絕了這種救贖的渴望。
IV Nietzsche’s Irresponsibilities	IV 尼采的不負責任
Tracing the idea of complete irresponsibility throughout Nietzsche’s development has yielded different, at times mutually exclusive senses of irresponsibility. From a developmental standpoint, we started with Nietzsche’s admiration of Heraclitus as the embodiment of an innocence that has become unthinkable in his contemporary Europe. Nietzsche listens in Heraclitus for what the modern European ear can no longer hear. What is irrefutable in him is not the doctrine of the innocence of becoming as such, but the type of human capable of endorsing it: near divine intuition, the strength to see in strife itself justice and harmony, and the pride and capacity for solitude to wed his divine intuition to the most counter-intuitive possibility. But in his refusal to take shelter in stability from the abyssal truth of becoming, we also find the latent contours of what Nietzsche will later identify as a “higher” responsibility. In Human, All too Human, Nietzsche speculates how a type of man capable of Heraclitus’ insight into humanity’s complete necessity and irresponsibility could ever develop out of a modern European who has now so thoroughly incorporated the need for praise and blame that life seems to have become unthinkable and unlivable without it. Consistent with Human, All too Human’s critique of convictions as such, actually teaching the doctrine of irresponsibility is not the main point of the passages. Instead, Nietzsche experiments with complete irresponsibility as a conviction by speculatively envisioning man’s liberation from responsibility as the result of its hypothetical future incorporation. In the later works, Nietzsche more explicitly acknowledges this paradoxical responsibility involved in the thought of complete irresponsibility, making his reflexive entanglement with the problem of irresponsibility clear to himself: he denied all purposes only to pursue his own purposes, pertaining to nothing less than the future of mankind. Thus, in Twilight of the Idols, we see Nietzsche finally explicitly appropriating complete irresponsibility as “our teaching,” as well as acknowledging that to teach that doctrine means assuming responsibility for the redemption of the world. That Heraclitus rejected precisely such desire had constituted an important reason for the early Nietzsche’s admiration of him. Yet in the early Nietzsche’s conviction of the “irrefutability” and thus the contemporary relevance of at least Heraclitus’ “personality” one can see the explicit later responsibility for the future of mankind as latently present in Nietzsche’s early concern for the fate of culture. Finally, we have seen that the later doctrine of complete irresponsibility also entails a critique of the “irresponsible” life of modernity that shies away from positing a goal for itself; abdicating this higher responsibility to will by seeking refuge in externally given goals and offloading one’s existence into a purpose.	在追溯尼采思想發展中的「完全不負責任」概念時，我們發現這個概念在不同時期具有不同、甚至互相矛盾的意涵。從發展的角度來看，我們從尼采對赫拉克利特的欽佩開始，他將赫拉克利特視為體現了一種在當代歐洲已經無法想像的純真。尼采在赫拉克利特的教義中傾聽那些現代歐洲人再也無法聽到的聲音。赫拉克利特所具有的不可駁斥之處並不在於「生成純真」的教義本身，而在於能夠接受這一教義的那種人類類型：擁有近乎神性的直覺力量，能在「衝突」中看見正義與和諧的力量，以及將這種直覺與最反直覺的可能性結合起來的驕傲與獨處能力。然而，在赫拉克利特拒絕以穩定來庇護自己遠離「生成的深淵真理」時，我們同樣可以看到尼采後來所稱之為「更高責任」的潛在輪廓。 在《人性，太人性》中，尼采推測出一種能夠從現代歐洲人身上發展出來的類型，而這些現代歐洲人早已徹底內化了對讚美與責備的需要，以至於沒有這些，生活似乎變得無法想像、難以忍受。與《人性，太人性》中對信念的批判一致，尼采在這些段落中的重點並非真正教授「不負責任」的教義，而是試圖實驗性地設想人類若能在未來納入這種信念，會如何從責任中解放出來。隨著晚期著作中尼采越來越明確地承認這種完全不負責任的思想中所隱含的矛盾責任，他也更清晰地看到了自己與不負責任問題的反身糾纏：他否認了一切目的，僅僅是為了追求自己的目的，並且這些目的與整個人類的未來密切相關。因此，在《偶像的黃昏》中，我們看到尼采終於明確地把完全不負責任當作「我們的教義」，同時也承認教授這一教義意味着承擔救贖世界的責任。 早期的尼采對赫拉克利特的欽佩正是因為他拒絕了這樣的救贖渴望。然而，在尼采對赫拉克利特「人格」不可駁斥性的堅信中，我們可以看到他對文化命運的早期關切，這種關切在尼采後期對人類未來的責任感中得以明確顯現。最後，我們看到，晚期的「完全不負責任」教義同樣包含對現代社會「不負責任」生活的批判，那種不為自己設定目標，反而尋找外在賦予的目標以將自身存在「卸載」到一個目的之中的生活。
What do these changes in Nietzsche’s development tell us about the meaning of irresponsibility? I started by pointing out the ambiguities involved in the grammatical seduction of treating complete irresponsibility solely as a counter-thesis to responsibility. It would be short-sighted to concluded that Nietzsche taught that there simply “are no” responsibilities. Nor is the point to consider the thought of complete irresponsibility refuted because it is taught out of some sense of responsibility and thus contradicts itself. Karl Jaspers famously wrote that no interpretation of Nietzsche is sufficient if it does not seek out contradictions in order to keep the tension of different possibilities alive.[49] We would then have to ask how to understand the contradiction between the doctrine of complete irresponsibility and Nietzsche’s critiques of irresponsibility. One common way to reconcile such contradictions, and to respond to the famous question of the unity of Nietzsche’s fragmentary writing, is by distinguishing different senses of the concept at hand. Since such commentary is geared towards the reconciliation of contradictions, it often has the specifically binary form of identifying a “positive” and a “negative” irresponsibility; an irresponsibility that Nietzsche “endorsed” and a different one that he “criticized.”[50] Although such expressions do occur in Nietzsche’s texts and have their place in commentary, I see three main shortcomings in this approach.	這些尼采發展中的變化告訴我們關於「不負責任」的意涵了什麼呢？一開始，我指出了將「完全不負責任」僅僅作為責任的對立面來理解時所包含的語法誘惑的模糊性。將尼采的教義簡單地解讀為「根本沒有責任」的說法未免過於短視。尼采的重點也不在於反駁「完全不負責任」的思想，因為它是基於某種責任感進行的教授，因此自相矛盾。正如卡爾‧雅斯培（Karl Jaspers）著名地指出的：對尼采的任何詮釋都不足夠，除非它設法尋找矛盾以保持不同可能性之間的張力。這意味著，我們必須思考如何理解「完全不負責任」的教義與尼采對「不負責任」批判之間的矛盾。 一種常見的調和這些矛盾的方法是區分概念中所隱含的不同層次，以回應著名的問題：如何理解尼采破碎式寫作的統一性。這類評論通常是針對矛盾的調和，它往往以二元的形式來標識「積極的」和「消極的」不負責任，即尼采所「贊同的」不負責任和他所「批判的」另一種不負責任。儘管這種表述確實出現在尼采的文本中，並且在評論中佔有一席之地，我認為這種方法有三個主要的不足之處。
The first problem is that Nietzsche’s texts, to put it very plainly, most often are just not like that. Rarely are Nietzsche’s criticisms and affirmations so unequivocal. Understanding the contradictions in Nietzsche’s work has often been interpreted as the challenge to reconcile one passage or fragment with another. This then leads to the famous question of the unity of Nietzsche’s fragmentary writing. Taking a cue from Blanchot, one could thus say that the challenge in the famous question of Nietzsche’s fragmentary writing is not that of reconciling one passage with another that would contradict it, but of reading the same passage in different senses simultaneously.[51] It is not only that Nietzsche in fact never wrote a text that unequivocally or definitively distinguishes a bad, criticized form of irresponsibility from a good, affirmed one. It is that he often expends extra effort to complicate such distinctions. Nietzsche’s specific type of Umdeutung does not just push concepts into new and uncharted territory; retaining the old names as well as deliberately mixing “old” and “new” levels is a crucial part of that practice. The identification of “good and bad” senses of a concept in these texts is an imposition that cannot but reduce the ways in which Nietzsche deliberately textually complicates the possibility of distinguishing such contradictory senses. Part of that has to do with Nietzsche’s specific suspicion of the philosophical tradition of which he shows in many different ways that it is animated by the very things it pretends to be able to keep at bay (the intellectual by the affects, the good by the bad, etc.).	第一個問題在於，尼采的文本——說得直白一些——往往並不是那樣的。尼采的批判與肯定很少是如此明確的。在理解尼采作品中的矛盾時，這通常被解讀為試圖調和一段文字或片段與另一段互相矛盾的文字，這也引發了關於尼采破碎式寫作統一性的著名問題。參考布朗肖（Maurice Blanchot）的觀點，可以說，尼采破碎式寫作的挑戰，不在於調和一段文字與另一段矛盾的文字，而在於同時以不同的意義閱讀同一段文字。尼采的文本並沒有明確或明確地區分出批判的壞「不負責任」和肯定的好「不負責任」。相反，他經常費盡心力去複雜化這種區分。尼采獨特的「重新詮釋」（Umdeutung）並非僅僅將概念推向新的未知領域，而是刻意保留舊的名稱，同時混合「舊的」與「新的」層次，這是其詮釋實踐的重要部分。對文本進行「好與壞」之分的簡化，不可避免地減少了尼采有意在文本上混淆矛盾意義的方式。這也與尼采對哲學傳統的懷疑有關，他以多種方式顯示，這種傳統本質上被其試圖排除在外的事物所驅動（如情感驅動知性，壞驅動好，等等）。
But the equivocality of Nietzsche’s concepts, the fact that they do not fit neatly into the binary distinction of the positive from the negative, does not deliver them over to an entirely open, more or less contingent, more or less determinable plurality of senses. This brings me to the second problem. In a codification loosely inspired by Jacques Derrida’s interpretive strategy,[52] I suggested at the start of this text that, more than the binary symmetry of contradictions, Nietzsche’s affirmations of irresponsibility seem always to entail not two but three senses or connotations: (1) a break with given responsibilities; (2) the absence of given responsibilities; and (3) what is not determinable through the opposition of responsibility and irresponsibility as either undecidable or paradoxical (if one wishes to label these ambiguities of the negation, one could perhaps say that the irresponsible can either be the anti-responsible, the unresponsible or the quasi-responsible). When Heraclitus chalked up all responsibility to mere human shortsightedness, his irresponsibility simultaneously broke with prevailing responsibility, denied any given standards for responsibility, and he did so out of a sense of responsibility and by seeing the world through the undecidably (ir)responsible “eye of the artist.” Paradoxically, the “proud-lonely truth-finder” was irresponsibility incarnate as proud-lonely, and was responsible as truth-finder in his refusal to take shelter in stability from the abyssal truth of becoming. In Human, All too Human, complete irresponsibility became the anti-responsible counter-doctrine as well as a denial of all responsibility, the incorporation of which would result in an experimental (and indeed unresolved) form of great liberation that Nietzsche paradoxically envisions out of a sense of responsibility for the fate of humankind. This implicit paradox then became explicit in Twilight of the Idols, which is at once a forceful anti-responsible critique of responsibility as resulting from the instinct for punishment, a complete affirmation of unresponsibility by positing the denial of all purposes as “our doctrine,” as well as an explicitly paradoxical advocation of irresponsibility out of the responsibility for the redemption of the world.	但是，尼采概念的模糊性，事實上並非僅僅表現為積極與消極的二元對立。這引出了第二個問題。在受雅克·德里達（Jacques Derrida）的詮釋策略所啟發的框架下，我在本文一開始提出，比起對立矛盾的對稱，尼采對不負責任的肯定似乎總是包含三重意涵：（1）與既有責任的決裂；（2）既有責任的缺失；以及（3）在責任與不負責任的對立之外，所無法確定的或悖論性的意涵（若要為這些否定的模糊性命名，或許可以將「不負責任」標記為反責任的、無責任的或準責任的）。當赫拉克利特將所有責任歸咎於人類的短視時，他的「不負責任」同時打破了既有的責任，否定了任何既定的責任標準，而這一切都是出於一種責任感，以及通過「藝術家的眼睛」來看待世界。悖論地說，這位「自豪孤獨的真理探索者」是孤獨的驕傲不負責任的化身，同時也是負責真理探索的化身，因為他拒絕在生成的深淵真理中尋求穩定的庇護。 在《人性，太人性》中，「完全不負責任」成為了反責任的對立教義以及對所有責任的否定，而這一教義的吸收將帶來一種實驗性（且確實未解決）的解放形式。這個隱含的悖論在《偶像的黃昏》中變得明確，那裡同時展現了對責任的批判（視其為懲罰本能的結果），完全的「無責任」肯定（將所有目的的否定設為「我們的教義」），以及以拯救世界的責任感而明確肯定的不負責任。
This rough threefold codification is not meant to be exhaustive, but it should rather serve to emphasize that all of these senses belong to irresponsibility and that irresponsibility cannot be reduced to any one of them. One cannot say that one of them is the truer or better sense of irresponsibility. But why could we still not say that, rather than having a “positive and negative” sense, irresponsibility simply has this threefold conceptual character? This brings me to the third problem. One reason is that the third sense is inherently experimental and therefore open. But more importantly, it is because the problem of Nietzsche’s equivocality does not just reflect the general logics of Umdeutung, but it performatively reflects his very (ir)responsibility. In the will to fixate such distinctions one can recognize the very will to Verantwortung that goes against the way Nietzsche textually assumes his (responsibility for) “complete irresponsibility.” Nietzsche’s texts deliberately shun the impulse to be held to account, to provide legitimization, to seek shelter in justification or exemption. In this way, in their thoroughgoing defiance, Nietzsche’s texts also performatively embody the complete irresponsibility they espouse.	這三重意涵的框架並非要涵蓋一切，而是要強調這些意涵都屬於不負責任，並且無法簡單地歸結為其中的某一個意涵。我們無法說哪一個是更真實或更好的不負責任意涵。但為何不能說，不負責任就僅僅具有這樣三重概念特性呢？這引出了第三個問題。一個原因在於，第三個意涵本質上是實驗性的，因而是開放的。但更重要的是，尼采的模糊性問題不僅反映了重新詮釋的一般邏輯，它還在表現上反映了尼采自己對「完全不負責任」的（不）負責任。在試圖固定這種區分的意圖中，我們可以看到一種對「責任」的固執，這與尼采在文本上「負責任地」承擔其「完全不負責任」的方式相違。尼采的文本故意避免受到約束，不提供正當化或尋求庇護的辯解。在這種徹底的挑戰中，尼采的文本也表現性地體現了它所提倡的「完全不負責任」。
When Richard Wisser published his text on Nietzsche’s doctrine of complete irresponsibility in 1972, the main impetus of his research was still the question to what extent Nietzsche could be held “responsible” for the horrors of Nazism.[53] We owe to the likes of Wisser (and his mentor Karl Jaspers) that the reductive readings involved in that idea are now well known, and Nietzsche’s relation to Nazism is no longer our most pressing question in engaging with Nietzsche today. Wisser showed that nothing of the horrors of Nazism can be attributed to Nietzsche because Nietzsche’s insistence on complete irresponsibility was neither simply destructive, nor did it ever turn into a new, positive doctrine of responsibility. But if Nietzsche is never responsible on those grounds, can he ever be fully exculpated? Does there not belong an essentially excessive, dangerous character to a thinking of complete irresponsibility? Is not something essential about Nietzsche’s writing lost if his domestication were truly complete?	當 Richard Wisser 在 1972 年發表關於尼采「完全不負責任」教義的文本時，他的研究主要動機依然是探討尼采在多大程度上應對納粹主義的恐怖負責。[53] 我們要感謝像 Wisser 及其導師 Karl Jaspers 這樣的學者，因為他們揭示了將尼采的思想簡化解讀為與納粹主義聯繫在一起的錯誤方式已經廣為人知。如今，尼采與納粹主義之間的關係不再是我們在探討尼采時的最緊迫問題。Wisser 表示，納粹主義的恐怖不能歸咎於尼采，因為尼采對「完全不負責任」的堅持既不單純具有破壞性，也未曾轉變成一種新的、積極的責任教義。然而，如果尼采在這方面不需負責，他是否真的能完全被無罪釋放？完全不負責任的思想難道沒有某種本質上過度且危險的特質嗎？如果尼采的思想真的完全被馴化，是否會失去某些本質的東西呢？
Pfeuffer has done Nietzsche even more justice by showing how Nietzsche did come to recognize (not positively but paradoxically) in the very idea of complete irresponsibility his own affirmative responsibility, which we have recognized latently in the model of the artist and explicitly in Nietzsche’s concern for the fate of mankind. This responsibility can be likened to the one Derrida described when characterizing literature’s right to say anything. For Derrida, the literary writer must “demand a certain irresponsibility”: “this duty of irresponsibility, of refusing to reply for one’s thoughts or writing to constituted powers, is perhaps the highest form of responsibility.”[54] Such is also the freedom in Nietzsche’s writing that allowed Pfeuffer to illuminate the most improbable connection: between Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas. For Pfeuffer, their shared “responsibility for irresponsibility” resides in a transformed relation to the other that exceeds the sphere of all worldly judgement, resentment and the spirit of revenge: “Responsibility for the other, as Nietzsche and Levinas think it, exists exactly where, according to general ethical guidelines, nothing points to it.” It is “not comprehensible by third parties and eludes any evaluation.”[55] But when Pfeuffer proceeds to declare this Nietzsche’s “real” or “proper [eigentliche]” responsibility,[56] the question arises: is something of the will to Verantwortung still active in this gesture? Is this a justification? Does it protect the right kind of responsibility from the wrong ones? It would be easy to show that declaring Nietzsche irresponsible in the sense of promoting destructive recklessness is entirely reductive.[57] But that holds also for a reading that wants to exculpate Nietzsche from it.	Pfeuffer 更進一步對尼采的理解表明，尼采確實在「完全不負責任」的概念中（並非以正面方式，而是以矛盾的方式）認識到自己積極的責任感，這一點在藝術家的範式中潛伏地顯現，而在尼采對人類命運的關懷中明確顯現。這種責任感可與德希達所描述的文學對「言說一切的權利」的責任類比。對德希達而言，文學作家必須「要求某種不負責任」：「這種不負責任的義務，即拒絕對構成權力為自己的思想或寫作作答，或許是最高形式的責任感。」[54] 這種自由同樣存在於尼采的寫作中，使得 Pfeuffer 得以揭示最不可能的聯繫：即尼采與 Emmanuel Levinas 之間的聯繫。對 Pfeuffer 而言，他們所共享的「對不負責任的責任」存在於一種對他者的轉化關係之中，這種關係超越了所有世俗判斷、怨恨與復仇之心：「如同尼采與 Levinas 所認為的那樣，對他者的責任恰恰存在於依據一般倫理準則來看並未顯示任何責任之處。」這種責任「無法為第三方所理解，且逃避任何評價。」[55] 然而，當 Pfeuffer 繼而宣稱這是尼采的「真正的」或「本質的 [eigentliche]」責任時，[56] 問題隨之而來：這一宣稱是否仍然活躍於某種對責任的意志之中？這是否是一種辯護？這是否在保護正確的責任免受錯誤責任的影響？要證明尼采的「不負責任」意味著提倡破壞性魯莽的觀點是完全簡化的，並不困難。[57] 但同樣地，這也適用於一種試圖將尼采從這一觀點中脫罪的解讀。
Perhaps Pfeuffer’s gesture serves to curb the risk on the part of the reader. Because we will recall that Pfeuffer rightly pointed out that what Nietzsche’s doctrine of irresponsibility does most fundamentally is not to teach but to disturb and irritate. Preventing the reader “from legitimizing [their] own deeds through it,” its function lies in its “potential for self-examination.”[58] But the results of such examination can never be guaranteed; there are no safeguards for what is triggered by an irritation; a disturbance consists precisely in providing no assurances and safeguards. It belongs to Nietzsche’s writings (and to his paradoxical responsibility for complete irresponsibility) that he takes that risk deliberately, exploiting and putting into play a multiplicity of senses he could not oversee or control, affirming the limits of authorial authority.	也許，Pfeuffer 的這一舉動旨在抑制讀者在面對風險時的反應。因為我們會記得，Pfeuffer 正確地指出，尼采的不負責任教義最根本的作用不是去教導，而是去擾亂和激怒。這一教義的功能在於它對自我審視的潛力，從而「阻止讀者通過這教義來合理化自己的行為。」[58] 但這種自我審視的結果無法得到保證；任何擾亂所觸發的事物都沒有保障；一場擾亂正是通過不提供任何保證和保障而成立的。尼采的寫作（以及他對「完全不負責任」的矛盾責任）本身就是他有意承擔這一風險的證明，他通過將他無法全面掌控的多重意義置於遊戲中，來肯認作者權威的局限。
As for Nietzsche himself, he made this abundantly clear especially in the period following that “dangerous book,”[59] Beyond Good and Evil – a designation that delighted Nietzsche so much that he famously declared himself dynamite (EH, Destiny 1). When conceived as a disturbance, as it should be, we can agree with Jaspers that at the heart of Nietzsche’s work, and at the center of the different senses of irresponsibility, we find “not a concept, a world-view, or a system;” not so much a “basic doctrine,” but a “basic drive” (not Grundlehre, but Grundantrieb).[60] What constitutes this animating drive – this exigency, as Blanchot calls it – may be given different names. Nietzsche himself has called it righteousness or justice (Gerechtigkeit), love, intellectual honesty (Redlichkeit) and courage (Tapferkeit). But a favorite among those names is also Verwegenheit, that is, an audacity that always has an element of bold courageous recklessness. Rather than worry whether his thought – including that of complete irresponsibility – might be misunderstood as dangerous, he worried that he might be understood; i. e.: domesticated, without taking into account the radicality of his thought. He accordingly appropriated bold and reckless irresponsibility as a fundamental characterization of his thought. By experimentally pushing the concept of (ir)responsibility into new and unforeseen directions in the third of the three senses of irresponsibility mentioned above, and especially in the refusal to reduce this multiplicity of senses and provide the reader with reassurances, Nietzsche’s experimental writing textually embodies his call to audacious knowledge.	至於尼采自己，他在那本「危險的書」[59]（《超越善惡》）出版後的時期尤其清楚地表達了這一點——這一稱謂讓尼采極為愉悅，以至於他著名地自稱為「炸藥」（《瞧！這個人》，命運篇，第1節）。當被視為一場擾亂，如它應該的那樣，我們可以同意雅斯培爾斯的看法，即在尼采的作品核心以及不同不負責任感的中心，我們找到的「並不是一個概念、一個世界觀或一個體系」，也並不那麼是一種「基本教義」（Grundlehre），而是一種「基本驅動」（Grundantrieb）。[60] 這種驅動力（如布朗肖所稱的「急迫性」）可能會被賦予不同的名稱。尼采自己稱之為「公正」（Gerechtigkeit），「愛」，「知識誠實」（Redlichkeit）和「勇氣」（Tapferkeit）。然而，他喜愛的其中一個名字是「魯莽」（Verwegenheit），即那種總是帶有大膽無畏成分的勇敢魯莽。與其擔心他的思想（包括「完全不負責任」的思想）可能被誤解為危險的，他更擔心的是，他的思想被理解了；換言之，被馴化了，而未能考慮到其思想的激進性。因此，他有意地將大膽和魯莽的不負責任作為其思想的根本特徵。通過實驗性地將（不）負責任的概念推向新的、未曾預見的方向——尤其是在拒絕簡化這種多重意義並為讀者提供保證的過程中，尼采的實驗性寫作在文本上體現了他對大膽知識的號召。
Article Note	文章註記
Much of the work for this article was done in the context of the research project Nietzsche – Experiment en Nihilisme, carried out at Radboud Universiteit in Nijmegen between 2018 and 2021. The author is grateful to the supervisors of that project, Prof. Gert-Jan van der Heiden and Prof. em. Paul van Tongeren, and to the Laura Foundation for their generous sponsorship and initiation of the project. Special thanks also go to Aukje van Rooden and to the participants in the Leiden Nietzsche Seminar and the seminar of the Leiden Centre for Continental Philosophy for their critical comments on early versions of this article.	本文章的大部分工作是於2018年至2021年間，在奈梅亨拉德堡德大學（Radboud Universiteit）進行的研究項目「尼采——虛無主義中的實驗」的背景下完成的。作者對該項目指導教授 Gert-Jan van der Heiden 和名譽教授 Paul van Tongeren 表示感謝，並感謝 Laura 基金會慷慨的資助和對該項目的啟動。特別感謝 Aukje van Rooden 以及參與萊頓尼采研討會和萊頓大陸哲學中心研討會的成員們，他們對本文早期版本的批判性評論提供了重要幫助。

 

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[1][1] Chatgpt：尼采認為人類的行為及本性如同花崗岩之為花崗岩一樣，無法選擇自己的狀態或存在的方式。／／從這個角度來看，「花崗岩」代表著某種自然存在的必然性。花崗岩無法選擇自己成為花崗岩，它只是這樣存在，無需承擔這種存在方式的責任。同樣地，尼采主張，人類的行為和本性也是一種自然的結果，受限於生命的諸多條件和環境影響，而不是個體自由選擇的結果。因此，人不應該被追究對於自己行為和本性的責任，正如花崗岩也不應該被要求對自身的狀態負責一樣。