[摘要] Can there be a Nietzschean sociology?.

Runciman, Walter G. (2000). Can there be a Nietzschean sociology?. European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 41(1), 3-21.

評述：這篇文章的重點，大概是說尼采可以視為社會學的社會學，幫助反省社會學的學科預設，甚至破除所謂知識份子以「清明」自恃的幻覺，這篇文章幹譙了韋伯〈學術作為一種志業〉的說法，基本上韋伯比較像戰士，只是偽裝成知識分子。其次，則是比較「格言」與「百科全書」式（或所謂教科書知識）帶來的洞察，格言大概類似四兩的炸藥（如尼采自述，我不是人，我是炸藥），去炸毀百科全書式的封閉樓層那樣的概念，而這個炸藥也可以幫助我們去炸尼采自身，尼采也有其盲點，重點是透過格言，帶入我們自身的立場與解釋，從我們自身的權能意志而戰那些過往的權能意志，使自己的自由精神得以炸裂昂揚。對於作者而言，若說真要有尼采的社會學的話，其必然建立在四個前提之上：(1)權力意志作為歷史動力(2)權力意志隨歷史社會脈絡而異(3)這些命題可能被人類用來解釋自身與他人之歷史(4)既然這些命題都是權力意志之產物，唯有座落於特定歷史與社會脈絡下，這些權力意志才能表達出來(p.9)作者的寫作並不流俗，有時會需要一點時間消化與閱讀，而不能草草讀過，但也因此常常有著洞見的火光。

本文目的： My aim is simply to answer the question: what sort of a sociology do we get if we (sociologists, that is) take Nietzsche's arguments about human history and psychology as seriously as we can? (p.3)

I.

兩種說法：（不可能有社會學／我們已經有了韋伯社會學）The first is to say that if you follow Nietzsche's arguments to their conclusion you cannot have a sociology of any kind at all. The second is to say that we already have a Nietzschean sociology to hand in the writings of Max Weber. (p.6)

知識是權能意志，但不意味著沒有知識。尼采的社會學的社會學，也可以是社會學。(p.7)

對作者而言，韋伯希望發現真正的社會學支配學說；而尼采則是從純心理學層面來探討權力意志的發展。(p.8)

（從兩篇演講與新教倫理來看，作者評價韋伯說不上是尼采主義者，因為）The  principal reason for which Weber's own sociology is, nevertheless,  uw-Nietzschean is that he remained too much both of a materialist and of a structural-functionalist in the broad sense in which most historical  and comparative sociologists have been and still are. (p.8)

一些論韋伯與尼采的文獻：
(6) Eugène Fleischmann, De Weber à  Nietzsche, Archives européennes de sociologie V  (1964), 190-238.  
(7) Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber. Essays in Reconstruction (tr. Tribe, London: Allen and  Unwin, 1988), Chapter 4: 'The Traces of  Nietzsche in the Work of Max Weber' (first  published in 1986 in the Jahrbuch der Akade  mie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen).  
(8) Robert Eden, Political Leadership and  Nihilism: a Study of Weber and Nietzsche  (Tampa: University of Southern Florida  Press, 1983), p.42.

II.

若有尼采的社會學，其將建立在四個前提之上：

(1)First, the 'will to power' is the driving force of history: it explains the observed outcome of human sociocultural evolution as nothing else does. 權力意志作為歷史動力

(2)Second, the will to power expresses itself differently in different historical and social contexts. (權力意志隨歷史社會脈絡而異)

(3)Third, these propositions apply to the explanation of human beings' own attempts to explain their history and impose their chosen explanations on one another. (這些命題可能被人類用來解釋自身與他人之歷史)

(4) Fourth, since these three propositions are themselves a product of the will to power, they can be assessed only by reference to the particular historical and social contexts in which the will to power has found expression. (既然這些命題都是權力意志之產物，唯有座落於特定歷史與社會脈絡下，這些權力意志才能表達出來) (p.9)

這些說法不否定真理，但否定真理的普遍性，而主張真理具備著關係性特質，是否為真，要仰賴社會歷史脈絡而定。

從權力意志的角度重新思考我們的科學（學科），那麼我們將會在政治、經濟、社會解釋之外，看到學者們如何以「非關利益」之名，將他們的利益暗嵌於對於世界的解釋過程中。　(Sociologists are neither forgers nor fantasists. But we  have now to see through new eyes the actions and motives not only of  political, economic and religious leaders, but of the scholars who study  them in the hope of realizing their supposedly disinterested ambition to  arrive at what they suppose to be 'the' truth; and from this it follows that  there is an inescapable constraint on the possibility of extending our  would-be wissenschaftlich discoveries about human history and psychology beyond a much narrower limit than the pedants, professors and  priests have hitherto persuaded themselves and the Volk who mistakenly  look up to them.) (p.10)

        唯有帶著權力意志之眼，我們才能自系譜學視角，看到百科全書式知識的權威及其隱藏的權力關係。（it leads to the conclusion that the minds of human beings, including not least professional practitioners of Wissenschaft, are full of ideas which  can first of all be exposed to view and then unmasked as illusions; and only from that conclusion, which is itself wissenschaftlich, does there follow the notion that the encyclopaedic professorial treatises on human history and psychology could be replaced to advantage by collections of aphorisms—unfashionable though even those of the 'masterly soul searcher' La Rochefoucauld have become. 〈HATH, 35,36〉） (P.10)

III.

格言作為對人類行為的觀察。但其價值卻被百科全書派詆毀。像是這樣的洞見，為什麼不能寫在社會學教科書裡呢？作者舉例說：

The Gay Science (§40): 'Oddly, submission to powerful, frightening, even terrible persons, like tyrants and generals, is not experienced as nearly so painful as is submission to unknown and uninteresting persons, which is what all captains of   industry are’.

作者回答說，為什麼像這類的洞見不能進入教科書？因為他們更重描述性，而不是解釋性。（The answer to these questions is that Nietzsche is right to see himself  as doing something other than what the conventional academic practi  tioners of the 'unnatural' sciences are doing. It is not only because of his own very personal just-so stories about the evolution of mankind and his own very idiosyncratic pronouncements about free spirits, supermen and eternal recurrences—to say nothing of his curious views about women or food. It is also because his aphorisms about the human condition, like those of the other aphorists whom he admires, are only  incidentally and in part hypotheses of cause and effect. They are more  descriptive than they are explanatory）(p.11)而且尼采希望讀者從自己的角度看見，而不是要求讀者從作者的角度來觀察（譬說說，他跑得更快了，因為他的腎上腺素增加了，這就是作者要求讀者觀察的角度）。

（說不存在無前提的假設，不意味著我們不能假設。而尼采的格式則像是維根斯坦所說的，幫助我們看見盲點的工具。）The function of a Nietzschean  aphorism, by contrast, is much more akin to what would be called in  Wittgensteinian terms the correction of 'aspect-blindness' in the  reader—including, it may well be, the inability which Wittgenstein  deplored to see that what the reader supposes to be a causal question is in  fact a conceptual one (14) (p.13)

(格言，與尼采的社會學的社會學) The recourse to aphorism is imposed on the would-be Nietzschean sociologist not as a retreat into either scepticism or  ubjectivism but as a  corollary of Nietzsche's sociology of sociology.能幫助知識份子除自身的魅（或所謂知識迷障）。 It is the least self deluding way of talking about the pursuit, distribution and exercise of  power in a world, including an intellectual world, which anyone of good  intellectual conscience must acknowledge to be a 'disenchanted'.

（尼采的支配理論，正是突顯了權力意志說在知識追求上之真誠）The implicit Lehre von den Herrschaftsgebilden is the  Entwicklungslehre of the will to power as it finds different expression in  different social contexts, most if not all of which either distort or repress what only a Nietzschean sociology can reveal to be its workings.社會學的分析，並不在社會學規則之外，我們都在權能意志之中，伴隨權能意志，運用權能意志而生。

（人類提出了自身無可反駁的錯誤→而且一直錯下去，如同分子生物學解釋遺傳）

To the reader who questions the grounds on which such a sociology lays claim  to a validity which rival sociologies are denied, Nietzsche's answer is  there in The Gay Science (§265) where he asks 'What then in the last  resort are the truths of mankind?' and replies 'They are the irrefutable  errors (unwiderlegbaren Irrtümer) of mankind. (p.14)

演化生物學對於權能意志的反駁（不是只有支配，還有合作，也是生物本能，也因而，所謂無法反駁的錯誤，這個說法，也適用在尼采自己所提的權能意志的觀點上）Sociology is still about structures of  power. But it is not all about the will to power. It is about the complex  and varying interplay between relations of domination and of cooperation in human institutions, communities and societies of different kind.

為什麼作者本人要寫這篇文章，因為要突顯所謂所謂的無可辯駁的錯誤，之所以無可辯駁，正是權力意志本身。而只能以權力交爭，來辯駁其並非無可辯駁。(p.16)

在《超越善惡》一書第192節，尼采說，我們已經習於說謊。作者用了這節，談社會學已不再檢視自身的基礎，而自以為真理。尼采，能夠幫助我們擁有自知之明。（s. A Lehre von den Herrschaftsgebilden, even if it goes no  further than to expose the Herrschaftsgebilden which are intrinsic to the  institutional practice of sociology itself, will to that extent have trans  cended successfully the 'premature hypotheses, the fictions, the good  stupid will to "believe", the lack of suspicion and patience' which he  says will be found by anyone who studies the historical development of  any individual Wissenschaft (BGE, §1）(p.17)

一旦引入了尼采的社會學，我們將看見知識場域內部的競逐，以及維持真誠(Wahrhaftigteit)的艱困。我們甚至可以說尼采的社會學與百科全書派的社會學，是相互依賴的鏡像。甚至連真誠本身，都是一種虛構，後尼采的社會學者，如何面配支配學說對於世界理念的解釋？（A post Nietzschean sociologist like Weber analyzing the pursuit, distribution  and exercise of power in human societies is accordingly to be likened not  to a post-Newtonian astrologer or post-Darwinian creationist so much  as to a post-Gödelian number theorist who struggles to prove new  theorems (and sometimes succeeds) in full awareness that if axiomatic set theory is consistent there are theorems which cannot be proved or disproved and that axiomatic set theory itself cannot be proved to be free of any possible contradiction. It is in this sense that a Lehre von der Herrschaftsgebilden can claim Wahrhaftigkeit even after conceding that  Wahrheit is an illusion.）　p.19

V.

尼采比起韋伯更誠實。韋伯在學術作為志業當中提到的真誠等諸條件，實際上是不可能實現的。（價值自由是防火牆，價值關聯說是掩蓋了權能意志之作用），而這些價伹關聯不會僅僅出現於社會科學，自然科學亦然（如畢達哥拉斯對數學之愛）。如同《善惡彼岸》187節所說，道德律令只是情緒性的命令手勢，不會再是別的什麼東西，也不會比較有價值。(p.20)雖然韋伯說承認價值多元論，但是面對他的競爭對手，他可是毫不留情地詆毀與攻擊，韋伯的舊教堂仍未倒塌，說一套作一套，是尼采可以幫助我們看到他的虛偽。人類歷史仍然是諸神爭戰的歷史（學術界亦不例外）。