#幻象政治：以布赫迪厄理論檢視台灣民主韌性與兩岸話語鬥爭（2025 年更新版）
1. Introduction: Navigating the Illusion – Taiwan's Democratic Resilience and the Cross-Strait Discourse Struggle
Taiwan stands as a dynamic and multifaceted democracy situated at the forefront of significant geopolitical complexities, most notably arising from its relationship with the People's Republic of China. The central challenge for Taiwan lies in maintaining its democratic resilience amidst a persistent and intensive discourse struggle orchestrated to undermine its sovereignty and distinct identity. This report undertakes an analysis of this intricate dynamic through the theoretical framework provided by the renowned French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, coupled with the concept of "phantom politics." The objective is to provide a nuanced understanding of how Taiwan navigates the pressures from across the Taiwan Strait while grappling with its own internal political dynamics. The upcoming publication of "Ghost Nation" in July 2025 1 underscores the continued international attention on Taiwan's precarious position and its pivotal role in the global balance of power. This report, aiming to provide an updated analysis for 2025, contributes to the ongoing scholarly and public discourse surrounding Taiwan's future.
Traditional approaches within political science may find limitations in fully capturing the subtle mechanisms of power and the intricate ways in which narratives are constructed and contested in the Taiwanese context. Pierre Bourdieu's sociological theories offer valuable analytical tools for comprehending the interplay between overarching social structures, the agency of individuals and groups, and the power dynamics that shape political realities. By examining Taiwan through Bourdieu's lens, this report aims to uncover the deeper social and cultural forces at play in its struggle for democratic resilience. Furthermore, the concept of "phantom politics" serves as a critical lens through which to examine potential discrepancies between the outward appearance and the underlying realities of political phenomena within Taiwan, particularly in relation to its complex relationship with China. This report will proceed by first deconstructing Bourdieu's key theoretical concepts, followed by an exploration of "phantom politics" and its potential manifestations in the Taiwanese context. It will then examine Taiwan's democratic resilience, analyze the cross-strait discourse struggle, and subsequently apply Bourdieu's framework to understand the interplay of these elements. Finally, the report will analyze Taiwan's current political landscape in light of recent events and public opinion, and discuss the evolving dynamics of cross-strait relations, culminating in concluding remarks on Taiwan's democratic future.
2. Deconstructing Bourdieu's Theoretical Lens: Power, Practice, and the Political Field
Pierre Bourdieu's intellectual project was fundamentally concerned with elucidating the dynamics of power within society, particularly the diverse and often subtle ways in which power is transferred and social order is maintained across generations.2 A central tenet of his work was the ambition to overcome the perceived oppositions that characterized the social sciences of his time, such as subjectivism/objectivism, micro/macro analysis, and the debate between freedom and determinism.2 His core concepts of habitus, field, and capital were conceived precisely with the intention of bridging these divides.2 This bridging is particularly relevant to the analysis of Taiwan, where the agency of the Taiwanese people in pursuing their democratic aspirations is constantly negotiated within the objective constraints imposed by the significant power asymmetry with China. The subjective experiences of Taiwanese identity and the desire for democratic self-determination must be understood within the context of the objective political and military pressures emanating from Beijing.
The concept of habitus, as defined by Bourdieu, refers to the deeply ingrained habits, skills, and dispositions that individuals acquire through their life experiences and the processes of socialization.4 It encompasses an individual's ways of seeing, moving, talking, and ultimately, their "way of being" in the world.5 Habitus functions as a mediator between individual subjectivity and the overarching social structures.4 Key characteristics of habitus include its durability, meaning that once established, these dispositions are enduring and resistant to change.4 It is also transposable, allowing individuals to apply these dispositions across various social contexts.4 Habitus operates at a subconscious level, functioning as a practical sense or a "feel for the game," enabling individuals to navigate their social environment with relative ease and efficiency.4 Furthermore, habitus is embodied, inscribed in the physical bodies of individuals through repetitive practices, manifesting in bodily movements, postures, and gestures.4 While experienced at the individual level, habitus also has a collective dimension, with members of the same social group or class often sharing similar habitus due to common experiences and socialization processes.4 The Taiwanese habitus, shaped by the distinct historical trajectory of the island, including periods of both authoritarian rule and democratic consolidation 7, likely fosters a strong inclination towards democratic values and a cautious stance regarding external influence. The historical memory of the White Terror 12 and the relatively recent transition to democracy have likely instilled a deep appreciation for democratic freedoms and a sensitivity to any perceived threats to these freedoms within the Taiwanese population. Bourdieu also highlighted the interconnectedness of habitus and doxa, where doxa represents the learned, fundamental, deep-founded, unconscious beliefs and values taken as self-evident universals within a particular field.3 Habitus, being congruent with the objective organization of the field, tends to reproduce the very structures of that field, thus reinforcing the prevailing doxa.3 In Taiwan, the doxa concerning national identity and the intrinsic value of democracy is likely reinforced by the shared experiences and social practices that constitute the habitus of its citizens, contributing to the resilience of these beliefs when confronted with external pressures.
Bourdieu's concept of field refers to a structured social arena, a site of competition where agents and their social positions are located.14 Fields can be defined as a series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations, appointments, and titles that constitute an objective hierarchy, producing and authorizing certain discourses and activities.2 These fields are framed by specific social, cultural, and institutional structures and practices that prescribe roles and responsibilities.2 Within these fields, individuals compete for the distribution of different kinds of capital.16 A crucial aspect of Bourdieu's field theory is the notion of illusio, which refers to the investment in the game, the acknowledgement of the stakes of the field, and the acquisition of interests and investments prescribed by the field.15 The cross-strait relationship can be conceptualized as a complex field where Taiwan and China act as key agents, engaging in competition for various forms of capital. This includes symbolic capital, such as international recognition and legitimacy; economic capital, encompassing trade and investment; and political capital, which involves influence within the region. Both sides invest significantly in this "game," adhering to established rules (or attempting to redefine them) and striving to accumulate capital that will enhance their respective positions and influence the ultimate outcome. Bourdieu also introduced the concept of the "field of power," which can be understood as a kind of "metafield" that regulates the struggles for power across all fields.17 It represents the space of positions from which power is exerted over capital, influencing the relative worth of different forms of capital.17 In the cross-strait context, the "field of power" is significantly shaped by global actors, most notably the United States, whose policies and actions can substantially impact the value and convertibility of various forms of capital for both Taiwan and China. The US's security commitments and diplomatic signals, for instance, can bolster Taiwan's symbolic capital and potentially deter China, or conversely, their absence could diminish Taiwan's standing and embolden Beijing.
Bourdieu expanded the traditional Marxist notion of capital beyond purely economic considerations, identifying several distinct forms that contribute to power dynamics within social fields.3 Economic capital refers to material wealth in the form of money and property, readily convertible into currency and fundamental for purchasing goods and services.2 Taiwan's considerable economic capital, particularly its dominance in the global technology sector, provides it with a degree of leverage and resilience in its interactions with China. Taiwan's pivotal role in the global supply chain, especially in the production of semiconductors, grants it an economic significance that China cannot easily disregard, which in turn translates into a form of political capital. Social capital encompasses the resources accessible through social networks and relationships, providing benefits derived from social connections that an individual can utilize for advancement.2 Taiwan's social capital, cultivated through international partnerships with democratic nations and its extensive diaspora networks, enhances its ability to withstand diplomatic isolation efforts by China. Taiwan's unofficial yet robust relationships with countries such as the United States, Japan, and member states of the European Union provide it with crucial political and diplomatic support, acting as a form of social capital within the international arena. Cultural capital exists in three distinct forms: embodied, objectified, and institutionalized.18 Embodied cultural capital refers to the knowledge, skills, and competencies acquired through socialization and education.18 Objectified cultural capital includes material objects and media, such as books and artworks, that signify cultural competence.18 Institutionalized cultural capital is the formal recognition of an individual's cultural capital, typically in the form of academic qualifications and credentials.18 Taiwan's distinct cultural capital, while sharing historical roots with Chinese culture, has evolved through its unique history and democratic experiences, serving as a significant marker of its separate identity. The preservation of traditional Chinese culture in Taiwan 22 alongside the development of a unique Taiwanese cultural identity contributes to its symbolic capital and distinguishes it from the PRC. Symbolic capital refers to one's status, honor, or prestige within a field, often derived from the possession of other forms of capital.2 Its value depends on the belief and recognition of others within the field.2 Taiwan's symbolic capital as a successful and resilient democracy in a region where authoritarianism persists enhances its international standing and strengthens its claim to self-determination. Taiwan's high rankings in global freedom indices 8 provide it with significant symbolic capital, bolstering its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
Finally, Bourdieu introduced the concept of doxa, which refers to the fundamental, deeply ingrained, and often unconscious beliefs and values that are taken for granted within a particular social field.2 Doxa represents the "natural attitude," the utterly taken-for-granted beliefs about the world and existence, sustained by shared beliefs and orientations.2 It contributes to the misrecognition of forms of social arbitrariness, leading to the unformulated, non-discursive, yet internalized and practical recognition of that same social arbitrariness.24 Doxa differs from opinion, which resides in the sphere of that which may be openly contested and discussed.26 In Taiwan, the doxa of democratic governance and the inherent right to self-determination have become increasingly ingrained, making the PRC's narrative of inevitable unification appear as an external imposition rather than a natural or unquestioned order. The overwhelming public opposition to the "one country, two systems" model 29 and the consistently strong support for maintaining the status quo 30 indicate a deeply entrenched doxa against Beijing's preferred outcome.
3. Understanding "Phantom Politics": Illusion, Spectacle, and the Erosion of Substance
The concept of "phantom politics," notably articulated by journalist Walter Lippmann in his 1925 book The Phantom Public 32, expresses a profound lack of faith in the democratic system. Lippmann argued that the public, as commonly conceived in democratic theory, exists merely as an illusion, a myth, and inevitably, a phantom.32 He posited that for the most part, individuals are primarily concerned with their private affairs and individual relations rather than the broader matters that govern society, about which they possess limited knowledge.32 In this view, the public acts more as a "deaf spectator in the back row" 32, responding to failures in the administration of government by deciding, through voting, whether to replace one party with another, often led by insiders who can identify and assess the situation for them.32 Lippmann viewed the public as largely incapable of rational decision-making on complex issues, asserting that "Public opinion is not a rational force. It does not reason, investigate, invent, persuade, bargain or settle".32 A "phantom" can be defined as something that appears to the senses but lacks substantial existence, an apparition, or something elusive or visionary.35 It can also refer to something existing in appearance only, or a representation of something abstract or incorporeal.35
Beyond Lippmann's initial critique, the concept of "phantom politics" has evolved in political science and sociology to encompass broader interpretations concerning the relationship between the appearance and reality of political phenomena. The notion of "phantom democracy" 36 suggests a scenario where the outward forms and processes of democracy, such as elections and the rhetoric of popular sovereignty, may exist without the substantive realization of democratic ideals like equal access to resources, genuine citizen empowerment, and freedom from hunger, humiliation, and violence. When fundamental social needs are unmet and inequalities persist, the promise of democracy can become a mere facade, a "fancy mask worn by wealthy political predators".36 The idea of the "phantom state" 37 proposes that the abstract terms "state" or "government" often obscure the concrete actions of individuals who wield power and operate under a different set of moral constraints than ordinary citizens. This abstraction can mask the specific interests and motivations driving political decisions. Furthermore, the concept of "phantom respondents" 38 highlights the potential for opinion surveys and polls to misrepresent public opinion due to factors like non-response bias, leading to a distorted understanding of collective sentiment. In sociology, the term "phantom" is also used in other contexts, such as "phantom communities" 39, to explore the gap between the imagined or represented and the actual lived experience of social life.
In the context of Taiwan and its cross-strait discourse struggle, the concept of "phantom politics" offers a valuable lens for analysis. It raises questions about the extent to which certain political narratives or expressions of public opinion might be shaped by external influence, particularly from China, or by internal biases, potentially creating a "phantom" reality that does not accurately reflect the genuine will or understanding of the Taiwanese people. For instance, the intense focus on symbolic gestures or rhetoric in cross-strait relations might, at times, overshadow substantive policy debates or genuine efforts at citizen engagement, creating an illusion of progress or resilience that does not fully address the underlying challenges. The pervasive nature of disinformation campaigns targeting Taiwan 8 raises concerns about the formation of a truly informed public opinion, potentially leading to a situation akin to Lippmann's "phantom public," where beliefs are shaped by manipulation rather than critical understanding.
4. Taiwan's Democratic Resilience: Foundations and Challenges in the Shadow of China
Taiwan's journey from a period of authoritarian rule under the Kuomintang (KMT) to its current status as a vibrant democracy is a testament to the resilience and vision of its people.7 This transformation began in the late 1980s, marked by the lifting of martial law in 1987 7, which had been in effect since 1949.9 This pivotal moment paved the way for political pluralism and the formation of opposition parties, most notably the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 7, which played a crucial role in advocating for democratic reforms and the articulation of a distinct Taiwanese identity. The 1990s witnessed rapid democratization, culminating in the first full legislative election in 1992 and the first direct presidential election in 1996.7 Unlike many countries in Asia, Taiwan's democratic evolution was largely peaceful and gradual, driven by internal pressures from civil society and a growing middle class.7 This relatively smooth transition, however, occurred against the backdrop of the "White Terror" 12, a period of political repression targeting dissidents and those suspected of communist sympathies, which serves as a stark reminder of the hard-won nature of Taiwan's democratic freedoms. By 2000, Taiwan experienced its first peaceful transfer of power between political parties with the election of Chen Shui-bian of the DPP as president 9, further solidifying its democratic credentials. Taiwan's democratic transition, while relatively recent, makes its resilience in the face of a powerful authoritarian neighbor all the more remarkable. Having experienced authoritarianism, the Taiwanese public likely possesses a heightened awareness of the value of democratic freedoms and a greater determination to protect them.
Taiwan's democratic system is characterized by several key institutional features. It operates as a unicameral system with a directly elected president who serves as the head of state.42 The Legislative Yuan, the single-chamber legislature, is responsible for enacting laws.45 The judiciary, including a Constitutional Court, plays a crucial role in upholding the rule of law and ensuring the constitutionality of legislation.23 Over the past two decades, Taiwan has also embraced direct democracy mechanisms, adopting a system similar to that of Switzerland, allowing citizens to initiate and vote on referendums on important issues.46 This implementation of direct democracy tools demonstrates a commitment to citizen participation and empowers the public to directly influence policy decisions, potentially strengthening democratic resilience by fostering a sense of ownership and engagement in the democratic process.
A significant pillar of Taiwan's democratic resilience is its vibrant and active civil society.46 Numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civic initiatives play a crucial role in promoting transparency, accountability, and informed public discourse.46 For instance, organizations like the Taiwan FactCheck Center and MyGoPen actively combat disinformation 46, which is a critical challenge in the context of cross-strait relations. Initiatives also exist to enhance youth participation in democratic processes 50 and to leverage digital platforms for citizen engagement in policy formation.51 Taiwan's vibrant civil society acts as a crucial buffer against both internal and external threats to democracy, actively promoting transparency, accountability, and informed public discourse. The numerous NGOs and initiatives focused on fact-checking, promoting youth engagement, and fostering digital participation demonstrate a strong societal commitment to democratic values and resilience.
Despite its democratic strengths, Taiwan faces several internal challenges that could potentially erode its resilience. Political polarization, particularly along the lines of national identity (the so-called "blue-green" divide), remains a significant feature of the Taiwanese political landscape.8 This entrenched polarization can lead to legislative gridlock and hinder the formation of a unified national response to external pressures.8 The intensity of this divide, often intertwined with differing perspectives on cross-strait relations, could be exploited by external actors to sow discord and undermine national unity. Taiwan also grapples with other domestic issues such as economic stagnation, rising housing costs, and energy policy debates.8 Unaddressed socio-economic issues could erode public trust in the democratic system and make citizens more susceptible to alternative narratives or external influence.
The most significant external threat to Taiwan's democratic resilience is the multifaceted pressure exerted by the People's Republic of China.8 This pressure manifests in various forms, including increasingly frequent and large-scale military exercises near the island 52, economic coercion, sophisticated disinformation campaigns aimed at swaying public opinion and sowing division 8, cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure 8, and concerted efforts to undermine Taiwan's international standing and diplomatic relations.8 China's increasingly assertive military posture and its normalization of People's Liberation Army (PLA) activity around Taiwan create a constant state of pressure that tests Taiwan's democratic resilience and its ability to maintain a sense of normalcy and security. The frequent incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and the staging of military exercises serve as constant reminders of the potential threat from across the strait, requiring Taiwan to invest heavily in defense and maintain a high level of vigilance. China has also explicitly stated that it will not renounce the use of force to achieve reunification if necessary.62
5. The Battle of Narratives: Cross-Strait Discourse Struggle for Hearts and Minds
At the heart of the cross-strait relationship lies a fundamental battle of narratives, with Taiwan and China holding deeply divergent historical interpretations of their connection. China's narrative emphasizes a long history of unity and views Taiwan as a renegade province that will inevitably be reunified with the mainland, if necessary by force.22 This narrative often invokes a sense of shared Chinese identity and national destiny. In contrast, Taiwan emphasizes its distinct history, particularly its experience under Japanese rule and its subsequent development as a vibrant democracy.22 Taiwan's narrative underscores the principle of self-determination and the right of its 23.5 million people to decide their own future.48 These competing historical narratives are not merely academic disagreements but are central to the political legitimacy and strategic objectives of both sides. China's narrative aims to justify its claims over Taiwan, while Taiwan's narrative underpins its right to self-governance. The way history is framed directly influences contemporary political attitudes and policy preferences. China's emphasis on historical unity seeks to delegitimize Taiwan's independence aspirations, while Taiwan's focus on its unique history strengthens its claim to sovereignty. The emergence of alternative narratives within Taiwan, such as the "separate governance without division" proposal 76, suggests an ongoing search for a framework to manage cross-strait relations that moves beyond the traditional dichotomy of unification versus independence. Proposals like this attempt to acknowledge the current reality of two distinct political systems while seeking a path towards peaceful coexistence.
The framing of sovereignty and legitimacy is another critical battleground in the cross-strait discourse struggle. Taiwan asserts its de facto sovereignty and autonomy, highlighting its democratically elected government and its independent functioning in the international community.61 President Lai Ching-te, in his victory speech in 2024, called for reopening dialogue with China while emphasizing the need to "replace confrontation" and maintain the "cross-strait status quo".72 On Taiwan's National Day in 2024, he asserted that "the People's Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan" but also called for "healthy dialogue".72 Conversely, China insists on its "One China" principle, viewing Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory and condemning any moves towards independence as "separatist" activities.61 The framing of sovereignty is a key battleground in the discourse struggle. Taiwan seeks international recognition of its independent status, while China actively works to deny it such recognition and reinforce its "One China" principle. Taiwan's efforts to participate in international organizations and its diplomatic outreach aim to build its symbolic capital as a sovereign entity, directly challenging China's narrative.
Symbolic warfare plays a significant role in the cross-strait discourse struggle, with both sides employing symbols, rhetoric, and cultural appeals to shape perceptions and build support for their respective positions.22 Taiwan's leaders frequently emphasize its democratic values, its commitment to freedom and human rights, and its distinct Taiwanese identity.48 China, on the other hand, often uses symbols of shared cultural heritage and national unity to appeal to a sense of common identity and belonging.22 President Lai's public praise for Taiwanese athletes who "united and inspired Taiwan" after winning a gold medal at the Paris Olympics, without referring to the country as "Chinese Taipei," signals an intent to assert a distinct Taiwanese identity.77 Conversely, China's military exercises are often framed as "warnings" to "separatist forces" 63, employing symbolic displays of power to convey its resolve. Symbolic actions and rhetoric play a significant role in shaping public opinion and national identity on both sides of the strait. Taiwan's leaders often emphasize its democratic values and distinct Taiwanese identity, while China uses symbols of shared culture and national unity. President Lai's emphasis on Taiwan's "tenacious fight" 77 and China's use of military exercises as "warnings" 63 are examples of symbolic actions intended to convey specific messages and influence perceptions.
Taiwan actively employs various counter-narratives and strategies to resist China's discourse and assert its own identity and values.64 These include highlighting its democratic achievements and its consistent high rankings in global freedom indices 8, emphasizing its commitment to maintaining the cross-strait status quo while resisting Chinese coercion 8, and building international support by aligning with like-minded democracies.48 However, Taiwan has faced challenges in effectively communicating its self-defense efforts and countering China's narratives in the information domain, experiencing what has been termed a "do-say" gap.81 Taiwan's focus on its democratic identity and its adherence to international norms are key elements of its counter-narrative, seeking to garner international support and legitimacy. By emphasizing its democratic values, Taiwan positions itself as a responsible member of the international community and contrasts itself with China's authoritarian system.
6. Bourdieu in Action: Analyzing Taiwan's Democratic Resilience within the Cross-Strait Field
The Taiwanese political landscape can be analyzed as a complex field in Bourdieu's terms, where various actors compete for influence and resources. Key actors in this field include the major political parties – the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) 44 – as well as government institutions, a vibrant civil society, and diverse media outlets. These actors possess different forms of capital that they deploy in their competition. The DPP's primary symbolic capital lies in its strong advocacy for Taiwanese identity and its firm resistance to political unification with China.44 This stance resonates with a significant portion of the electorate, particularly younger generations who increasingly identify as solely Taiwanese.31 The KMT, on the other hand, often leverages its historical ties with the mainland and emphasizes the importance of maintaining peaceful and stable cross-strait relations.76 Its social capital might stem from established networks and connections built over decades of political involvement, and it may also draw on economic capital from certain business interests that benefit from cross-strait economic exchange. The TPP, a relatively newer political force, appears to derive its capital from its appeal as a third-party alternative, focusing on domestic issues and positioning itself as critical of both the DPP and the KMT.49 Its support base tends to be younger voters who may feel disillusioned with the traditional political establishment.83 These differing forms of symbolic capital shape the political strategies and electoral bases of each party within the Taiwanese political field.
The habitus of different groups within Taiwan plays a crucial role in shaping their political orientations and their responses to the cross-strait discourse. Younger generations, having grown up in a more democratic and increasingly Taiwanese-centric environment, likely possess a habitus that aligns more closely with the DPP's emphasis on Taiwanese identity and its cautious stance towards China.31 Their socialization has occurred within a context where Taiwanese identity has been increasingly asserted and where the history of authoritarian rule under the KMT is more critically examined.7 In contrast, older generations, whose formative years may have been during the period of KMT rule and who might hold stronger cultural or historical connections to the mainland, may possess a habitus that aligns more with the KMT's approach to cross-strait relations. Generational differences in socialization and lived experiences likely lead to variations in habitus, influencing political preferences and attitudes towards the complex dynamics across the Taiwan Strait.
Various forms of capital are strategically deployed by different actors to gain influence within the Taiwanese political field, particularly in the context of cross-strait relations. China's significant economic capital provides it with considerable leverage to potentially influence Taiwanese elites in business, media, and politics.85 These individuals or groups might prioritize the economic benefits derived from engagement with the mainland over concerns about Taiwan's long-term security or sovereignty. The snippets on PRC influence and elite capture suggest that Beijing actively cultivates relationships with influential figures in Taiwan, offering economic incentives in exchange for promoting narratives favorable to unification.85 This potential for "elite capture" could subtly shift policy in ways that benefit Beijing, even if this does not reflect the broader public sentiment.
The concept of "maintaining the status quo" has become a dominant doxa within Taiwan's political field.8 This taken-for-granted belief reflects a pragmatic approach to the complex and potentially dangerous cross-strait situation, accommodating diverse views on Taiwan's ultimate future while prioritizing immediate peace and stability. Public opinion data consistently shows strong support for the status quo, with a significant portion of the population favoring this position over either immediate unification or immediate independence.30 This doxa of the "status quo" allows for a temporary equilibrium in the Taiwanese political field, accommodating diverse views on the ultimate future of Taiwan while prioritizing immediate peace and stability. However, this doxa can also be a site of contestation, with different parties interpreting "status quo" in ways that align with their broader political goals. While there is broad agreement on maintaining the current situation, the DPP likely interprets it as de facto independence, while the KMT might see it as a step towards eventual (though perhaps distant) unification.
The cross-strait relationship itself can be viewed as a distinct but interconnected sub-field within the broader Taiwanese political field, possessing its own specific rules, stakes, and forms of capital. The rules of this cross-strait "game" are heavily skewed in favor of China due to its significantly greater economic and military power.65 Taiwan's primary forms of capital in this sub-field are its democratic values, which garner international sympathy and support 46, and its strategic importance in the global economy, particularly in the technology sector.42 Taiwan operates within a constrained environment where China sets many of the parameters for interaction. Taiwan's strategy often involves leveraging its soft power, its democratic identity, and its international alliances to counter China's dominance in this asymmetric sub-field.
7. The Interplay of "Phantom Politics" and Bourdieu's Theory in Taiwan: Unmasking Illusions
The extensive disinformation campaigns orchestrated by China targeting Taiwan 8 present a significant challenge to the formation of genuine public opinion, potentially creating a "phantom public" where expressed views are not authentically held or are based on manipulated information. The constant barrage of disinformation from China aims to erode trust in Taiwan's democratic institutions and government, sow division within Taiwanese society, and undermine the will to resist unification.64 By spreading false narratives about corruption within the government, the unreliability of the United States as an ally, or the purported inevitability of unification, China seeks to undermine the foundations of Taiwan's democratic resilience. If a significant portion of the information consumed by Taiwanese citizens is distorted or fabricated by external actors, their political choices and perceptions of reality might be skewed, leading to a disconnect between the appearance and the substance of public will.
The potential for "elite capture" by China, where influential individuals or groups within Taiwan are swayed by economic or social capital to act in ways that favor Beijing's agenda 85, raises concerns about a form of "phantom democracy." In this scenario, the formal democratic processes might continue to function, but the outcomes could be subtly influenced by actors whose interests are not aligned with the broader Taiwanese public. If influential elites in Taiwan prioritize economic ties with China or are susceptible to Beijing's incentives, their actions, such as promoting pro-unification narratives in media outlets or lobbying for policies that benefit the mainland, might create a "phantom" of cross-strait consensus that does not accurately represent the genuine sentiment of the majority of Taiwanese citizens. This could lead to a situation where the appearance of democratic governance masks underlying influences that undermine the true expression of the public will.
While the dominant doxa of "maintaining the status quo" provides a degree of stability within Taiwan's political field 8, it might also mask underlying divisions and a lack of genuine consensus on Taiwan's long-term future, potentially creating a "phantom" of national unity. The broad support for the status quo might encompass a range of underlying beliefs, from those who genuinely believe it is the best long-term solution to those who see it as a temporary holding pattern before eventual independence, or even, in a smaller segment of the population, unification under certain conditions.31 This inherent ambiguity within the "status quo" doxa could lead to instability or a perceived lack of national unity if external pressures from China force a clearer and more definitive choice about Taiwan's future.
Finally, an over-reliance on symbolic gestures or rhetoric in cross-strait relations might create the illusion of progress or resilience – a form of "phantom progress" – without effectively addressing the fundamental power imbalance between Taiwan and China or the persistent and multifaceted threat posed by Beijing.78 While diplomatic statements of support from international partners and pronouncements of Taiwan's unwavering resilience can be valuable in bolstering morale and signaling international concern, they might create a "phantom" of security if not accompanied by concrete and substantive actions to strengthen Taiwan's self-defense capabilities and develop robust strategic plans to deter or effectively withstand potential aggression from across the strait. Symbolic improvements in relations or expressions of goodwill need to be grounded in tangible progress in addressing the underlying security challenges and ensuring Taiwan's long-term democratic future.
8. Taiwan's Current Political Landscape: Insights from Recent Events and Public Opinion (2024-2025)
The 2024 Taiwanese elections resulted in a complex and somewhat fragmented political landscape.80 While Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), traditionally associated with a more assertive stance towards China, won the presidential election with 40.05% of the vote 82, the DPP lost its majority in the Legislative Yuan.80 The Kuomintang (KMT) emerged as the largest party in the legislature with 52 seats, followed closely by the DPP with 51 seats. Notably, the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), led by Ko Wen-je, secured 8 seats, positioning itself as a potential kingmaker in the new legislative session.80 This outcome indicates a divided electorate, where no single party holds a dominant mandate, potentially leading to political instability and challenges in forming a unified approach to cross-strait relations. The need for coalition building and negotiation in the legislature could either lead to more moderate and consensus-based policies or to political gridlock, hindering effective governance.
Recent public opinion polls conducted between late 2024 and early 2025 provide valuable insights into Taiwanese attitudes towards cross-strait relations and national identity.30 These polls consistently reveal a strong preference among the Taiwanese public for maintaining the status quo in cross-strait relations, with support levels generally exceeding 80%.30 Furthermore, a clear majority of Taiwanese identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, with this trend particularly pronounced among younger generations.31 Support for eventual Taiwan independence remains significantly higher than support for unification with China.31 Notably, a majority of Taiwanese believe that Taiwan should be an independent nation but should also maintain cordial relations with China.31 Satisfaction levels with President Lai's handling of cross-strait relations in early 2025 were relatively positive, with a majority of respondents expressing satisfaction.96 These polling trends provide a crucial understanding of the underlying public sentiment in Taiwan, which any analysis of democratic resilience must take into account. The consistency of these findings over time suggests a deeply rooted preference for the current ambiguous situation.
The persistent political polarization in Taiwan continues to be a significant factor shaping the political landscape.53 Divisions between the DPP and the KMT remain deep on a range of issues, including energy policy, judicial reform, and approaches to cross-strait engagement.53 The 2024 legislative elections resulted in a hung parliament, further exacerbating the potential for political gridlock and making it more challenging for the government to implement its agenda.80 This deep political polarization could hinder the formation of a unified national consensus on how to effectively address the multifaceted pressures emanating from China, potentially weakening Taiwan's overall democratic resilience in the face of external threats. The inability of the major parties to find common ground on key issues could lead to legislative paralysis and a less effective response to Beijing's assertive cross-strait policy.
9. Evolving Cross-Strait Dynamics: Recent Developments and Future Trajectories (2024-2025)
Political interactions and statements between leaders and officials from Taiwan and China in late 2024 and early 2025 indicate a continuation of strained relations.61 While President Lai Ching-te has expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue with China under the principles of dignity and parity 68, Beijing has consistently denounced his administration as pursuing "separatist" agendas and has reiterated its commitment to the "One China" principle as the precondition for any meaningful interaction.61 This fundamental disagreement on the political status of Taiwan continues to hinder any substantial progress in official cross-strait relations. The continued sharp rhetoric from Beijing following President Lai's election suggests that China remains unwilling to engage in meaningful dialogue without Taiwan accepting its "One China" principle, creating a stalemate in official cross-strait relations. China's labeling of Lai as a "destroyer of cross-strait peace" 68 and its insistence on the "1992 Consensus" 61 indicate a fundamental disagreement that prevents substantive political engagement.
Military activities conducted by China in the vicinity of Taiwan have remained a significant concern throughout late 2024 and early 2025, with the PLA conducting increasingly frequent and complex exercises in the Taiwan Strait.52 These exercises often involve naval vessels and aircraft, including incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ and across the median line of the Taiwan Strait.67 Taiwan's military has responded by monitoring these activities and deploying its own forces as a defensive measure.63 China's escalating military activities around Taiwan serve as a constant reminder of the potential for conflict and are likely intended to intimidate the Taiwanese population and deter international intervention. The normalization of PLA incursions across the median line 67 and the staging of large-scale military drills 63 demonstrate China's growing assertiveness and its willingness to project power in the Taiwan Strait.
Despite the persistent political tensions, economic ties between Taiwan and China remain substantial.98 Taiwan's economy continues to be significantly intertwined with the mainland through trade and investment, creating a complex dynamic of interdependence despite the political animosity. While Taiwan has been seeking to diversify its economic partnerships and reduce its reliance on the Chinese market, the sheer volume of cross-strait economic activity means that economic considerations will continue to play a role in shaping the relationship.
The involvement of international actors, particularly the United States, remains a critical factor influencing cross-strait dynamics.62 The US maintains a policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding its potential response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, but it has also been increasing its support for Taiwan through arms sales and diplomatic engagements.68 The US State Department has also adjusted its language regarding Taiwan's independence, signaling a potential shift in its long-standing policy.62 The level and nature of international support, particularly from the United States, remains a crucial factor in Taiwan's ability to deter Chinese aggression and maintain its democratic way of life. US arms sales 68 and statements of support, alongside the actions of other like-minded nations, send important signals to both Taiwan and China about the potential consequences of unilateral action.
Looking ahead, the future of cross-strait relations likely entails continued tension and strategic competition.72 China's military modernization and its unwavering commitment to unification suggest that pressure on Taiwan will persist and potentially intensify.62 Taiwan's democratic resilience will be crucial in navigating this challenging environment, requiring a combination of robust self-defense capabilities, effective strategies to counter disinformation and influence operations, and the maintenance of strong international partnerships. The interplay of China's growing military power, Taiwan's commitment to democracy, and the evolving international geopolitical landscape will ultimately determine the future trajectory of cross-strait relations.
10. Conclusion: Resilience in the Shadow of Illusion – Taiwan's Democratic Future
This report has analyzed Taiwan's democratic resilience and its ongoing discourse struggle with China through the theoretical lens of Pierre Bourdieu and the concept of "phantom politics." The findings highlight the complex interplay of social structures, individual agency, and power dynamics that shape Taiwan's unique geopolitical position. Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, field, and capital provide a valuable framework for understanding the motivations and strategies of various actors within Taiwan's political landscape and in the broader cross-strait context. The dominance of the "status quo" doxa, while providing a degree of stability, also underscores the delicate balancing act that Taiwan must perform.
Taiwan has demonstrated remarkable democratic resilience, transitioning from authoritarian rule to a vibrant democracy characterized by strong institutions, an active civil society, and a deep-seated commitment to freedom and human rights. However, this resilience is constantly tested by significant internal challenges, such as political polarization, and the persistent and multifaceted pressure from the People's Republic of China. The cross-strait discourse struggle is a continuous battle for hearts and minds, with competing narratives seeking to shape perceptions of history, sovereignty, and legitimacy.
The concept of "phantom politics" illuminates the potential for illusions and manipulated narratives to obscure and shape political realities in Taiwan. China's extensive disinformation campaigns raise concerns about the authenticity of public opinion, potentially creating a "phantom public." The influence of certain elites might contribute to a "phantom democracy," where formal processes do not fully reflect the will of the majority. Even the dominant doxa of the "status quo" could mask underlying divisions and a lack of long-term consensus.
Taiwan's current political landscape, as reflected in the 2024 election results and recent public opinion polls, reveals a divided electorate that strongly favors maintaining the status quo and increasingly identifies as Taiwanese. The ongoing political polarization and the evolving dynamics of cross-strait relations, marked by continued tension and military assertiveness from China, suggest a challenging future.
Future research could delve deeper into the specific manifestations of "phantom politics" in Taiwan, examining the long-term impact of disinformation on democratic resilience and the evolving nature of Taiwanese identity in response to persistent external pressure. Ultimately, Taiwan's democratic future hinges on its ability to navigate the persistent shadow of illusion, maintain internal unity, strengthen its defenses, and cultivate robust international support in the face of authoritarian challenges. Taiwan's ongoing democratic experiment holds significant implications for the future of democracy in the region and globally, serving as a crucial case study in resilience and self-determination.
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