尼采論主權個體的一些討論

1.Paphitis, Sharli Anne. "Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual and the Ethics of Subjectivity." The Ethics of Subjectivity. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015. 71-102.

本文主張，納入脆弱性的概念，有助於我們理解尼采的主權個體。所謂主權個體，乃是肯定脆弱性，並擁抱脆弱性，而非逃避脆弱性之人。

2.Leiter, Brian. "Who is the'sovereign individual'? Nietzsche on freedom." Nietzsche on Freedom (September 10, 2009). CAMBRIDGE CRITICAL GUIDE TO NIETZSCHE'S ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY, Simon May, ed (2010).

站在非道德論者的立場上，尼采以主權個體的概念作為手段嘲諷理性個體與自由，主權個體的自主性，也許是長期間無意識鍛造而後的強制結果。責任或自由之類的概念，不是「主權個體」此概念的考慮，他們不構成構成主權個體之概念。

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[1]1.Paphitis, Sharli Anne. "Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual and the Ethics of Subjectivity." The Ethics of Subjectivity. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015. 71-102.

Nietzsche is perhaps one of the most controversial figures in Western philosophical history. This is in no small part owed to his attacks on Christianity and conventional morality, as well as his skepticism about human freedom. Nietzsche’s skeptical views of human freedom and the self might initially make him seem an unlikely candidate for providing us with a robust account of subjectivity, and his attacks on morality might similarly make him a seemingly unlikely proponent of an account of human flourishing. However, in this chapter I explore Nietzsche’s understanding of the ethics of subjectivity, showing that Nietzsche provides us with an attractive positive account of human agency, personhood, and flourishing. Nietzsche asserts, in part through his characterization of the Sovereign Individual, that some form of self-control is required for the project of exercising agency. 1 This self-control view of human agency is similarly central to recent analytic accounts proposed by Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson and Alfred Mele. 2 While the self-control view of agency is plausible, we should question whether, and in what ways, exercising selfcontrol contributes to our understanding of ourselves as persons and to our flourishing – as Nietzsche himself does.	尼采也許是西方哲學史上最具爭議性的人物之一。這在很大程度上歸功於他對基督教和傳統道德的攻擊，以及他對人類自由的懷疑論。尼采對人類自由和自我的懷疑觀點最初可能會使他成為一個不太可能為我們提供強有力的主體性說明的候選人，而他對道德的攻擊也可能同樣使他成為一個不太可能的人類繁榮說明的支持者。然而，在這一章中，我探討了尼采對主體性倫理的理解，表明尼采為我們提供了一個關於人類機構、人格和繁榮的有吸引力的正面說明。尼采主張，部分通過他對主權個人的描述，某種形式的自我控制是行使代理權的專案所需要的。1 這種關於人類代理權的自我控制觀點同樣也是最近由哈裡-法蘭克福、加里-沃森和阿爾弗雷德-梅爾提出的分析性描述的核心。2 雖然自我控制的代理觀點是合理的，但我們應該質疑，行使自我控制是否以及以何種方式有助於我們對自己作為人的理解和我們的繁榮--正如尼采本人所做的那樣。
In her paper Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism, Martha Nussbaum argues that Nietzsche’s philosophical project can be seen as an attempt to “bring about a revival of Stoic values of self-command and self-formation.” 3 She argues that, to his detriment, Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual epitomizes a kind of Stoic ideal of inner strength and self-sufficiency which goes “beyond Stoicism” in its valorization of radical self-emancipation from the contingencies of life and from our own human vulnerability. Nussbaum thus urges us to question whether the picture of strength through self-control in Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual is really a picture of human strength at which we would be willing, or at which we ought, to aim.	在她的論文《憐憫與慈悲。Martha Nussbaum認為，尼采的哲學項目可以被看作是試圖 "使斯多葛式的自我命令和自我改造的價值觀得到復興"。3 她認為，尼采的 "主權個人 "是一種斯多葛式的內在力量和自給自足的理想的縮影，這對他來說是不利的，因為它強調從生活的偶然性和我們自身的脆弱性中獲得徹底的自我解放。努斯鮑姆因此敦促我們質疑尼采的《主權個人》中通過自我控制獲得力量的圖景是否真的是我們願意或應該追求的人類力量圖景。
In this chapter I take up Nussbaum’s challenge within the framework of my own thoughts on the role of both agency and vulnerability in our conception of personhood. While I agree with Nussbaum that the self-emancipation characterization of the Sovereign Individual provides us with, in many important ways, an ultimately unattractive ideal of human strength at which to aim, such a characterization of Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual remains problematic. It is my contention here that the Sovereign Individual, like the Stoic, is to be characterized in terms of his deep recognition of the necessity of his own vulnerability, but that, importantly, it is the Sovereign Individual’s reaction to this recognition that distinguishes the ideal of strength which we find in him from the problematic Stoic ideal. While the Stoics overemphasize the ideal subject’s capacity for control, suggesting that he will do so in an attempt to transcend his necessary human vulnerability through an escaping and rejecting of it, Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual is antithetical to the Stoic in precisely this respect: the Sovereign Individual lives through and with his vulnerability by actively affirming it. The Sovereign Individual is thus more properly to be understood as embodying and affirming precisely the very fragility and vulnerability which the Stoic person seeks to transcend through rejection and denial. 4 Given Nussbaum and Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Stoic position, I argue that Nietzsche and Nussbaum may have more in common than Nussbaum suggests. Finally, in this chapter I aim to show that by proposing the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence as the ultimate test for the highest affirmation of life which the Sovereign Individual must pass, Nietzsche also provides part of what he takes to be the solution to the threat of both the impending nihilism and the inhibiting current morality of his age.	在這一章中，我將在我自己對代理權和脆弱性在我們的人格概念中的作用的思考框架內接受努斯鮑姆的挑戰。雖然我同意努斯鮑姆的觀點，即主權個人的自我解放特徵在許多重要方面為我們提供了一個最終沒有吸引力的人類力量的目標，但尼采的主權個人的這種特徵仍然存在問題。我在這裡的論點是，像斯多葛派一樣，"主權個人 "的特點在於他對自身脆弱性的必要性的深刻認識，但重要的是，正是 "主權個人 "對這種認識的反應，使我們在他身上發現的力量理想與有問題的斯多葛派理想相區別。斯多葛派過分強調理想主體的控制能力，認為他這樣做是為了通過逃避和拒絕人類必要的脆弱性來超越它，而尼采的 "主權個體 "恰恰在這方面與斯多葛派相反："主權個體 "通過並與他的脆弱性一起生活，積極肯定它。因此，"主權個人 "更應該被理解為體現和肯定了斯多葛主義者試圖通過拒絕和否定來超越的脆弱和弱勢。4 鑒於努斯鮑姆和尼采對斯多葛立場的批評，我認為尼采和努斯鮑姆的共同點可能比努斯鮑姆所建議的更多。最後，在這一章中，我旨在表明，通過提出 "永恆複現 "學說作為主權個體必須通過的對生命的最高肯定的終極測試，尼采也提供了他認為是解決即將到來的虛無主義和他那個時代的抑制性的現行道德的威脅的部分方法。

 

 

Concluding remarks

In his seminal paper “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Harry Frankfurt outlines what he takes to be most distinctive of our personhood. Personhood, for Frankfurt, is a term which has been misappropriated by P.F Strawson precisely because of the lack of agency talk in his discussions of personhood. Against the Strawsonian view in which the person is defined exclusively as something which has a mind and a body, Frankfurt outlines what he takes to be most distinctive of our personhood, those characteristics and abilities which he claims are “essential to persons,” or which are “uniquely human,” as primarily defined by our agency. Recall that on Frankfurt’s account, and similarly on other formal analytic accounts which follow Frankfurt’s general framework, it is our ability to govern and control our own actions and behavior that is the distinguishing mark of our humanity, since it is this ability that is taken to make us the authors of ourselves and our lives. And agency is taken to be what constitutes our personhood because agency gives us the kind of control over ourselves that is thought to distinguish us from the rest of the animal kingdom.

哈裡-法蘭克福在其開創性的論文《意志自由和人的概念》中，概述了他認為我們的人格的最顯著特徵是什麼。對法蘭克福來說，人格是一個被P.F Strawson盜用的術語，這正是因為他在討論人格時缺乏對代理權的談論。在斯特勞森的觀點中，人被完全定義為有思想和身體的東西，與此相反，法蘭克福概述了他認為我們的人格的最獨特之處，他聲稱這些特徵和能力是 "人的本質"，或者說是 "獨特的人"，主要由我們的機構來定義。回顧一下，在法蘭克福的論述中，以及在遵循法蘭克福總體框架的其他形式分析論述中，我們支配和控制自己的行動和行為的能力才是我們人性的顯著標誌，因為正是這種能力使我們成為自己和自己生活的作者。代理權被認為是構成我們人格的東西，因為代理權給了我們對自己的那種控制，而這種控制被認為是將我們與其他動物王國區分開來。

In this chapter, I have argued against the Frankfurtian picture of the role of agency in personhood, although I do, nevertheless, think that agency is an important constitutive element of our personhood. There is, of course, something quite remarkable (and arguably unique) about our capacity to exercise this kind of control over ourselves. And here, I do think that Frankfurt points out precisely what is, in part, wrong with the Strawsonian view of personhood. However, I have also argued that to characterize agency as of primary importance in our understanding of personhood is not only to misunderstand the nature of our personhood, it is also a dangerous misunderstanding which impoverishes our idea of both personhood and human flourishing, or living the “good life” (in broadly speaking ethical terms). My life, I think, would not be recognizably human and it would be radically impoverished, if not wholly undesirable, if I did not care very deeply about the things over which I have no control – specifically, we could mention concerns such as how my projects actually fare in the external world and my interpersonal relationships with other people. Nussbaum is right, I have argued, to point out that our human vulnerability and our reaction to this vulnerability are necessary for understanding what personhood entails. Where I have disagreed with Nussbaum is in her reading of Nietzsche. Nietzsche, I have argued, similarly to Nussbaum, disagrees with Frankfurt about the role of agency and vulnerability in personhood. And this is precisely where Nietzsche’s account of personhood, like Nussbaum’s, gains its strength. 88 88. Taking the notion of vulnerability as a fundamental idea in Nietzsche’s ethics may, at first blush, seem somewhat controversial, and it has certainly not been a widely discussed aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy in general. As I have argued in this chapter, I take the notion of vulnerability to be something addressed by Nietzsche in subtle, yet nuanced ways. I think that this aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy thus requires further investigation.

在這一章中，我反對法蘭克福式的關於代理權在人格中的作用的描述，儘管我確實認為代理權是我們人格的一個重要構成要素。當然，我們對自己進行這種控制的能力是相當了不起的（可以說是獨一無二的）。在這裡，我確實認為法蘭克福恰恰指出了斯特勞森式的人格觀點的部分問題。然而，我還認為，把代理權作為我們對人格的理解的首要因素，不僅是對我們人格的本質的誤解，也是一個危險的誤解，它使我們對人格和人類繁榮的想法變得貧乏，或過上 "美好生活"（廣義上的倫理術語）。我認為，如果我不深切關心我無法控制的事情，我的生活就不是可識別的人類，即使不是完全不可取，也會從根本上變得貧乏--具體而言，我們可以提及的關切包括我的項目在外部世界的實際表現以及我與其他人的人際關係。我認為，努斯鮑姆指出我們人類的脆弱性和我們對這種脆弱性的反應對於理解人格的內涵是必要的，這是正確的。我與努斯鮑姆不同的地方在於她對尼采的解讀。我認為，尼采和努斯鮑姆一樣，不同意法蘭克福關於機構和脆弱性在人格中的作用的看法。而這恰恰是尼采對人格的描述，就像努斯鮑姆的一樣，獲得了它的力量。88 88. 将脆弱性的概念作为尼采伦理学的一个基本思想，乍一看似乎有些争议，而且这肯定不是尼采哲学的一个普遍讨论的方面。正如我在本章中所论述的，我认为脆弱性的概念是尼采以微妙而又细微的方式处理的。因此，我认为尼采哲学的这个方面需要进一步研究。

 

Leiter, Brian. "Who is the'sovereign individual'? Nietzsche on freedom." Nietzsche on Freedom (September 10, 2009). CAMBRIDGE CRITICAL GUIDE TO NIETZSCHE'S ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY, Simon May, ed (2010).

1.      站在非道德論者的立場上，尼采以主權個體的概念作為手段嘲諷理性個體與自由，主權個體的自主性，也許是長期間無意識鍛造而後的強制結果。責任或自由之類的概念，不是「主權個體」此概念的考慮，他們不構成構成主權個體之概念。 

導言 Most readers of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality over the last century would, one suspects, be astonished to discover the prominence recent scholarship has given to the enigmatic figure of the “sovereign individual,” who appears just once, in section 2 of the second essay (GM, II, 2), and never appears again, in the Genealogy or indeed anywhere else in the corpus.1 Yet according to Keith Ansell-Pearson, for example,	導言 在過去的一個世紀裡，尼采《道德譜系》的大多數讀者都會驚訝地發現，最近的學術研究對 "主權個人 "這個神秘的人物給予了突出的評價，他只在第二篇文章的第二節（GM，II，2）中出現過一次，而且在《道德譜系》中或者實際上在文獻的其他地方都沒有再出現。
The overriding aim of the Genealogy of Morals is to show that what Kant and the modern liberal tradition of moral and political thought simply take for granted, the sovereign individual in possession of a free will and conscience, is in reality the product of a specific historical labour of culture or civilization. (Ansell-Pearson 1991: 277)	道德譜系》的首要目標是表明，康德和現代自由主義道德和政治思想傳統簡單地認為是理所當然的，擁有自由意志和良知的主權個人，實際上是文化或文明的特定歷史勞動的產物。(Ansell-Pearson 1991: 277)
If this were really the “overriding aim” of the Genealogy, one would have expected Nietzsche to be a bit clearer about it and to have more to say about this “sovereign individual.” Ansell-Pearson’s claim is, to be sure, rather extreme, but his is, nonetheless, on a recognizable continuum with more sober assessments. John Richardson, for example, describes GM, II, 2, as “a dramatic statement of [Nietzsche’s] positive view” of freedom (Richardson 2009: 128). For Peter Poellner, the sovereign individual gives expression to “the constitutive conditions of full-fledged, autonomous rather than heteronomous selfhood” (Poellner 2009: 152). Ken Gemes thinks the “sovereign individual” illuminates “genuine agency” (2009: 37), the question, “what is it to be a self capable of acting” (39), indeed, “what exactly it is to be a genuine self” (40).	如果這真的是《家譜》的 "首要目標"，我們就會期待尼采對此有更清晰的認識，對這個 "主權個體 "有更多的論述。Ansell-Pearson的主張無疑是相當極端的，但他的主張與更清醒的評估是可識別的連續體。例如，John Richardson將GM, II, 2描述為 "對[尼采]自由的積極觀點的戲劇性陳述"（Richardson 2009: 128）。對Peter Poellner來說，主權個人表達了 "成熟的、自主的而非異質的自我身份的構成條件"（Poellner 2009: 152）。Ken Gemes認為 "主權個體 "照亮了 "真正的機構"（2009：37），即 "什麼是能夠採取行動的自我"（39），實際上，"到底什麼是真正的自我"（40）。
So who is this “sovereign individual” of GM, II, 2, and what does he have to do with Nietzsche’s conceptions of free will, freedom, or the self? I shall argue for what would have been, at one time, a fairly unsurprising view, namely, that (1) Nietzsche denies that people ever act freely and that they are ever morally responsible for anything they do; (2) the figure of the “sovereign individual” in no way supports a denial of the first point; and (3) Nietzsche engages in what Charles Stevenson (1938) would have called a “persuasive definition” of the language of “freedom” and “free will,” radically revising the content of those concepts, but in a way that aims to capitalize on their positive emotive valence and authority for his readers.2	那麼，GM, II, 2中的這個 "主權個人 "是誰，他與尼采的自由意志、自由或自我的概念有什麼關係？我將論證在某一時期相當不令人驚訝的觀點，即：（1）尼采否認人們曾經自由行動，否認他們對自己所做的一切負有道德責任；（2）"主權個體 "的形象絕不支持對第一點的否認。(3) 尼采對 "自由 "和 "自由意志 "的語言進行了查理斯-史蒂文生（1938）所說的 "有說服力的定義"，從根本上修改了這些概念的內容，但其方式是為了利用這些概念對讀者的積極情感價值和權威。 2
More precisely, I aim to show that the image of the “sovereign individual” is consistent with the reading of Nietzsche as a kind of fatalist, which I have defended for many years (Leiter 1998; 2002: 81–87; 2007). On the fatalist interpretation, Nietzsche thinks that persons have certain essential psychological and physiological traits over which they have no autonomous control and which, together perhaps with environmental influences like values, causally determine their life trajectories. In particular, Nietzsche thinks that the feeling of free will is, at bottom, an epiphenomenon of a process in which conscious thoughts that are consistent with and temporally proximate to succeeding actions are misinterpreted as causal, when, in fact, both the thoughts and the actions themselves are causally determined by non-conscious, perhaps neurophysical aspects of the person (see Leiter 2007). The upshot is that our actions are neither causa sui, nor caused by any conscious state with which we might identify, and so our actions cannot bear ascriptions of responsibility, that is ascriptions of justified praise and blame. To the extent, then, that Nietzsche continues to use the language of “freedom” and “free will” – and he does so in a variety of passages that we will consider – he must use those concepts in revisionary senses unrecognizable to either of the two major traditions of thinking about free will in the modern era: on the one hand, the broadly Kantian identification of freedom with autonomous action, meaning action arising from rational selflegislation (or guidance), which grounds moral responsibility; and, on the other, the broadly Humean equation of freedom with acting on the basis of effective, conscious desires with which we “identify” (in some sense to be specified). Neither traditional concept of freedom or free will is available to or embraced by Nietzsche the fatalist.3	更確切地說，我旨在表明 "主權個人 "的形象與我多年來一直捍衛的對尼采作為一種宿命論者的解讀是一致的（Leiter 1998; 2002: 81-87; 2007）。在宿命論的解釋中，尼采認為人有某些基本的心理和生理特徵，他們無法自主控制這些特徵，而這些特徵或許與價值觀等環境影響因素一起，因果地決定了他們的生活軌跡。特別是，尼采認為，自由意志的感覺從根本上說是一個過程的表像，在這個過程中，與後續行動相一致且在時間上相近的有意識的想法被誤解為因果關係，而事實上，這些想法和行動本身都是由人的非有意識的、也許是神經物理方面的因素決定的（見Leiter 2007）。結果是，我們的行為既不是因果關係，也不是由我們可能認同的任何意識狀態造成的，因此我們的行為不能承擔責任的銘文，也就是合理的讚美和責備的銘文。那麼，只要尼采繼續使用 "自由 "和 "自由意志 "的語言--他在我們將要考慮的各種段落中都是這樣做的--他就必須在現代關於自由意志的兩個主要思維傳統中的任何一個都無法識別的修正意義上使用這些概念。一方面，康得對自由與自主行動的廣泛認同，意味著由理性的自我立法（或指導）產生的行動，它是道德責任的基礎；另一方面，休謨對自由與基於有效的、有意識的欲望的行動的廣泛等同，我們 "認同 "這些欲望（在某種意義上有待明確）。這兩種傳統的自由或自由意志的概念都不為宿命論者尼采所利用或接受。
To show that the image of the “sovereign individual” squares with Nietzsche’s fatalism, I distinguish, in what follows, between two possible “deflationary readings” of the passage. On one such reading, the figure of the “sovereign individual” is wholly ironic, a mocking of the petit bourgeois who thinks his petty commercial undertakings – his ability to make promises and remember his debts – are the highest fruit of creation. On another deflationary reading, the “sovereign individual” does indeed represent an ideal of the self, one marked by a kind of self-mastery foreign to less coherent selves (whose momentary impulses pull them this way and that), but such a self and its self-mastery is, in Nietzschean terms, a fortuitous natural artifact (a bit of “fate”), not an autonomous achievement for which anyone could be responsible.4 To associate this ideal of the self with the language of “freedom” and “free will” is an exercise in “persuasive definition” by Nietzsche, a rhetorical skill at which he was often the master. I am inclined to think the second reading is probably the correct one, though the somewhat ridiculously hyperbolic presentation of the “sovereign individual” makes the first reading attractive. But either reading allows us to understand how and why Nietzsche, the fatalist and arch-skeptic about free will, would have created the figure of the “sovereign individual.”	為了證明 "主權個人 "的形象與尼采的宿命論相吻合，我在下文中對這段話進行了兩種可能的 "通貨緊縮 "解讀。在一種解讀中，"主權個人 "的形象完全是一種諷刺，是對小資產階級的嘲諷，他認為自己的小商業活動--他的承諾和記帳能力--是創造的最高成果。在另一種通貨緊縮的解讀中，"有主權的個人 "確實代表了一種自我的理想，一種與不太連貫的自我（其瞬間的衝動將他們拉向這個方向或那個方向）相異的自我管理，但這樣的自我及其自我管理，用尼采的話說，是一種偶然的自然產物（一種 "命運"），而不是一種任何人都能負責的自主成就。將這種自我理想與 "自由 "和 "自由意志 "的語言聯繫起來，是尼采對 "有說服力的定義 "的一種練習，他常常是這種修辭技巧的高手。我傾向于認為第二種解讀可能是正確的，儘管對 "主權個人 "的有點可笑的誇張表述使第一種解讀具有吸引力。但無論哪種解讀，都能讓我們理解尼采這個宿命論者和對自由意志持懷疑態度的人，是如何以及為什麼會創造出 "主權個體 "這個人物。
1 I have generally started with the translations of Nietzsche’s works by Clark and Swensen, Hollingdale, and/or Kaufmann, and then made changes based on the Colli and Montinari edition of the Sämtliche Werke (1980–88), though in some cases the translations are entirely mine.	1 我一般從克拉克和斯文森、霍林代爾和/或考夫曼對尼采作品的翻譯開始，然後根據Colli和Montinari版的《Sämtliche Werke》（1980-88）進行修改，不過在某些情況下，譯文完全是我的。
2 “A ‘persuasive’ definition is one which gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar word without substantially changing its emotive meaning, and which is used with the conscious or unconscious purpose of changing, by this means, the direction of people’s interests” (Stevenson 1938: 331).	2 "一個'有說服力的'定義是指在不大幅改變其情感意義的情況下為一個熟悉的詞賦予新的概念意義，並且在使用時有意識或無意識地想通過這種方式改變人們的利益方向"（Stevenson 1938: 331）。
3 Rutherford (2009) makes a prima facie plausible case that Nietzsche’s view is closer to Spinoza’s conception of freedom, but as Rutherford notes, Spinoza’s is a“neglected”conception in the history of philosophy, and so has little or no resonance with those ideas of freedom that are culturally important. (Rutherford also discusses the Stoic view of freedom as a possible antecedent, but given Nietzsche’s explicit hostility to the Stoics and his many substantive differences with them – over the role of “assent” in the causation of action, the possibility of correct judgments about “the good,” and compatibilism [all noted by Rutherford] – this pedigree for Nietzsche’s view seems less likely.)	3 Rutherford (2009)提出了一個表面上看似合理的理由，即尼采的觀點更接近於斯賓諾莎的自由概念，但正如Rutherford所指出的，斯賓諾莎的概念在哲學史上是一個 "被忽視的 "概念，因此與那些具有文化重要性的自由觀念幾乎沒有共鳴。盧瑟福也討論了斯多葛的自由觀作為一個可能的前因，但鑒於尼采對斯多葛的明確敵意以及他與他們的許多實質性分歧--關於 "同意 "在行動的因果關係中的作用，關於 "善 "的正確判斷的可能性，以及compatibilism（盧瑟福都提到了）--尼采的觀點的這種淵源似乎不太可能）。
4 The Spinozian view that Rutherford ends up ascribing to Nietzsche – according to which “[t]he person who becomes free is the person whom fate favors with the ability to regiment in herself a principle of acting that is expressive of her inherent power” (Rutherford 2009: 35) – comes to the same thing, though Rutherford does not remark upon the radically revisionary notion of freedom involved.	4 盧瑟福最後將斯賓諾莎的觀點歸於尼采--根據這一觀點，"成為自由人的人是被命運眷顧的人，他有能力在自己身上規定一個表現她內在力量的行動原則"（Rutherford 2009: 35）--得出了同樣的結論，儘管盧瑟福並沒有對所涉及的自由概念進行根本的修正。

 

 

Conclusion If Nietzsche really says so little that suggests he holds out the hope of a freedom or free will that would be recognizable to the philosophical tradition, or common sense, as such; if his skepticism about freedom and responsibility is so resolute; if what he actually says about freedom and free will is so clearly revisionary, so plainly an exercise in persuasive definition that means to exploit his readers’ antecedent emotional investment in “freedom” on behalf of very different Nietzschean ideals, even quite illiberal ones – then how are we to explain the recent scholarly “consensus” (if that is what it is) with which we began? It is, I fear, a manifestation of the fault against which Nietzsche often railed, and which we have seen so many times before in the Nietzsche literature, in Heidegger’s transformation of Nietzsche into the last metaphysical philosopher, in Kaufmann’s rendering of him as a harmless secular humanist, in Nehamas’s defanging of him as an aestheticist (cf. Leiter 1992). In each case, the aim is to make Nietzsche less appalling to we delicate modern readers than he really is: for Nietzsche does not believe in freedom or responsibility; he does not think we exercise any meaningful control over our lives; he does not think that his revisionary sense of “freedom” – the “long, protracted will” as he puts it in the passage from GM, II, 2, with which we began – is in reach of just anyone, that anyone could “choose” to have it; indeed, in the important passage from Twilight with which we concluded, “freedom” is rather clearly invoked on behalf of Nietzsche’s illiberal vision of the inescapable reality of human inequality. The resistance to these points in the recent scholarly literature, I conclude, reflects the continuing malign influence of moralizing readings of Nietzsche, of the failure to remember what he says about his conception of Renaissance virtue, namely, that we understand it, and him, “moralinefree” (A, 2).16

結論 如果尼采真的沒有說什麼，表明他對哲學傳統或常識所認可的自由或自由意志抱有希望；如果他對自由和責任的懷疑態度是如此堅決。如果他對自由和自由意志的實際論述是如此明顯的修正，如此明顯的說服性定義的練習，意在利用他的讀者對 "自由 "先前的情感投資，代表非常不同的尼采理想，甚至相當不自由的理想--那麼我們如何解釋最近的學術 "共識"（如果那是什麼的話），我們開始時就是這樣？我擔心這是尼采經常抨擊的錯誤的表現，我們在尼采文獻中已經多次看到這種錯誤，在海德格爾將尼采轉變為最後的形而上學哲學家，在考夫曼將他渲染為無害的世俗人文主義者，在尼哈馬斯將他詆毀為美學家（參見Leiter 1992）。在每一種情況下，其目的都是為了使尼采在我們這些脆弱的現代讀者眼中不至於像他那樣令人震驚。因為尼采不相信自由或責任；他不認為我們對自己的生活有任何有意義的控制；他不認為他的修正意義上的 "自由"--"漫長的、持久的意志"，正如他在我們開始提到的《轉基因》第二章第2節中所說的那樣--是任何人都可以得到的，任何人都可以 "選擇 "擁有它。事實上，在我們最後提到的《暮光之城》的重要段落中，"自由 "被相當明確地引用，代表尼采對人類不平等這一不可避免的現實的不自由的看法。我的結論是，最近的學術文獻中對這些觀點的抵制，反映了對尼采的道德化解讀的持續惡性影響，反映了沒有記住他對文藝復興時期美德概念的說法，即我們對它和他的理解是 "無道德的"（A，2）。

16 An earlier draft benefited from the discussion of it at a plenary session of the annual meeting of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society at St. Peter’s College, Oxford, in September 2009. I am especially grateful to Peter Kail for pressing on me the need to think about Spinoza, which led me in turn to the illuminating paper by Rutherford (2009),

16 早期的草案得益於2009年9月在牛津大學聖彼得學院舉行的弗裡德里希-尼采學會年會的全體會議上對它的討論。我特別感謝彼得-凱爾向我強調了思考斯賓諾莎的必要性，這反過來又讓我看到了盧瑟福（2009）的富有啟發性的論文。

 

科學在行動 附錄

 

Latour, Bruno. Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Harvard university press, 1987.
Latour, Bruno(2005)科學在行動：怎樣在社會中跟隨科學家和工程師。劉文旋、鄭開譯。北京：東方出版社。

目錄與標題、小標題	APPENDIX 1 Rules of Method 方法規則	APPENDIX 2 Principles 原則
Introduction Opening Pandora‘s Black Box (1) Looking for a way in (2) When enough is never enough (3) The first rule of method	規則一。我們研究行動中的科學，而非既成科學；我們探索黑箱化之前的事實與機器，或跟隨能開啟黑箱的爭議 Rule I We study science in action and not ready made science or technology; to do so, we either arrive before the facts and machines are blackboxed or we follow the controversies that reopen them. (Introduction) 規則一：我們研究的是行動中的科學，而不是已經形成的科學或技術。為了進行這種研究，一方面，我們在事實和機器被變成黑箱以前抵達它們，另一方面，我們也緊隨把它們重新打開的爭論。(導論)
Part I From Weaker to Stronger Rhetoric第一部份 從弱修辭到強修辭
Chapter 1 Literature Part A: Controversies. (1) Positive and negative modalities (2) The collective fate of fact-making Part B: When controversies flare up(爆發) the literature becomes technical. (1) Bringing friends in (2) Referring to former texts (3) Being referred to by later texts Part C:Writing texts that withstand (經受) the assaults of a hostile environment. (1) Articles fortify themselves (2) Positioning tactics部署戰術 　(a) STACKING堆疊 　(b) STAGING AND FRAMING登場與構框 　(c) CAPTATION構陷 (3) The second rule of method Conclusion: Numbers, more numbers	規則二。決定某宣稱是客觀或者主觀的，或者某個機制是否完善或有效率，我們不從尋求內部屬性來解答，而是完全從之後它們遭遇他人之手而經受的轉變來斷定。 Rule 2 To determine the objectivity or subjectivity of a claim, the efficiency or perfection of a mechanism, we do not look for their intrinsic qualities but at all the transformations they undergo later in the hands of others. (Chapter l) 規則二:為了判定一個斷言的客觀性或主觀性、一個機制的充分性或完滿性，我們尋求的不是它們的內在性質，而完全是它們後來在別人手裡經受的轉變。(第一章)	第一原則。事實或機器的命運掌握在後續使用者的手中；事實或機器的性質因此是集體行動的結果，而非原因。 First principle The fate of facts and machines is in later users' hands; their qualities are thus a consequence, not a cause, of a collective action. (Chapter 1) 第一原理：事實或者機器的命運掌握在後來使用者的手裡，因此，它們的性質是集體行動的一個結果，而不是原因。(第一章)
Chapter 2 Laboratories Part A: From texts to things: A showdown. 攤牌 (1) Inscriptions (2) Spokesmen and women (3) Trials of strength力量試煉 Part B: Building up counter-laboratories. (1) Borrowing more black boxes (2) Making actors betray their representatives (3) Shaping up new allies (4) Laboratories against laboratories Part C: Appealing (to) nature 訴諸(求助於)自然 (1) 'Natur. mit uns' (自然與我們同在) (2) The double-talk of the two-faced Janus	規則三。由於爭議之平息，是大寫自然之再現表徵的成因，而非結果，因此，我們無法以這個結果（即大寫自然），來解釋如何以及為何一個爭議已然平息。 Rule 3 Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature's representation, not its consequence, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a controversy has been settled. (Chapter 2) 規則三：由於一個爭論的解決是自然圖像的原因而不是結果，因此，我們永遠不能用自然這個結果來解釋一個爭論是如何解決和為什麼被解決了的。(第二章)	第二原則。科學家與工程師以他們的新盟友之名說話（這些新盟友由工程師與科學家形塑與徵召）；（作為其他代言者間的代言者，工程師與科學家透過追加未預期的資源，以有利於自身的方式，傾覆原先的力量均衡。 Second principle Scientists and engineers speak in the name of new allies that they have shaped and enrolled; representatives among other representatives, they add these unexpected resources to tip the balance of force in their favour. (Chapter 2) 第二原理:科學家和工程師以他們已經塑造和吸收了的新盟友的名義說話。作為其他代表者之中的代表，他們為了自身的利益增加這些不期而至的資源，以便打破力量的平衡。(第二章)

 

Part II FROM WEAK POINTS TO STRONGHOLDS 從弱點到要塞
Chapter 3 Machines Introduction: The quandary (困惑) of the fact-builder. Part A: Translating interests. (1) Translation one: I want what you want (2) Translation two: I want it, why don't you? (3) Translation three: if you just make a short detour ... (4) Translation four: reshuffling(重排) interests and goals. (A) TACTIC ONE: DISPLACING GOALS (B) TACTIC TWO: INVENTING NEW GOALS (C) TACTIC THREE: INVENTING NEW GROUPS (D) TACTIC FOUR: RENDERING THE DETOUR INVISIBLE (E) TACTIC FIVE: WINNING TRIALS OF ATTRIBUTION (5) Translation five: becoming indispensable Part B: Keeping the interested groups in line. (1) A chain is only as strong as its weakest link (2) Tying up with new unexpected allies (3) Machinations (權謀) of forces Part C: The model of diffusion versus the model of translation (1) Vis inertia ...(慣性力) (2) Weaker and stronger associations (3) The fourth rule of method	規則四。由於爭議之平息，是大寫社會之穩定的成因，而非結果，因此，我們無法以這個結果（即大寫自然），來解釋如何以及為何一個爭議已然平息。 我們應該對稱地考慮人類與非人類資源在其中的作功。 Rule 4 Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Society's stability, we cannot use Society to explain how and why a controversy has been settled. We should .consider symmetrically the efforts to enrol human and non-human resources. (Chapter 3) 規則四：因為一個爭論的解決是社會得以穩固的原因，因此，我們不能用社會來解釋一個爭論是如何解決和為什麼被解 決了的。我們應當對吸收人類資源和非人類資源的努力加以對 稱的考慮。(第三章)	第三原則。我們不曾遭遇科學、技術與社會，我們遭遇的是完完全全的更弱的或更強的聯結；因此，理解事實或機器是什麼(what)，與理解人們是誰(who)，是同樣的工作。 Third principle We are never confronted with science, technology and society, but with a gamut of weaker and stronger associations; thus understanding what facts and machines are is the same task as understanding who the people are. (Chapter 3) 第三原理：我們面對的從來不是科學、技術和社會，而是或強或弱的聯合的整個範圍。因此，理解事實和機器是什麼與理解人們是誰是同樣的工作。(第三章)
Chapter 4 Insiders Out Part A: Interesting others in the laboratories. (1) When everyone can do without scientists or engineers (A) WHEN BEING A SCIENTIST IS NOT YET A JOB (B) A NON-OBLIGATORY PASSAGE POINT (2) Making the laboratories indispensable (3) What is technoscience made of? {A) 'WHO IS REALLY DOING SCIENCE, AFTER ALL?' (B) EVERYBODY IS MADE TO GIVE A HAND Part B: Counting allies and resources (1) Counting on Scientists and Engineers (2) Not counting only on scientists and engineers (3) The fifth rule of method	規則五。我們必須如同我們所跟隨的（構成技術科學的）不同行動者那般（看見人事物的）未決定（狀態）；每次只要打造好了一個內外之分，我們就應該同時研究兩邊，並列出清單（不論這個清單多長或多異質），指出是誰創造了這個區分。 Rule 5 We have to be as undecided as the various actors we follow as to what technoscience is made of; every time an inside/ outside divide is built, we should study the two sides simultaneously and make the list, no matter how long and heterogeneous, of those who do the work. (Chapter 4)　［內容另據英文本175倒數第四行以降補充］ ［我們不問何為社會，何為科學，而是追問諸種連結如何連結或分離］p176 規則五：至於技術科學是由什麼構成的，對此，我們必須像我們所跟隨的各種不同的參與者一樣懸而未決(undecided )。每當一種內行/外行的區分被製造出來時，我們就應當同時對兩者進行研究，並制定出那些參與工作者的清單，不論這份清單會多長，也不論構成這份清單的成分會多麼地多種多樣。(第四)	第四原則。科學與技術有深奧的內容越多，則向外延伸越遠；因此，「科學與技術」只是技術科學的子集合。 Fourth principle The more science and technology have an esoteric content the further they extend outside; thus, 'science and technology' is only a subset of technoscience. (Chapter 4) 第四原理：科學和技術越是具有生僻的內容，它們就越是擴展到內行以外。因此，「科學和技術」僅僅是技術科學的一個子集。(第四章)

 

PART III FROM SHORT TO LONGER NETWORKS從短網絡到長網絡
Chapter 5 Tribunals of Reason Part A: The trials of rationality. (1) Peopling the world with irrational minds (2) Reversing the outcome of trials in irrationality (3) Straightening up distorted beliefs Part B: Sociologies. (1) Running against other people's claims (2) What is tied to what? (3) Mapping the associations Part C: Who needs hard facts? (1) Why not soft facts instead? (2) Hardening the facts (3) The sixth rule of method: just a question of scale…	規則六。遭逢被指控為不合理性的情況，我們既不注重何種邏輯規則已被打破，也不注重何種社會結構能否解釋此扭曲，我們只關注觀察者的位移方向與位移角度，以及這個網絡因而能夠被建造的長度。 Rule 6 Confronted with the accusation of irrationality, we look neither at what rule of logic has been broken, nor at what structure of society could explain the distortion, but to the angle and direction of the observer's displacement, and to the length of the network thus being built. (Chapter 5) 規則六：面對不合理性這種指責，我們既不考慮何種邏輯規則被打破了，也不考慮何種社會結構能解釋變形，而只考慮觀察者的置換( displacement) 角度和方向，以及由此而被建立起來的網路的長度。(第五章)	第五原則。不合理性永遠是個創造出來的指控，這個控訴是網絡建構者為了要排除攔路者創造的；因此，心智之間不存在大分裂；存在的僅僅是更長或更短的網絡；更堅實的事實並非規則而是例外，因為這些更堅實的事實，僅在像這樣的例子底下是需要的：以這些事實大規模取代其他事實，讓這些事實不再能以既有方式行事。 Fifth principle Irrationality is always an accusation made by someone building a network over someone else who stands in the way; thus, there is no Great Divide between minds, but only shorter and longer networks; harder facts are not the rule but the exception, since they are needed only in a very few cases to displace others on a large scale out of their usual ways. (Chapter 5) 第五原理：不合理性這種指責通常由這樣的人提出，此人建立一種網路系統是為了越過另一個擋住其去路的人。因此，並不存在頭腦之間的分水嶺，只存在或長或短的網路。更硬的事 實不是規律而是例外，因為，僅僅在把別人從其通常道路中大規模地轉移出來這種極少見的情況下才需要它們。(第五章)
Chapter 6 Centres of calculation Prologue: The domestication of the savage mind. Part A: Action at a distance. (1) Cycles of accumulation (2) The mobilization of the worlds (3) Constructing space and time Part B: Centres of calculation. (1) Tying all the allies firmly together (A) SOLVING A FEW LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS 　(B) CALCULATING, AT LAST ... (2) What's the matter of (with) formalism? 　(A) DOING AWAY WITH 'ABSTRACT THEORIES' 　(B) WHY FORMS MATTER SO MUCH: THE SEVENTH RULE OF METHOD Part C: Metrologies (各種計量學) (1) Extending the networks still further (2) Tied in by a few metrological chains (3) About a few other paper-shufflers	規則七。在歸因於於任何人類心智或人類的方法的任何特殊性質之前，我們首先檢視銘寫的各種方法，如收集到的、結合成的、綁縛成群的以及被拒絕的種種方法。要是網絡已研究透徹，但某事物仍未被解釋時，我們才應該開始論及認知因素。 Rule 7 Before attributing any special quality to the mind or to the method of people, let us examine first the many ways through which inscriptions are gathered, combined, tied together and sent back. Only if there.is something unexplained once the networks have been studied shall we start to speak of cognitive factors. (Chapter 6) 規則七：在把任何特殊的性質歸於人的頭腦或方法以前，讓我們先檢查一下記錄被聚集、聯結、結合在一起或者被拒絕的大量方式。只有當研究了網路系統之後還存在某些未被解釋的事物時，我們才開始談及認知因素。(第六章)	第六原則。技術科學的歷史，是延著網絡散落了的資源的歷史的很大一部分。 Sixth principle History of technoscience is in a large part the history of the resources scattered along networks to accelerate the mobility, faithfulness, combination and cohesion of traces that make action at a distance possible. (Chapter 6) 第六原理：技術科學的歷史佔據著資源史的很大一部分，這些資源被沿著網路散開，從而促進對使遠距離行動成為可能的 蹤跡進行調集、信任、聯結和凝聚。(第六章)

 

社會學導引_人文取向的透視 (黃樹仁/劉雅靈譯本)

社會學家是一個強烈的、無休止的、厚臉皮的興趣於人類作為的人。他的天生棲息之處是世界上所有人類聚居之地，不論人們是聚居於何處。...

We would say then that the sociologist (that is, the one we would really like to invite to our game) is a person intensively, endlessly, shamelessly interested in the doings of men. His natural habitat is all the human gathering places of the world, wherever men come together. The sociologist may be interested in many other things. But his consuming interest remains in the world of men, their institutions, their history, their passions. And since he is interested in men, nothing that men do can be altogether tedious for him. He will naturally be interested in the events that engage men’s ultimate beliefs, their moments of tragedy and grandeur and ecstasy. But he will also be fascinated by the commonplace, the everyday. He will know reverence, but this reverence will not prevent him from wanting to see and to understand. He may sometimes feel revulsion or contempt. But this also will not deter him from wanting to have his questions answered. The sociologist, in his quest for understanding, moves through the world of men without respect for the usual lines of demarcation. Nobility and degradation, power and obscurity, intelligence and folly—these are equally interesting to him, however unequal they may be in his personal values or tastes. Thus his questions may lead him to all possible levels of society, the best and the least known places, the most respected and the most despised. And, if he is a good sociologist, he will find himself in all these places because his own questions have so taken possession of him that he has little choice but to seek for answers. (1963:18)

尼采與黑格爾的差異

 

尼采與黑格爾的差異

 

黑格爾，如同老子所說的「為腹」不為目，辯證法以自身的消化為中心，目的在於成為同一。主奴辯證始於抽象，始於欲望，始於虛空，始於恐懼，經由中介，而致承認的鬥爭，而致由他人而承認之具體。欲望以他者為對象，在尼采的角度來看，仍是至於被動。對於欲望的克服是消化；而不是自我肯定與創造。人如何克服自身的奴隸狀態，在尼采看來，就是創造價值；在黑格爾看來，則是克服畏懼。賴老認為此與啟蒙理性的背景有關，如同霍布斯也是站在相同的立場。尼采的起點是人的健忘，永遠可以有個新的開始；不一定非得變成什麼樣，接受自己，肯定自己就可以了。

[期刊資料備忘] 學程 與課程改革 /職業連帶.

 馮朝霖 (民90)，從高等教育困境看學程整合與課程規劃，傳播研究簡訊，25卷頁11-14。

王秀槐、王燦槐、Wang, Hsiou-huai、Wang, Chang-hwai (民95)，大學跨領域創意學程對學生創造力改變影響之研究，科技發展政策報導，頁841-858。

提升學生創造力為今日大學教育的重要任務。蓋提升大學生創造力有多重方 式，其中之一為集合不同領域教師，提供完整課程架構，透過具創意教學，整體 提升修習學生的創造力，這樣的「學程取向」在國內創造力教學領域尚屬新興做 法。國內一所綜合性大學結合不同領域教師設立了「創意學程」，提供完整系列 課程，供學生修習，以期提升學生創造力．為了評估初期課程的成效，研究者針 對修習學生進行創造力評量．本論文將介紹創意學程的構想做法以及評量結果， 內容包括：（一）創意學程的理論基礎、課程設計以及實施狀況；（二）創造力評 量的方法、工具與過程；（三）參與學生創造力的改變．本文也將討論（四）研 究結果對教育以及後續研究的啟示． 關鍵字：創造力、創意學程、創造力評量、大學教學

潘文福、陳雅苓、Pan, Wen-fu、Chen, Ya-lin (民101)，東華大學課程學程化之實施成效分析：CGDI觀點，慈濟大學教育研究學刊，頁91-117。

本研究的目的在於以東華大學壽豐校區96學年度學士班實施課程學程化的現況，作為分析課程學程化實施成效的案例，研究中以詮釋結構模式（ISM）作為文件分析的方法，詮釋結構乃參考Charles Wiseman提出的五項策略推力為基礎，進而修改為成本（Cost）、成長（Growth）、特色與差異化（Differentiation）、整合（Integration）等四項成效分析的構面觀察向度，由研究者以前述四個向度初擬出成效分析架構草案，經過東華大學課程規劃小組進行的內部討論、修正與凝聚共識後，再透過東華大學校級課程委員會全體委員的外部檢核修正，建構出四項成效分析構面的11項成效參考指標，接著以這11 項成效參考指標，開始蒐集成效分析的質性資料或佐證數據。經由本研究的分析歸納後發現，東華大學實施課程學程化的具體成效至少可以包括以下四項：1.課程學程化能降低大學生選修學分之成本；2.課程學程化比較容易引導各系學生之學習成長；3.課程學程化可以成為東華大學修讀制度之差異化特色；4.透過排課時段與課委會諮詢意見之整合，能幫助學生完成跨領域第二專長學程之修讀。

潘文福、張詩晨、徐俊斌、Pan, Wen-fu、Zhang, Shi-cheng、Hsu, Chun-pin (民104)，大學生對實施課程學程化之滿意度研究，教育行政論壇，頁27-55。

個案大學自2007年實施學程化，課程都規劃為21-27學分的模組以便跨修。本研究旨在探討實施課程學程化後學生的滿意度，並比較不同背景學生之滿意度差異。研究中採問卷調查法，並以自編滿意度問卷透過分層比例隨機抽樣獲得919份有效問卷，所得資料採描述統計、t檢定、變異數分析等方法分析，結論有七：1.課程學程化較能吸引學生跨修；2.學生對學程化整體滿意度屬中上，最滿意降低修讀成本；3.一二四年級滿意度高於三年級；4.管院學生滿意度高於人社學院；5.有跨修者特別滿意降低成本和模組特色；6.有跨修者對學程化評價高於未跨修者；7.理工、人社、民族、教育等院有跨修者修讀成本滿意度高於該院無跨修者。文末亦提建議供參考。

卓岳霖、鄭鈞文、蔡瑋中、賴常榮 (民98)，跨領域學程實施成效與運用模式之探討(以各校數位內容相關學程為例)，圖文傳播藝術學報，頁87-102。

在這個資訊科技日新月異的時代，為將人類文明的紀錄完整、長久的保存與傳承，世界各國無不致力於發展文化的數位化，而如何將人文與科技相融合，是各國亟欲努力的目標，其功能可運用在學術研究、商業、產業、出版、加值等方面。因此，政府機關近年來透過專案方式補助國內學術機構開設跨領域之學程，如台灣最高學府國立台灣大學於民96年就已開設了32個跨領域學程。數位內容相關學程也含括於跨領域學程在內，然而本研究團隊與本系修習過數位內容相關學程學生接觸過後，發現學生也未知學程習得技能是否能應用在未來工作上，因此引發本次探討跨領域學程實施成效與運用模式之契機。本研究旨在透過問卷方式彙整數位內容相關學程承辦行政人員與修習學生對學程之滿意度，也檢測此學程對於學生專業技能與未來就業幫助程度，日後也將提供學生及開辦行政機構參考之途。

王維旎、蔡秀美、陳怡華、郭書馨、Wang, Wei-ni、Tsai, Hsiu-mei、Chen, Yi-hua、Kuo, Shu-hsin (民100)，非正規教育學程認證制度之政策規劃與實施策略芻議，成人及終身教育學刊，頁67-106。

終身學習是二十世紀末延續到本世紀最重要的學習觀點與思潮，當終身教育與回流教育日益興盛之際，有關學習成就的資格認證與學歷證明問題也愈受到重視。我國於2006年11月起開始試辦非正規教育課程認證，透過該機制建構正規與非正規教育體制之間的橋樑，以落實終身學習。雖然本質上，課程認證具備認可個人學習、連結正規與非正規學習經驗等效益，但著重單一課程的教學內容認證，易忽略實際教學狀況與學習成果，也難以將所獲得的學分與其他學習經驗做系統性整合，加上參與課程認證的機構有限，使得我國非正規學習成就認證制度難以推展。本研究提出將非正規課程朝學程化發展的構想，利用文件分析法探討主要國家非正規學習成就認證制度的現況，並辦理焦點座談與公聽會以廣納意見，據此研擬我國非正規教育學程認證的實施辦法與途徑。最後本研究提出非正規教育學程認證制度朝授與終身學習學士學位、發展新興證照、與正規高等教育銜接，以及取得部分國家考試資格等方式發展之芻議，以為本研究之結論。

1.教育學程 (跨域之原型？)

題名：臺灣師資培育制度變遷之考察--師範院校、教育院系所培育機構的變革 

作者：曹仁德／梁忠銘   

書刊名：臺東師院學報 

卷期：13(下)

出版日期：2002

資料類型：期刊論文

台灣師資培育制度之發展，從1896 年起迄今已經超過一百年的歷史，因政治型態、教育目標等因素影響，使台灣師資培育制度顯現出特殊的時代背景與意義。若依近代政治因素來考量可區分成兩大時代，一為日本佔領時期（1895-1945 ）與回歸中華民國時期（1945~）。而在回歸中華民國政府之後又因社會變遷的需要，歷經數度的改革過程。理所當然每次的制度變革均有其他的社會、政治意涵和教育目標。整體來看我國在1994 年「師資培育法」修法以前，長期以來台灣的師資培育制度發展，受教育政策、政治型態及社會變遷的影響最大。日據時期如此，戒嚴時期亦是如此，為完成教育及政經目標，深深導引台灣師資培育之發展的脈絡。「師資培育法」頒布之後，改變傳統的師範教育體制及結構，確立我國多元化的師資培育制度。根據本法，師範大學及師範院校以外的一般大學,可申請設立教育系所及教育學程，加入培育高級中學、國民中小學至幼稚園教師的機構。往昔封閉一元化的師資培育模式，由開放多元化的師資培育制度所取代。師範校院不再享有「獨占」教育市場的特權，必須與一般大學一起角逐有限的師資需求。藉此，來自不同背景、經歷不同專業化領域的教師得以加入教學的任務，這種轉變可說是從特殊校園文化培育師範的方式，轉變成自由市場的競爭模式，其目的是期望整體教師素質的改善進而提昇教育品質。 但是在多元開放師資培育制度衝擊之下，原有師資培育的師範院校，遽然陷入不利困境，引起師生不安心情。師範院校雖力圖改變體質或轉型，卻又苦於缺乏資源。加上大學教育的全面鬆綁政策，師範校院將面臨更深且鉅的發展與轉型的競爭考驗。 雖然，教育部在師範院校轉型發展方向，以因應世界及台灣社會、政治、經濟的發展潮流，積極鼓勵師範院校進行校際合作、策略聯盟，或鼓勵同區域或性質可以互補的大學院校整合，以達到教育資源有效整合及提昇競爭力的目標。然而，面對師資培育多元之衝擊，現有之師範院校極應亟思如何面對時代潮流，化師資培育多元化之衝擊危機為轉機，讓師範校院悠久、優良的師資培育專業傳統，不在這個潮流中隱沒、消跡之時，有必要重新檢證我國師資培育制度之發展經緯，以正確構思因應之道。

題名：臺灣的政府與師資培育機構關係之探討--1980年代中期至今的變化 

作者：白惠芳

書刊名：新竹師院學報 

卷期：16

出版日期：2003

資料類型：期刊論文

本文試圖指出，雖然受到1980年代中期開始的政治自由化的衝擊，國民黨政府對師範校院的管制逐漸出現了某種程度的鬆動，但到了1990年代中期，在經濟成長轉緩的情況下，政府卻得以藉市場之名，重建合法的管制措施。也就是說，從1980年代中期至今，政府與師資培育機構的關係，基本上是由鬆動轉為重新介入管制。而原本期望大學校院的參與能減弱政府對師資培育的掌控的訴求，顯然落空了。這樣的現象，雖與政治經濟情勢的改變有關，但更重要的是，在以自由市場解除黨國干預成為主流論述的影響下，忽略了政府在市場機制的運作下所仍握有的操縱空間，而再度正當化政府的介入管制。

題名：大專生求學經歷與就業力關係 

作者：秦夢群  ／莊清寶 

書刊名：教育資料與研究 

卷期：94

出版日期：2010

資料類型：期刊論文

隨著高等教育學生數遽增及國際金融海嘯之影響，大專生就業問題已日益受到重視。本文以高等教育資料庫「2005學年度大學畢業後一年問卷調查」之資料，採用結構方程模式進行分析後發現：一，就業力之內涵包括就業所需之一般能力、專業知能、專業態度、及職涯規劃四個核心概念；二，「校系課程」及「課外經歷」皆對其就業力具有直接的預測效果（分別為0.34及0.19），且「校系課程」可再透過「課外經歷」對就業力產生間接的預測效果（0.18）。根據發現結果，本文建議大專校院及其系所需體認其對學生就業力負有重責大任，且應多鼓勵學生修習輔系、雙主修、學程及通識課程，並加強規劃遊學、社團、考取證照及提供工讀或實習機會等輔導措施，以有效協助學生提升就業力。

題名：大學生就業力發展之縱貫性分析：跨領域學程之探討

作者：蕭佳純 引用關係／陳雯蕙

書刊名：教育政策論壇

卷期：15:2=42 出版日期：2012 資料類型：期刊論文

摘要

自1990年代以來，就業力已經成為先進國家高度重視的青年政策議題，而提升 大學畢業生就業力也成為歐美高等教育改革的主要驅動力之一。本研究旨在探討大 學生就業力之成長模式，藉以分析修習跨領域學程對於大學生就業力的初始狀態和 成長速率的影響。為達成研究之目的，本研究採用次級資料庫，樣本以四次完全參 與台灣高等教育資料庫的11,346位大學生為分析對象，以階層線性模式進行跨層次 分析，再根據研究結果，獲致以下主要結論：一、大學生的就業力會隨時間而有正 向成長趨勢；二、跨領域學程對大學生就業力的初始狀態和成長速率，皆有顯著的 影響力。最後，依據上述研究發現，提出具體之建議，俾供大學生、大專院校、教 育行政機關及未來研究之參考。

題名：傳播科系學程制度規劃與反思：以南華大學傳播學系為例

作者：施伯燁

書刊名：傳播研究與實踐

卷期：11:1 出版日期：2021 資料類型：期刊論文

南華大學自2013年起推動課程革新，從「T型教育」延伸到「π型教育」，並推動課程學程化，旨在透過多元選課組合引導學生主動學習。本研究為瞭解學生實際學習經驗與意見，透過學生學習意見調查與專家座談，調查師生對課程學程化之意見。調查發現，課程革新主要關鍵在於如何規劃必修課程，如何建立與分類課程模組，如何銜接總整課程與實務應用等。因此，進一步提出深化與改善策略，包括重新整合與調整課程模組、減少修課與總整課程限制、強化產業連結與實務課程。本文認為課程規劃重點在於建立系所特色與定位、改變教學與學習主體、適應媒體產業與環境變遷，學程制度與課程規劃目的在於提高學習者的自主學習動機，而不只是追求特定媒介形式專業或就業技能。

關鍵詞：π型教育、自主學習、課程革新、課程學程化、學習經驗

尋找台灣味 隨筆記 社會學堅持之闕如

正當化拼裝，基於情感與生存之故；與拼裝的正當化，基於生存與創造之故。

　　今日閱讀《尋找台灣味》第一部份〈東南亞的台灣DNA　技術跨界〉的三篇文章，分別是練聿修的跨界台茶；雲冠仁的越洋去作台灣珍奶；於趙于萱的異地生根台灣味。大抵是談台商在東南亞，如何創造利基，使得規模化的茶葉生產，得以供給大眾巿場，基於「把賣不掉的茶，用配方技術（拼配，或者混茶）」，而能夠在味覺上突破精英巿場之限制，成就另類巿場典範之說；第三篇則是指巿場存在，味蕾先行，而在水災而產生的利益空缺下，台商如何順勢以認證農產品的姿態，打進大城巿的超巿通路。拼裝是歷史透視與研究者探問，才得以窺見之實質；在大眾巿場上，台味即是台味，但台味即是拼裝，並且是特定要求與品味之拼裝，以致於拼裝，乃是「拚妝」，為奮力妝點，以與他者區別之謂。在這樣的視角下，我們看見了台商們拚博的努力，但對於「污名政治」之回應，也只能點到為止，在各自場域裡努力。若回到社會學之視野觀之，在污名政治／盛名政治究竟如何在台茶／越南茶之間纏鬥，也可以再探究竟。當一面謂「拼配」之正當；另一面則固守「純粹」，正當與非正當化之鬥爭，在本文謂之劃界與跨界。但執著於地理之視角，而未見「時機之權宜」，此乃未見場域與互動之憾。

　　先求有，再求好，顯是作為鼓勵後進之作為。以理論焦慮為據，轉進實證田野考察，持「有」即是安頓。無被視為「無用」，空被視為「空洞」，而研究者成為被研究者之喉舌與代理人，此乃批判意識的缺席，也是當代知識分子之退卻，相對自主立場之喪失。為何必須堅持社會學的思考，為何必須堅持場域觀？因為希望能殺出基於多重視角，而非執於一偏之見之學術界的相對自主性。「科普」為名，自有貢獻；但「科學作為科學」，科學作為建構、贏得、爭來之物，仍不可輕易讓步。但究竟可以支撐多久？於是保持沉默，謂此偏執理念，仍不合時宜之謂。