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GM 114_1—Introduction—Course Explanation—Transcript Record Collaborative Software: Google Meet (for video recording), Good Tape (for transcription), and Google Gemini (for organization).
The Academic Essence of Nietzsche's Preface to On the Genealogy of Morality: A Study of Method, Polemics, and the Affirmation of Life
I. Introduction: The Premise of the Genealogical Inquiry
This report aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the philosophical foundations laid by Friedrich Nietzsche in the preface to his work, On the Genealogy of Morality (Zur Genealogie der Moral). According to the lecture's interpretation, this book is considered the most methodologically rigorous and clearly structured of Nietzsche's works, even more so than Beyond Good and Evil (Jenseits von Gut und Böse), making it a more suitable entry point for understanding his philosophy. The core task of the preface is not merely to trace the origins of morality, but to fundamentally question the "value" of moral prejudices themselves. Its opening line—"We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge"—sets the tone for the entire book, marking the beginning of a radical critique of knowledge, truth, and self-awareness.
On the Genealogy of Morality as an Entry Point to Nietzsche's Thought
The lecturer points out that Nietzsche himself recommended On the Genealogy of Morality as the key work for understanding his thought, as its line of argument is the clearest, providing readers with the methodological key to grasping his overall philosophy. This book is not a simple historical investigation of morality, but a philosophical act aimed at the "revaluation of all values" (Umwertung aller Werte).
The Core Question: The Value of Values
The analysis focuses on the fundamental question posed by Nietzsche: What is the value of the moral values we hold dear?. This question transcends traditional ethics' inquiry into "what is good," and instead asks: Do these revered value judgments serve the enhancement and flourishing of life, or do they signify life's decay and decline? This question constitutes the main tension and polemical core that runs through the entire book.
"We Are Unknown to Ourselves": The Dilemma of the Knower
The preface begins with the startling assertion, "We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge" (Wir erkennen uns nicht, wir Erkennenden). The lecturer interprets this not just as a statement about human ignorance, but as a profound critique of the "will to truth" (Wille zur Wahrheit) itself. The pursuit of truth, traditionally seen as selfless and noble, is, in Nietzsche's view, potentially a guise for weakness—a way of hiding behind the masks of objectivity and universality because one dares not openly declare one's own perspective and will.
This argument constitutes a clever subversion of the Socratic "I know that I know nothing." Socrates' ignorance is the starting point for objective truth, clearing the path by sweeping away false certainties. Nietzsche's assertion, however, reveals that the drive for knowledge is itself a symptom that alienates the knower from themselves. The act of knowing becomes an escape, absolving one from the more arduous tasks of self-creation and self-understanding. Where traditional philosophy posits the problem as a lack of external knowledge, Nietzsche reframes it as an internal alienation caused by the very tools of knowledge. In this view, the more we "know" in the traditional sense, the less we understand the will to power and the life force that drives us.
II. The Genealogical Method: Unearthing Power in the Roots of Morality
This chapter aims to elaborate on the "genealogical method" as the core analytical tool of On the Genealogy of Morality. This method is not merely about tracing origins; it is a critical practice designed to reveal the contingent, power-laden, and violent origins of moral concepts that we consider eternal and pure.
Genealogy as a "Family Tree" of Concepts
The lecturer employs a central metaphor, likening "genealogy" (Genealogie) to a family's "family tree" (家譜). This metaphor vividly illustrates that moral concepts, like family lineages, have a genealogy filled with power, selection, and forgetting. It is not a linear, harmonious process of development, but a historical field full of ruptures and struggles.
The Politics of Naming and Forgetting
The lecturer uses the example of the erasure of matrilineal descent in patriarchal naming systems—for instance, how the surnames of mothers and grandmothers are forgotten in the family lineage—to concretely illustrate the operation of the genealogical method. This example becomes a microcosm of the genealogical method, showing how seemingly neutral customs (like naming rules) actually contain profound historical power relations and political decisions about "who should be remembered" and "who should be forgotten."
From Custom to Categorical Imperative
The lecturer traces the historical solidification of the word "morality." Its etymological root, mores, simply means "customs" or "habits," which are inherently local and contingent. However, this concept was gradually elevated to the status of an absolute, universal law, a process that reached its zenith in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The task of genealogy is to reverse this process of abstraction, revealing the contingent historical customs hidden beneath the absolute law.
Behind this methodology lies the practice of genealogy as a fundamentally "anti-metaphysical" endeavor. It persistently historicizes and materializes abstract concepts. By constantly asking, "Whose choice was this?" and "Under what conditions did this concept emerge?", genealogy denies that any concept has a transcendent or ahistorical origin. The lecturer contrasts Nietzsche's historical investigation with the approach of theology or pure rationalism, which "looks for answers in a vacuum," highlighting this point. This method forces philosophy's perspective to shift from a vertical axis (truth originating from God or reason) to a horizontal axis (truth emerging from the "human, all too human" power struggles in history). Therefore, genealogy is not just about telling an "origin story"; it is a philosophical practice aimed at dismantling metaphysics. It demonstrates that every "truth" is rooted in a concrete, material history of power. It replaces the traditional question "What is truth?" with "What will to power has shaped this into truth?"
III. Polemics Against Predecessors: Nietzsche's Philosophical Battlefield
This section will systematically analyze Nietzsche's critiques of his philosophical predecessors in the preface, which form the polemical foundation of the entire book. The lecturer positions Nietzsche in direct confrontation with the dominant moral traditions of his time, aiming not just to refute but to diagnose the symptoms of the entire era.
Critique of Kantian Universalism
Deconstructing the Categorical Imperative
The lecturer details how Nietzsche views Kant's moral philosophy as a secularized version of Christian theology, rather than a triumph of pure reason. Nietzsche diagnoses the "priest's blood" (神父的血液) flowing in Kant's veins and argues that Kant merely replaced "God" with "Reason" as the source of the absolute moral command. This critique fundamentally shakes the claim of moral universality. In Nietzsche's view, the universal law that Kant presents as applicable to all rational beings is, in fact, merely the universalized expression of a specific type of will (namely, a weak, life-denying one).
Rejection of Schopenhauer's Pessimism and Morality of Compassion
The Problem of Mitleiden (Compassion)
The analysis here focuses on the critique of Arthur Schopenhauer's morality of compassion. The lecturer interprets the German word Mitleiden as "suffering with" (共同受苦). In Nietzsche's view, this is not a virtue but a symptom of nihilism—it does not overcome suffering but instead drags everyone into a shared misery, doubling the pain. This value originates from a state of life that can no longer affirm itself.
From Passive to Active Nihilism
The lecturer astutely points out the transformation in Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche takes up Schopenhauer's passive, pessimistic nihilism ("life is meaningless suffering") and pushes it to its extreme, thereby transforming it into an active nihilism. If everything is meaningless, then the assertion "everything is meaningless" must itself be meaningless. This "nihilism of nihilism" creates a value vacuum, a zero point, thereby opening up the possibility for the creation of new values.
Dismissal of the "English Psychologists" (Paul Rée)
Superficiality and Lack of Historical Depth
The report analyzes Nietzsche's critique of thinkers like Paul Rée. Although Rée was German, Nietzsche mockingly classifies him as an "English breed" (英國品種) to associate him with the ethical currents of utilitarianism and evolutionism. The lecturer explains that Nietzsche found their explanations of morality (e.g., "good" is what is useful to the community) to be naive, lacking historical sense and psychological depth. They failed to see the true origins of morality in power, cruelty, and
ressentiment.
Nietzsche's Method: Affirmation, Not Dialectical Negation
The lecturer here emphasizes a key methodological distinction: Nietzsche does not employ Hegelian dialectics (辯證法) to negate his opponents. He does not seek to produce a new synthesis by negating the old. Instead, he practices a method of "affirmation": he allows his opponent's view to exist as a symptom of a certain form of life, and then directly proposes a stronger, more life-affirming alternative. His goal is to open a new path, not to correct the old one. As the lecturer puts it: "I'm going to tell you, it can be this way over here".
Taken together, these critiques are not isolated academic disputes but form a coherent diagnosis of the "décadence" of modern European morality. Kant represents the decadence of reason (reason in service of slave morality), Schopenhauer represents the decadence of the will (the will turning against itself in compassion), and the English psychologists represent the decadence of the spirit (a flat, mediocre, herd-like view of humanity). Nietzsche's polemics are, in essence, a comprehensive pathology of the various ways in which the life force in modern philosophy has become diseased and turned against itself.
Comparative Analysis of Moral Philosophical Stances
IV. The Primacy of Life: Experience, Health, and the Will to Power
This chapter will shift from critique to an exposition of Nietzsche's affirmative philosophical project. It will synthesize the lecturer's points on Nietzsche's radical affirmation of bodily experience, his redefinition of "health" as a state of integrated power, and his view of "will" as the fundamental drive of all existence.
Bodily Experience vs. the Metaphysics of the Digital Age
The lecturer draws a sharp contrast: on one side, there is real, living "experience" (體驗), and on the other, the disembodied, abstract world of modern media and information, which he calls the "new metaphysics of the digital-analog age" (數位類比時代的新形上學). Using the example of watching adult films, the lecturer illustrates how such activities lead to a kind of mental self-gratification followed by exhaustion, contrasting this with the richness of direct, embodied, sensory life experience. This highlights Nietzsche's emphasis on affirming the body, desire (lust), and the senses as the locus of authentic experience.
Health as Wholeness and Unimpeded Force
The lecturer provides a key etymological insight, tracing the word "Health" back to a root meaning "whole" (Heil). The report extends this idea, clarifying that in Nietzsche's philosophy, "health" is not merely the absence of disease but a state of complete integration. In this state, an individual's will and actions flow unimpeded, unconstrained by internal conflict or the "morality that gets stuck in your throat" (卡在喉嚨的道德). In contrast, "illness" is experienced as a state of division, blockage, and foreignness.
The Will to Knowledge as a Form of the Will to Power
Here, the theme of knowledge from the preface's opening is connected to the core doctrine of the will to power. The lecturer explains that Nietzsche's own philosophical enterprise is driven by a powerful "will to knowledge". This is not a passive desire to receive truth, but an active, commanding will that seeks to interpret and dominate the world. For Nietzsche, all drives—including the drive for truth—are manifestations of the more fundamental "will to power" (Wille zur Macht): the intrinsic drive of all things to expand, overcome resistance, and discharge their strength.
The lecturer repeatedly emphasizes action, contrasting Nietzsche's thought with the "idle speculation" (空想) of past philosophers and using the protagonist of the popular culture work
Demon Slayer as an example of "thinking based on action" (基於行動的思考). This reveals a fundamental turn in Nietzsche's philosophy: philosophy is no longer a contemplative activity separate from life, but an interpretive tool embedded within the processes of living, acting, and "becoming" (
becoming). This resonates with the lecturer's point that Nietzsche, influenced by Darwinian thought, focuses on "becoming" rather than static "being". The ultimate test of a thought is not its abstract logical coherence, but its practical effect on the actor's capacity for action and vitality. Nietzsche's philosophy thus becomes a "performative" discipline, one that is "done" in the practice of life, not "thought" in the study. Its value is instrumental, measured by the degree to which it enhances an individual's power and agency in the world.
V. The Dionysian Spirit and the Art of Revaluation
The concluding section of this report will focus on the ultimate goal and spiritual temperament of Nietzsche's philosophical project. It will synthesize the lecturer's interpretation of the "Dionysian" (Dionysus) spirit as a new ethical symbol that transcends traditional morality and affirms life. It will also incorporate key methodological advice on how to read Nietzsche, framing the act of interpretation itself as a philosophical practice.
The Dionysian Spirit: In Opposition to the Christ on the Cross
The lecturer interprets Dionysus as a symbol representing joyous creation, ecstatic dance, the breaking of all norms, and the affirmation of life's eternal cycle. As the ultimate "amoral" or "immoral" figure, Dionysus stands in direct opposition to the Christian ideal of the suffering savior. He represents an ethic of "harvest" and "pleasure" to counter a morality of sin and redemption.
The Art of Reading: Rumination as a Philosophical Practice
Finally, this section will analyze the lecturer's key advice on "how" to read Nietzsche. His metaphor of "ruminating like a cow" (母牛一樣反芻) is not just a call for slow reading. It represents a specific art of interpretation: repeatedly examining the same aphorism in different contexts and from different angles, allowing its meaning to deepen over time. This stands in stark contrast to the hasty, superficial consumption of information in modern life.
The lecturer's final point implies that Nietzsche's text is not merely a set of doctrines to be learned, but a spiritual "training manual." Its aphoristic style and the demand for "ruminative" reading are intentional. They are designed to force the reader to develop the intellectual and spiritual strengths necessary for the revaluation of values in their own life—patience, perspectivism, interpretive intensity, and spiritual fortitude. Nietzsche's language is compared to a repeatedly forged blade , and the reader must learn the "art of interpretation". Thus, the act of reading is transformed from passive information reception into an active, disciplined practice. The form of the text mirrors its philosophical content: just as creating new values requires strength and effort, so too does understanding the text that calls for this action. The book itself is a "spiritual gymnasium" for future creators of value.
Conclusion: Legislating for Oneself
The analysis of this report culminates in a central idea: becoming one's own legislator ("legislating for our own greatness"). The entire genealogical project—from critiquing old values to affirming life—is ultimately a preparation for this final creative act. By clearing away the inherited moral rubble, Nietzsche, as interpreted by the lecturer, opens up a space for the individual to create and follow their own life-enhancing values.
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